

## Please Read: About This Document—Report to NIST on the Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Roadmap <sup>1</sup>

Under the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has “primary responsibility to coordinate development of a framework that includes protocols and model standards for information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and systems...” [EISA Title XIII, Section 1305]

In early 2009, responding to President Obama’s energy-related national priorities, NIST acted to accelerate progress and promote stakeholder consensus on Smart Grid interoperability standards. On April 13, NIST announced a three-phase plan to expedite development of key standards.

This document is input into the first phase: engaging utilities, equipment suppliers, consumers, standards developers and other stakeholders in a participatory public process to identify applicable Smart Grid interoperability standards, gaps in currently available standards and priorities for new standardization activities.

NIST awarded the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) a contract to engage Smart Grid stakeholders and develop a draft interim standards roadmap; NIST will use this document as a starting point in developing a NIST interim “roadmap” for Smart Grid interoperability standards. EPRI technical experts compiled and distilled stakeholder inputs, including technical contributions made at two EPRI-facilitated, two-day, public workshops. Other inputs include the accomplishments of six domain expert working groups established by NIST in 2008, and the cybersecurity coordination task group established in 2009. To date, hundreds of people have participated in the roadmapping process.

*This document contains material gathered and refined by the contractor using its technical expertise. This deliverable is not a formally reviewed and approved NIST publication. Rather, it is one of many inputs into the ongoing NIST-coordinated roadmapping process.*

NIST is now reviewing EPRI’s synthesis of stakeholder inputs received through the end of May 2009, as presented in this document. In addition, NIST is inviting public comment on the EPRI deliverable. A request for comments will be issued in the *Federal Register*. Comments can be submitted electronically to [smartgridcomments@nist.gov](mailto:smartgridcomments@nist.gov) or

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by mail to: George Arnold, 100 Bureau Drive, Stop 8100, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8100.

Along with this EPRI deliverable, NIST will review the comments received. By early fall, NIST intends to issue its Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Roadmap, which will set priorities for interoperability and cybersecurity requirements, identify an initial set of standards to support early implementation, and list plans to meet remaining standards needs.

For more information, go to: <http://www.nist.gov/smartgrid/>

# Report to NIST on the Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Roadmap

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June 17, 2009

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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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President Obama has made a smart electrical grid a key element of his plan to lower energy costs for consumers, achieve energy independence and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. A smart grid would employ real-time, two-way communication technologies to allow users to connect directly with power suppliers. The development of the grid will create jobs and spur the development of innovative products that can be exported.

The electricity grid can only get so smart without a framework for interoperability. This framework will identify a suite of standards that enable the integration of diverse technologies. The Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007 gave the U. S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) the “primary responsibility to coordinate development of a framework that includes protocols and model standards for information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and systems...”

This report provides an Interim Roadmap for the development of the Interoperability Framework. It describes the current status, issues, and priorities for interoperability standards development and harmonization. The report also describes the high-level architecture for the smart grid including a conceptual model, architectural principles and methods and cyber security strategies.

A broad range of stakeholders were engaged in the development of this Interim Roadmap. Over 1000 stakeholders participated in two workshops to achieve consensus on the critical standards and standards development activities needed for the Smart grid.

In section 1, this report provides a general overview of this project.

In section 2, this report summarizes the efforts to date to define the smart grid and describes the ongoing governance process that will be required to develop the smart grid.

Section 3 defines a conceptual model for thinking about the smart grid and its implementation. It discusses the architectural principles that will enable the smart grid to support new technologies and support new business models.

One can best understand interactions between the domains through looking closely at key cross-cutting applications. Section 4 of this report introduces the applications Automated Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Demand Response (DR), Plug-In Electric Vehicles (PEV), Cyber Security, Wide Area Situation Awareness (WASA), Market Communications, and Distributed Generation and Energy Storage (DG).

Section 5 discusses the security requirements of the smart grid. As the smart grid relies on business interactions as much as it does upon the physical processes of delivering electricity, security for the smart grid must consider interference or disruption of business communications as much as it does disruption of the delivery of electricity. Matters of identity and authorization are paramount, as are privacy and appropriate access concerns for handling personal information of customers.

Section 6 presents the near-term actions that NIST can take in advancing the Interoperability Framework. The highest priority actions include:

- Developing a common semantic model - NIST should work with the appropriate standards development organizations to form a common representation of information models for the smart grid
- Developing a common pricing model standard - NIST should work with the relevant standards development organizations to develop an approach for developing a common pricing model to traverse the entire value chain.
- Developing a common semantic model for advanced metering, demand response and electric transportation – NIST should coordinate the various industry activities to accelerate the development and adoption of a unified semantic model for these high-priority applications.
- Conducting an analysis to select Internet Protocol Suite profiles for smart grid applications - NIST should commission a group to perform a comprehensive mapping of smart grid application requirements to the capabilities of protocols and technologies in the Internet Protocol Suite to identify Internet protocol Suite subsets as important for various applications in the various smart grid domains.
- Investigating Communications Interference in Unlicensed Radio Spectrums - NIST should commission a group of experts to study the issue of communications interference in unlicensed radio spectrums for smart grid applications.
- Developing common time synchronization and management - NIST should work with the appropriate standards development organizations to develop or adopt application or role based time synchronization guidelines
- Coordinating efforts across Standards Development Organizations – NIST should coordinate cross-SDO efforts for harmonizing and extending their standards and addressing new standards requirements.

The Appendices to this report present a detailed guide to existing standards developed from the workshops and from expert opinion. It is not a cookbook; rather it outlines the issues, overlaps and gaps that exist in the current standards.

In undertaking these key actions and the many subsidiary actions that are identified in this report, NIST will help provide the Interoperability Framework needed to build the smart grid and meet President Obama's energy and environmental goals.



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# **1 Purpose and Scope**

## **1.1 Background**

This document is the result of a focused project that is a part of an overall mandate laid out in the Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) 2007 Federal Legislation. EISA states that NIST:

“...shall have primary responsibility to coordinate development of a framework that includes protocols and model standards for information management to achieve interoperability of smart grid devices and systems...”

As called out by EISA, NIST has solicited input and cooperation from key stakeholders, including, but not limited to, GridWise Architecture Council, the International Electrical and Electronics Engineers, the National Electric Reliability Organization recognized by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and National Electrical Manufacturer's Association.

The goals of Interim Roadmap project can be summarized as follows:

- Develop an Interim Roadmap that describes the high-level Smart Grid architecture, principles and interface design.
- Describe the current status, issues, and priorities for interoperability standards development and harmonization including an action plan that addresses these issues.
- Rapidly build consensus for the Interim Roadmap among the various Smart Grid stakeholders.

Everything already on the grid is legacy, and must be supported for years. Existing systems and components must be encapsulated and re-engineered to be compatible with new standards and new innovations. The most significant challenge of interoperability is, and will continue to be, interoperability with the installed legacy systems, while addressing interfaces between new and yet to be established devices, systems and domains constituting the Smart Grid.

This roadmap document identifies the short term and long term plans for Architecture Development and associated standards and infrastructure development for the Smart Grid. This draft distills a set of recommended processes and actions from individuals with broad experience in the utility and related industries working as part of the NIST Domain Expert Working Groups (DEWGS) and a focused document team from NIST and EPRI, along with a sequence of two workshops designed to discuss and inform the work by the direct involvement of hundreds of stakeholder participants.

The interim roadmap will identify a set of standards that can be applied directly in projects and as necessary further developed into a Smart Grid infrastructure. A set of standards actions and recommendations are included in chapter 6.

## **1.2 Context of this Document**

This document provides a context for assessing the status of standards and protocols for smart-grid-related information exchange. It identifies the issues in coordinating the development of a

## *1.0 Purpose and Scope*

framework that involves participation with and ownership by the principle stakeholders. It identifies an initial set of architecturally significant interfaces and their relationship to existing standards as defined primarily, by stakeholders engaged through workshops. It also identifies and prioritizes the interoperability standards activities required to support the integration of smart devices and systems in the electric system.

This document is divided into the following major sections:

### *1.0 Purpose and Scope*

### *2.0 Smart Grid Vision*

This section provides understanding as to what we consider to be the “Smart Grid”. It also gives insight into development planning and deployment of Smart Grid components including the associated organizational drivers, opportunities and challenges.

### *3.0 Smart Grid High-Level Architecture*

Here a conceptual model of the Smart Grid is presented that illustrates the landscape of applications across this extensive notion.

### *4.0 Smart Grid Applications Requirements*

Through Use Case analysis and using the priority functionalities identified by FERC, a set of example applications are investigated to expose key interfaces and requirements.

### *5.0 Cyber Security Requirements*

This section presents a high level view of critical infrastructure cyber security requirements for the Smart Grid.

### *6.0 Prioritized Actions and Timelines*

This section discusses the recommendations for resolving the gaps identified in the previous section.

## **1.3 NIST Role and Plans**

As the Nation’s measurement and standards institute, NIST is making a unique contribution to the establishment of the Smart Grid. Recognizing the benefit of focusing NIST’s technical expertise and industry-oriented mission on what is one of the Nation’s most pressing issues, Congress called on NIST in the **Energy Independence and Security Act (EISA) of 2007** to take a leadership role in ensuring an interoperable, secure, and open energy infrastructure that will enable all electric resources, including demand-side resources, to contribute to an efficient, reliable electricity network.

NIST is uniquely qualified to undertake this task because of its technical capability, industry knowledge, standards and testing expertise, and international influence. Ensuring interoperability of the Smart Grid requires the integration of technical expertise in numerous disciplines. NIST

## *1.0 Purpose and Scope*

brings 1) knowledge of the electric utility industry through its research in supporting measurement technology and testing; 2) expertise in advanced networking technology; 3) expertise in industrial controls and their interfaces to the electrical infrastructure; 4) expertise in the technology of buildings and their interfaces to the electric grid, and, of critical importance, 5) expertise in computer and network security. NIST has a long track record of working closely with industry and standards development organizations to develop consensus standards for use by industry, and where needed, for regulatory agencies. NIST has extensive experience in establishing testing and certification programs in critical areas including cyber security. Finally, NIST has strong presence and leadership in key international standards organizations and the ability to effectively represent U.S. interests in the international arena.

Responding to Congress's mandate, in 2008 NIST initiated a government/industry effort, in collaboration with the Department of Energy, to establish an Interoperability Framework and engage the many Smart Grid stakeholders in a more coordinated approach. NIST's effort was intensified in early 2009 and actions taken to accelerate progress toward industry consensus on Smart Grid standards. Once the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) judges that there is sufficient consensus, EISA instructs it to institute a rulemaking proceeding to adopt the standards and protocols that may be necessary to ensure that there is Smart Grid functionality and interoperability in interstate transmission of electric power, and in regional and wholesale electricity markets.

The priority that the Administration has placed on the Smart Grid in its plans to move the nation toward energy independence, coupled with the investments contained in the American Reinvestment and Recovery Act of 2009 to spur its development, demands that the development of standards be expedited.

In April 2009 NIST announced a 3-phase plan to fast-track the development of consensus on an initial suite of Smart Grid standards while establishing a robust framework for the longer-term development and evolution of additional standards. By year-end 2009, after engaging utilities, equipment suppliers, trade organizations, consumers, and others, NIST plans to:

1. Publish a report that documents stakeholder consensus on: the Smart Grid architecture, standardization priorities for securing and assuring the interoperability of Smart Grid components, an initial set of standards (Smart Grid Release 1), and a roadmap for addressing remaining standards needs.
2. Launch a formal public-private partnership to coordinate and facilitate development and evolution of additionally needed standards; and
3. Develop an overall plan for testing and certification to ensure that Smart Grid devices and systems conform to standards for both cyber security and interoperability.

The first phase of this program involves the development of the standards roadmap described in this document.

NIST has responded to the nation's priority to transition to the Smart Grid with a program that will expedite the development of key standards while providing a robust foundation for development and evolution of additional standards.



## **1.4 Summary of Interim Roadmap Project**

Over a thousand people have contributed to this effort. Hundreds of participants representing a wide variety of perspectives, including transmission & distribution, markets, storage, smart buildings, smart homes, business, finance, and policy makers. These stakeholders met in two Smart Grid roadmap workshops designed to identify existing candidate Smart Grid standards for today, and identify standards requirements, gaps, and issues for future Smart Grid interoperability. Hundreds more stakeholders have participated in the NIST Domain Expert Workgroups (DEWs) since last summer, contributing their expertise, and building consensus on standards priorities.

Some patterns emerged:

- A great deal of knowledge and experience is represented by the participants from varied perspectives.
- Each participant, typically, values and understands a small set of standards, which are often different from other stakeholders.
- Few participants have a detailed knowledge of a significant number of these standards.
- Participants with detailed understanding of one standard often do not have similar understanding of other standards.
- Preservation of existing assets and business processes based on adopted standards are often stronger drivers for standards selection than technical merit or enabling innovation.
- Not all stakeholders are necessarily represented, and the best path forward cannot be determined based on a simple vote, due to unbalanced representation.

These patterns make rapid consensus difficult. So, it is appropriate that these results be built upon through further analysis and refinement. NIST desires to accommodate existing technology while relying on technical experts that aid in successfully developing a standards roadmap to achieve an innovative smart grid.

The greatest benefit from the smart grid will be interoperability that will open up every aspect of the generation, distribution, and use of energy to innovation. Innovation will create change, and change will increase diversity. Diversity is always, and always will be, one of the greatest challenges not only to initial integration, but to maintenance management and to operational integrity of the grid.

Today's utilities manage risk and complexity and cost by limiting diversity. This drives the passion that binds one business to one standard and another to a second, creating conflict for interoperability across geographic and participant boundaries on the grid. These standards, and their often proprietary roots, limit diversity and so reduce complexity. Mere identification of standards "brands" through workshops such as these will not deliver interoperability.

The great challenge, then, for Smart Grid interoperability, and for the standards that support it, will be to support diversity and innovation. This requires loosely coupled standards that enable shallow integration of diverse technologies. These standards will support diversity of business

## *1.0 Purpose and Scope*

models through symmetry, transparency, and composition. These standards require enterprise-class cyber security at each interface. These standards are not ready today.

Deployments must be made, and will always be made, to meet today's business needs. Everything already in the field is based upon legacy standards interacting with legacy technology. There is no clear path to the future Smart Grid for every technology and every capital investment made in the past. Everything already in the field will require support for many years. Those technologies deployed next year, using next year's standards, will then also be part of the legacy environment, requiring support for many years. Encapsulation of existing systems for interoperation with the Smart Grid will remain a significant challenge.

## 2 Smart Grid Vision

This section presents a consensus derived from a variety of stakeholders on what a smart grid should be. It describes the destination for the technological and architectural paths that are described in this roadmap.

### 2.1 *What is the Smart Grid?*

The Smart Grid as defined here is based upon the descriptions found in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The term “Smart Grid” refers to a modernization of the electricity delivery system so it monitors, protects and automatically optimizes the operation of its interconnected elements – from the central and distributed generator through the high-voltage network and distribution system, to industrial users and building automation systems, to energy storage installations and to end-use consumers and their thermostats, electric vehicles, appliances and other household devices.

The Smart Grid will be characterized by a two-way flow of electricity and information to create an automated, widely distributed energy delivery network. It incorporates into the grid the benefits of distributed computing and communications to deliver real-time information and enable the near-instantaneous balance of supply and demand at the device level.

### 2.2 *Smart Grid Characteristics: Drivers and Opportunities*

The definition of the smart grid builds on the work done in EPRI’s IntelliGrid [2] program, in the Modern Grid Initiative (MGI) [8], and in the GridWise Architectural Council (GWAC) [6]. These considerable efforts have developed and articulated the vision statements, architectural principles, barriers, benefits, technologies and applications, policies, and frameworks that help define what the Smart Grid is. This section describes some of these widely accepted principle characteristics that will be the basis for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century grid we are striving to achieve.

#### 2.2.1 Smart Grid Benefits

Smart Grid benefits can be categorized into 5 types:

- **Power reliability and power quality.** The Smart Grid provides a reliable power supply with fewer and briefer outages, “cleaner” power, and self-healing power systems, through the use of digital information, automated control, and autonomous systems.
- **Safety and cyber security benefits.** The Smart Grid continuously monitors itself to detect unsafe or insecure situations that could detract from its high reliability and safe operation. Higher cyber security is built in to all systems and operations including physical plant monitoring, cyber security, and privacy protection of all users and customers.
- **Energy efficiency benefits.** The Smart Grid is more efficient, providing reduced total energy use, reduced peak demand, reduced energy losses, and the ability to induce end-user use reduction instead of new generation in power system operations.
- **Environmental and conservation benefits.** The Smart Grid is “green”. It helps reduce greenhouse gases (GHG) and other pollutants by reducing generation from inefficient

## 2 IBSmart Grid Vision

energy sources, supports renewable energy sources, and enables the replacement of gasoline-powered vehicles with plug-in electric vehicles.

- **Direct financial benefits.** The Smart Grid offers direct economic benefits. Operations costs are reduced or avoided. Customers have pricing choices and access to energy information. Entrepreneurs accelerate technology introduction into the generation, distribution, storage, and coordination of energy.

### 2.2.2 Stakeholder Benefits

The benefits from the Smart Grid can be categorized by the three primary stakeholder groups:

- **Consumers.** Consumers can balance their energy consumption with the real time supply of energy. Variable pricing will provide consumer incentives to install their own infrastructure that supports the Smart Grid. Smart grid information infrastructure will support additional services not available today.
- **Utilities.** Utilities can provide more reliable energy, particularly during challenging emergency conditions, while managing their costs more effectively through efficiency and information.
- **Society.** Society benefits from more reliable power for governmental services, businesses, and consumers sensitive to power outage. Renewable energy, increased efficiencies, and PHEV support will reduce environmental costs, including carbon footprint.

A benefit to any one of these stakeholders can in turn benefit the others. Those benefits that reduce costs for utilities lower prices, or prevent price increases, to customers. Lower costs and decreased infrastructure requirements ameliorate social justice concerns around energy to society. Reduced costs increase economic activity which benefits society. Societal benefits of the Smart Grid can be indirect and hard to quantify, but cannot be overlooked.

Other stakeholders also benefit from the Smart Grid. Regulators can benefit from the transparency and audit-ability of Smart Grid information. Vendors and integrators benefit from business and product opportunities around Smart Grid components and systems.

### 2.2.3 Modern Grid Initiative Smart Grid Characteristics

For the context of this section, characteristics are prominent attributes, behaviors, or features that help distinguish the grid as “smart”. The MGI developed a list of seven behaviors that define the Smart Grid. Those working in each area of the Smart Grid can evaluate their work by reference to these behaviors. These behaviors match those defined by similar initiatives and workgroups.



Figure 1 – MGI's Principle Characteristics are part of their Smart Grid system vision for measuring success

The behaviors of the Smart Grid as defined by MGI are:

- **Enable Active Participation by Consumers.** The Smart Grid motivates and includes customers, who are an integral part of the electric power system. The smart grid consumer is informed, modifying the way they use and purchase electricity. They have choices, incentives, and disincentives to modify their purchasing patterns and behavior. These choices help drive new technologies and markets.
- **Accommodate All Generation and Storage Options.** The Smart Grid accommodates all generation and storage options. It supports large, centralized power plants as well as Distributed Energy Resources (DER). DER may include system aggregators with an array of generation systems or a farmer with a windmill and some solar panels. The Smart Grid supports *all* generation options. The same is true of storage, and as storage technologies mature, they will be an integral part of the overall Smart Grid solution set.
- **Enable New Products, Services, and Markets.** The Smart Grid enables a market system that provides cost-benefit tradeoffs to consumers by creating opportunities to bid for competing services. As much as possible, regulators, aggregators and operators, and consumers can modify the rules of business to create opportunity against market conditions. A flexible, rugged market infrastructure exists to ensure continuous electric service and reliability, while also providing profit or cost reduction opportunities for market participants. Innovative products and services provide 3<sup>rd</sup> party vendors opportunities to create market penetration opportunities and consumers with choices and clever tools for managing their electricity costs and usage.
- **Provide Power Quality for the Digital Economy.** The Smart Grid provides reliable power that is relatively interruption-free. The power is “clean” and disturbances are minimal. Our global competitiveness demands relatively fault-free operation of the digital devices that power the productivity of our 21<sup>st</sup> century economy.

- **Optimize Asset Utilization and Operate Efficiently.** The Smart Grid optimizes assets and operates efficiently. It applies current technologies to ensure the best use of assets. Assets operate and integrate well with other assets to maximize operational efficiency and reduce costs. Routine maintenance and self-health regulating abilities allow assets to operate longer with less human interaction.
- **Anticipate and Respond to System Disturbances (Self-heal).** The Smart Grid independently identifies and reacts to system disturbances and performs mitigation efforts to correct them. It incorporates an engineering design that enables problems to be isolated, analyzed, and restored with little or no human interaction. It performs continuous predictive analysis to detect existing and future problems and initiate corrective actions. It will react quickly to electricity losses and optimize restoration exercises.
- **Operate Resiliently to Attack and Natural Disaster.** The Smart Grid resists attacks on both the physical infrastructure (substations, poles, transformers, etc.) and the cyber-structure (markets, systems, software, communications). Sensors, cameras, automated switches, and intelligence are built into the infrastructure to observe, react, and alert when threats are recognized within the system. The system is resilient and incorporates self-healing technologies to resist and react to natural disasters. Constant monitoring and self-testing are conducted against the system to mitigate malware and hackers.

### 2.3 Smart Grid Challenges

The Smart Grid poses many procedural and technical challenges as we migrate from the current grid with its one-way power flows from central generation to dispersed loads, toward a new grid with two-way power flows, two-way and peer to peer customer interactions, and distributed generation. These challenges cannot be taken lightly – the Smart Grid will entail a fundamentally different paradigm for energy generation, delivery, and use.

#### 2.3.1 Procedural Challenges

The procedural challenges to the migration to a smart grid are enormous, and all need to be met as the Smart Grid evolves:

- **Broad Set of Stakeholders.** The Smart Grid will affect every person and every business in the United States. Although not every person will participate directly in the development of the Smart Grid, the need to understand and address the requirements of all these stakeholders will require significant efforts.
- **Complexity of the Smart Grid.** The Smart Grid is a vastly complex machine, with some parts racing at the speed of light. Some aspects of the Smart Grid will be sensitive to human response and interaction, while others need instantaneous, automated responses. The smart grid will be driven by forces ranging from financial pressures to environmental requirements.
- **Transition to Smart Grid.** The transition to the Smart Grid will be lengthy. It is impossible (and unwise) to advocate that all the existing equipment and systems to be ripped out and replaced at once. The smart grid supports gradual transition and long coexistence of diverse technologies, not only as we transition from the legacy systems

and equipment of today, but as we move to those of tomorrow. We must design to avoid unnecessary expenses and unwarranted decreases in reliability, safety, or cyber security.

- **Ensuring Cyber Security of Systems.** Every aspect of the Smart Grid must be secure. Cyber security technologies are not enough to achieve secure operations without policies, on-going risk assessment, and training. The development of these human-focused procedures takes time—and needs to take time—to ensure that they are done correctly.
- **Consensus on Standards.** Standards are built on the consensus of many stakeholders over time; mandating technologies can appear to be an adequate short cut. Consensus-based standards deliver better results over.
- **Development and Support of Standards.** The open process of developing a standard benefits from the expertise and insights of a broad constituency. The work is challenging and time consuming but yields results more reflective of a broad group of stakeholders, rather than the narrow interests of a particular stakeholder group. Ongoing engagement by user groups and other organizations enables standards to meet broader evolving needs beyond those of industry stakeholders. Both activities are essential to the development of strong standards.
- **Research and Development.** The smart grid is an evolving goal; we cannot know all that the Smart Grid is or can do. The smart grid will demand continuing R&D to assess the evolving benefits and costs, and to anticipate the evolving requirements.

### 2.3.2 Technical Challenges to Achieving the Smart Grid

Technical challenges include the following:

- **Smart equipment.** Smart equipment refers to all field equipment which is computer-based or microprocessor-based, including controllers, remote terminal units (RTUs), intelligent electronic devices (IEDs). It includes the actual power equipment, such as switches, capacitor banks, or breakers. It also refers to the equipment inside homes, buildings and industrial facilities. This embedded computing equipment must be robust to handle future applications for many years without being replaced.
- **Communication systems.** Communication systems refer to the media and to the developing communication protocols. These technologies are in various stages of maturity. The smart grid must be robust enough to accommodate new media as they emerge from the communications industries and while preserving interoperable, secured systems.
- **Data management.** Data management refers to all aspects of collecting, analyzing, storing, and providing data to users and applications, including the issues of data identification, validation, accuracy, updating, time-tagging, consistency across databases, etc. Data management methods which work well for small amounts of data often fail or become too burdensome for large amounts of data—and distribution automation and customer information generate lots of data. Data management is among the most time-consuming and difficult task in many of the functions and must be addressed in a way that will scale to immense size.

- **Cyber Security.** Cyber security addresses the prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and, if needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems and services (and the information contained therein) to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
- **Information/data privacy.** The protection and stewardship of privacy is a significant concern in a widely interconnected system of systems that is represented by the Smart Grid. Additionally, care must be taken to ensure that access to information is not an all or nothing at all choice since various stakeholders will have differing rights to information from the Smart Grid.
- **Software applications.** Software applications refer to programs, algorithms, calculations, and data analysis. Applications range from low level control algorithms to massive transaction processing. Application requirements are becoming more sophisticated to solve increasingly complex problems, are demanding ever more accurate and timely data, and must deliver results more quickly and accurately. Software engineering at this scale and rigor is still emerging as a discipline. Software applications are at the core of every function and node of the Smart Grid.

### 2.3.3 Government drivers: Planning Assumptions

The Smart Grid is vital component of President Obama’s comprehensive energy plan, which aims to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil, create jobs, and help U.S. industry lead in the global race to develop and apply clean energy technology. The President has set ambitious short and long-term goals, necessitating quick action and sustained progress in implementing the components, systems, and networks that will make up the Smart Grid.

For example, the President’s energy policies are intended to double renewable energy generating capacity, to 10 percent, by 2012—an increase in capacity that is enough to power 6 million American homes. By 2025, renewable energy sources are expected to account for 25 percent of the nation’s electric power consumption.

The American Recovery and Investment Act includes \$11 billion in investments to “jump start the transformation to a bigger, better, smarter grid.”<sup>1</sup> These investments and associated actions to modernize the nation’s electricity grid will result, for example, in more than 3,000 miles of new or modernized transmission lines and 40 million “smart meters” in American homes.<sup>2</sup> In addition, progress toward realization of the Smart Grid will contribute to accomplishing the President's goal of putting one million plug-in hybrid vehicles on the road by 2015.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> “The American Reinvestment and Recovery Plan—By the numbers,” [http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/recovery\\_plan\\_metrics\\_report\\_508.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/recovery_plan_metrics_report_508.pdf).

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “President Obama Announces \$2.4 Billion in Funding to Support Next Generation Electric Vehicles.” March 19, 2009.



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Over the long term, the integration of the power grid with the nation's transportation system has the potential to yield huge energy savings and other important benefits.

A Department of Energy study found that the idle capacity of today's electric power grid could supply 70 percent of the energy needs of today's cars and light trucks without adding to generation or transmission capacity—if the vehicles charged during off-peak times.<sup>4</sup> Estimates of associated potential benefits include:

- Displacement of about half net oil imports;
- Reduction in U.S. carbon dioxide emissions by about 25 percent; and
- Reductions in emissions of urban air pollutants of 40 percent to 90 percent.

While the transition to the Smart Grid may unfold over many years, incremental progress along the way can yield significant benefits. In the United States, electric-power generation accounts for about 40 percent of human-caused emissions of carbon dioxide, the primary greenhouse gas.<sup>5</sup> If the current power grid were just 5 percent more efficient, the resultant energy savings would be equivalent to permanently eliminating the fuel consumption and greenhouse gas emissions from 53 million cars.<sup>6</sup>

President Obama has called for a national effort to reduce, by 2020, the nation's greenhouse gas emissions to 14 percent below the 2005 level and to about 83 percent below the 2005 level by 2050.<sup>7</sup> Reaching these targets will require an ever more capable Smart Grid with end-to-end interoperability.

Progress in developing the Smart Grid will strongly and broadly support the Administration's policies to advance energy and climate cyber security, while promoting economic recovery efforts. Specifically, steps toward realizing of the Smart Grid will help to:<sup>8</sup>

- Create new jobs in a "clean energy economy" by spurring development of new green manufacturing opportunities,
- Promote U.S. competitiveness in the global economy,
- Enable and foster innovation in next-generation energy technologies;

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<sup>4</sup> M. Kintner-Meyer, K. Schneider, and R. Pratt, "Impacts Assessment of Plug-in Hybrid Vehicles on Electric Utilities and Regional U.S. Power Grids." Part 1: Technical Analysis. Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, 2006.

<sup>5</sup> Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy, "U.S. Carbon Dioxide Emissions from Energy Sources, 2008 *Flash Estimate*." May 2009.

<sup>6</sup> U.S. Department of Energy, *The Smart Grid: an Introduction*.

<sup>7</sup> Office of Management and Budget, *A New Era of Responsibility, Renewing America's Promise*. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 2009.

<sup>8</sup> Citation from: FACT SHEET: President Obama Highlights Vision for Clean Energy Economy, April 22, 2009, [http://www.whitehouse.gov/the\\_press\\_office/Clean-Energy-Economy-Fact-Sheet](http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Clean-Energy-Economy-Fact-Sheet)

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- Break U.S. dependence on oil by promoting development of the next generation of cars and trucks and the alternative fuels that will power them;
- Enhance U.S. energy supplies through responsible development of domestic renewable energy, fossil fuels, advanced biofuels and nuclear energy;
- Promote energy efficiency and reduce energy costs in the transportation, electricity, industrial, building and agricultural sectors; and.
- Develop an economy-wide emissions reduction program to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and secure the greatest benefits at the lowest cost for families and businesses.

### **2.4 The Initial Project Application Areas**

The Roadmap development process maintains that new applications and extensions to existing systems need to be developed across the scope of the Smart Grid. These include many new areas that need to be further developed across all the major domains. This project is meant to serve as a set of directions and an interim roadmap to the future. To this end a limited set of initial applications are selected as examples that can be worked through within the timeframe of this initial interim roadmap and the series of workshops planned to augment its development. The initial focus of the roadmap is on applications identified as higher priority by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) in its Proposed Smart Grid Policy [11] released for comments on March 19, 2009. We note here that development solely in these priority areas is not sufficient enough to meet fully the needs and goals of the Smart Grid Architecture.

These areas are introduced here and more extensively described in Chapters 4, 5, and 6.

FERC identified four (4) Smart Grid functional priorities that include:

1. Wide Area Situational Awareness
2. Demand Response
3. Electricity Storage
4. Electric Vehicles

Additionally, the team pursued two additional categories of applications:

5. Distribution Grid Management Initiatives
6. Advanced Metering Infrastructure

### **2.5 The Landscape of the Smart Grid Roadmap**

Although the final destinations of the smart grid roadmap are not known, much that is needed on the way there is. Requirements must continue to be developed. Standards that allow interoperation and innovation must be ready. The business processes of today and tomorrow must be supported. Development of the tools and work force that will build and maintain the smart grid must be pursued.

The Smart Grid effort is unprecedented in its scope and breadth. It will demand unprecedented levels of cooperation to achieve. Along the way, solutions must be developed for each of the issues in this section.

### **2.5.1 Requirements Must Be Mature**

Requirements that lay out the functions and applications of the Smart Grid are foundational to the Smart Grid. Requirements define what the Smart Grid is and does. The following are some of the key requirements destinations:

- Industry policies and rules of governance are well developed, mature, and can be consistently applied.
- Requirements are well-developed by domain experts and well documented following mature systems-engineering principles.
- Requirements define support for applications and are well developed enough to support their management and cyber security as well.

### **2.5.2 Well-Developed Standards Are in Place**

Standards are critical to enabling interoperable systems and components. Mature, robust standards are the foundation of mature markets for the millions of components that will have a role in the future Smart Grid. Standards enable innovation where components may be constructed by thousands of companies. They also enable consistency in systems management and maintenance over the life-cycles of components. Metrics can be further developed around the following:

- Open stable and mature industry-level standards developed in consensus processes from standards development organizations (SDOs) are available.
- Standards are integrated and harmonized with complementing standards across the utility enterprise through the use of an industry architecture that documents key points of interoperability and interfaces.
- The standards were thoroughly evaluated both from focused technical review as well as through the development of reference designs and implementations that were subsequently tested rigorously.
- Standards are robust and can be extended as necessary to meet future requirements and applications as needs arise.
- There is a mechanism in place such as a user group to support and evolve the definition of the standard as the requirements of the stakeholders evolve.
- Standards conformance testing suites are thorough and are complemented with interoperability and performance testing suites.

### 2.5.3 Mature Architectures Guide Development

Architectures define how systems and components interact. Architectures assist in technical and management governance and direct ongoing development work. Architectural concepts integrate technical and non technical features and components of systems. Each domain within the Smart Grid may have its own architecture or architectures.

The architectures of the Smart Grid must be well defined, well documented and robust. Desired attributes of architectures for the Smart Grid include:

- Architecture artifacts include well-defined interfaces across industries external to the utility industry.
- Modern system-modeling tools and techniques are used to manage the documentation and complexity of the system.
- Architectural interfaces are well-defined. Each architectural element must be appropriate for the applications which reside within it. The architectures must support development of massively scaled, well-managed and secure networks with life-spans of 30 years or more.
- The infrastructure supports third party products that are interoperable and can be integrated into the management and cyber security infrastructures.

### 2.5.4 Support Infrastructure must be Ready

Each application, technology, and architecture requires its own support infrastructure. Not only must each be well defined, documented and implemented, but the necessary economic and societal structures must be in place to support their use. These include:


- Up-to-date system-modeling tools to manage the documentation and complexity of the system.
- Multiple vendors are able to produce interoperable components.
- Workforces are educated and can support all aspects of the lifecycle of Smart Grid systems.
- Educational resources are in place to support workforce development and renewal<sup>9</sup>.
- Well defined specification and requirements documents for procurement of smart grid components.

### 2.5.5 Smart Grid Networking

The Smart Grid is a network of networks. That is, many networks with various ownership and management boundaries are interconnected to provide end to end services between stakeholders and in and among intelligent electronic devices (IEDs).

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<sup>9</sup> Pervasive Security and Complex Systems Architecture are two areas of education that will require particular ongoing development and attention.



**Figure 2 – Smart Grid Networks for Information Exchange**

Figure 2 is a high level view of the information network for the Smart Grid. It handles the two-way communication between the network end points residing in their respective domains. By domain, here, we mean the unique distributed computing environments in which communicating end points can be found (see Figure 3 – Smart Grid Conceptual Model – Top Level in the next section). Thus, any domain application could communicate with any other domain application via the information network, subject to the necessary network access restrictions and quality of service requirements<sup>10</sup>.

The applications in each domain are the end points of the network as shown on the top and bottom of Figure 2. For example, an application in the Customer domain could be a smart meter at the customer premise; an application in the Transmission domain could be a phasor measurement unit (PMU) unit on a transmission line or in a Distribution domain at a substation; an application in the Operation domain could be a computer or display system at the operation center. Each of these applications has a physical communication link with the network. The smaller clouds within the network represent sub-networks that may be implementing unique functionality. The networking function in the Operations, Market, Service Provider domains may not be differentiable from normal information processing networks; therefore no unique clouds are illustrated.

• <sup>10</sup> Note the concept of domains is expanded and detailed in subsequent sections of this document.

## *2 IBSmart Grid Vision*

This information network may consist of multiple interconnected networks as shown in Figure 2, where two backbone networks, A and B are illustrated. The physical links within these two networks and between the network and the network end points could utilize any appropriate communication technology currently available or yet to be developed in the future.

Additional requirements for the information network are as follows:

- management functionality for network status monitoring, fault detection, isolation, and recovery,
- secure protocols to protect Smart Grid information in transit and authenticate infrastructure components,
- cyber security countermeasures,
- addressing capability to entities in the network and devices attached to it,
- routing capability to all network end points,
- quality of service support for a wide range of applications with different latency and loss requirements.

### **2.6 Smart Grid Interoperability Standards Governance**

The Smart Grid is recognized as a key strategic infrastructure needed for consumers, utilities, service providers, operators and the country. Whether Smart Grid deployments are being driven by legislative and regulatory policies, realizing operational efficiencies, or creating customer value, the motivation and pressure to produce has caused the industry to perform Smart Grid implementations in fragmented efforts with limited or no stakeholder coordination or agreed-upon standards. As the technology and interoperability standards mature and gain consensus, some early adopters may be faced with “sunk costs” or, at the very least, some serious integration and interoperability issues going forward.

According to a recent article in SmartGridNews.com authored by the Open Smart Grid Subcommittee and the Utility Smart Grid Executive Working Group, there are three challenges facing broad Smart Grid standards adoption [9]:

1. The large number of stakeholders, different considerations, number and complexity of standards available (and missing) requires a more formal nationally-driven governance structure.
2. Since Smart Grid efforts are underway, and in some cases complete, standards adoption must consider work already completed and underway.
3. Interoperability discussions and definitions should be expanded to focus on standards across systems (inter-system) rather than just within systems (intra-system).

A governance model for standards would accelerate the implementation of a secure, intelligent, interoperable, and a fully-connected smart grid. Early identification and development of standards for interoperability and for device specification will ensure that pending deployments will offer lasting and extensible value.

## *2 IBSmart Grid Vision*

NIST will nurture a governance process to identify and guide the development of smart grid standards. Many of the foundational standards for the Smart Grid already exist. Organizations including the GridWise Architecture Council (GWAC), and Open Smart Grid (OpenSG) Subcommittee of the Utility Communications Architecture International Users Group (UCAIug) have already created wide awareness, engaged a large cross-section of the stakeholders, and begun identifying and refining interoperability standards.

Ongoing governance of smart grid standards should include key stakeholder representatives, including:

- Utilities
- RTOs, ISOs, and aggregators.
- Equipment suppliers and systems developers from each domain of the Smart Grid.
- Consumer advocates
- Information technology and e-commerce
- Standards organizations
- User groups
- Industry technical advisory workgroups
- New market participants as they are identified

The governance process:

- Promotes participation, openness, accountability, and transparency
- Ensures balanced stakeholder representation for voting actions
- Prioritizes standards development and adoption based on consensus and value
- Encourages inclusion, open participation, and early publication to provide transparency of efforts and to encourage collaboration among stakeholders.
- Publishes deliberations and standards selection criteria early and often for free-of-charge public web access to ensure the process is open, unbiased, and fully documented.
- Meets in publicly announced summits and workshops in diverse locations to encourage easy participation of all stakeholders, interested parties.
- Documents decisions and results from all workshops and summits for timely publishing in a free public location.

## 3 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

This Section provides a conceptual model for discussing the Smart Grid. The Smart Grid is a system of systems, each with its own architecture. The high level conceptual model will define the principles, cyber security strategies, and methodologies that will be used in developing the architectures of the domains. Compliance with the architectural principles will assure that the domains that comprise the Smart Grid will work together effectively and efficiently.

### 3.1 Principles

As we define the Smart Grid architecture we must evaluate each substantive decision against the core principles: “Does what we’re doing enable markets? Motivate and include the customer? Optimize assets and operate efficiently?”<sup>11</sup> The GridWise Architecture Council[6] (GWAC) has developed a framework for understanding interoperability and interfaces, notably in the Interoperability Constitution [5] and the “GWAC Stack.” These provide the business, policy, and technology context for developing the Smart Grid.

A critical goal of the Smart Grid is to enable new technologies and support new business models, just as the Internet generated new technologies and business models a decade ago, and just as it continues to do today. Like the Internet, the Smart Grid is a system of systems that embraces diversity of technology, operators, and connection. The composition of these systems will change as technology evolves, generating new businesses and new interactions. To support this generative quality, the systems of the Smart Grid must not demand great intimacy with each other—they must interact with each other using minimum amounts of mutual information. This approach requires:

- *Loose coupling* is a design tenet for scalable, high performance architectures, used in enterprise software and device component design today. Loose coupling helps create a scalable platform on which genuine, valid bilateral and multilateral transactions can occur without elaborate pre-arrangement in each instance.<sup>12</sup>
- *Layered systems* exist all around us—standards to browse a web site form several distinct layers with separation of function and loose coupling. We can think of layers as a collection of conceptually similar functions that provides services to the layer above and receives services from the layer below. Understanding and applying layering helps avoid placing unnecessary restrictions on one layer because of the implementation of adjacent layers.
- *Shallow integration*, driven by the requirement for *minimum knowledge*, extends the reach of each standard, and enhances the value of composition. The market operations and load curtailment for (say) electricity and natural gas might be the same. Management,

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<sup>11</sup> Adapted from the Modern Grid Strategy, Department of Energy

<sup>12</sup> Note that while this is true for the general case, for critical infrastructure controls, tight coupling will often be required.



### 3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

discovery or profiling of components may avoid deep knowledge of the managed or configured components.

For the evolving Smart Grid, each interface must also honor the principles of *symmetry*, *transparency*, and *composition* while addressing management and *cyber security*:

- *Symmetry* is the principle that each action can run both ways: buyers of power at one moment can be sellers at the next. Symmetry is a fundamental characteristic of Net Zero Energy buildings. Integrating Distributed Energy Resources need attention to symmetry for energy flow and management.
- *Transparency* goes hand in hand with symmetry and the emergence of options in every market. Do you want to buy a certain class of power as part of a carbon strategy, in a multiparty marketplace? There needs to be a transparent and auditable chain of transactions showing that the markets actually cleared in each class of power.
- *Composition*, the building of complex interfaces from simpler interfaces, enables diversity. Composition enables interoperation among diverse, multi-sourced, multiplatform devices and data. We cannot demand universal database models to proceed; and if we had such models they would be a barrier to innovation. For example, standards for metering can be separated from those for bidding and negotiations. As long as the model and each standard are scalable and designed for upward compatibility, pairs of actors can use only the subsets appropriate to their needs.
- *Cyber security* is critical and must be managed over the life-cycle of the systems deployed. Cyber security is fundamentally about managing risk. Security must be commensurate with the vulnerabilities and exposures from any given application. Security must be considered at the time the application requirements are being developed since the domain experts are in the best position to understand what is at stake.

### 3.2 The Smart Grid Conceptual Model

The Smart Grid Conceptual Model is a set of views (diagrams) and descriptions that are the basis for discussing the characteristics, uses, behavior, interfaces, requirements and standards of the Smart Grid. This does not represent the final *architecture* of the Smart Grid; rather it is a tool for describing, discussing, and developing that architecture. The conceptual model provides a context for analysis of interoperation and standards, both for the rest of this document, and for the development of the architectures of the Smart Grid. The top level of the conceptual model is

shown in Figure 3.

## Conceptual Model




Figure 3 – Smart Grid Conceptual Model – Top Level

The conceptual model consists of several *domains*, each of which contains many *applications* and *actors* that are connected by *associations*, which have *interfaces* at each end:

- **Actors** may be devices, computer systems or software programs and/or the organizations that own them. Actors have the capability to make decisions and exchange information with other actors through interfaces.
- **Applications** are the tasks performed by the actors within the domains. Some applications are performed by a single actor, others by several actors working together.
- **Domains** group actors to discover the commonalities that will define the interfaces. In general, actors in the same domain have similar objectives. Communications within the same domain may have similar characteristics and requirements. Domains may contain other domains.

### 3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

- **Associations** are logical connections between actors that establish bilateral relationships. At each end of an association is an *interface* to an *actor*.
- **Interfaces** show either electrical connections or communications connections. In Figure 3, the electrical interfaces are shown as yellow lines and the communications interfaces are shown in blue. Each of these interfaces may be bi-directional. Communications interfaces represent an information exchange between two domains and the actors within; they do not represent physical connections. They represent logical connections in the smart grid information network interconnecting various domains (as shown in Figure 2).

The domains of the Smart Grid are listed briefly in Table 1 and discussed in more detail in the sections that follow. In Figure 3, domains are shown as clouds.


**Table 1 – Domains in the Smart Grid Conceptual Model**

Domain	Actors in the Domain
Customers	The end users of electricity. May also generate, store, and manage the use of energy. Traditionally, three customer types are discussed, each with its own domain: home, commercial/building, and industrial.
Markets	The operators and participants in electricity markets
Service Providers	The organizations providing services to electrical customers and utilities
Operations	The managers of the movement of electricity
Bulk Generation	The generators of electricity in bulk quantities. May also store energy for later distribution.
Transmission	The carriers of bulk electricity over long distances. May also store and generate electricity.
Distribution	The distributors of electricity to and from customers. May also store and generate electricity.

It is important to note that domains are NOT organizations. For instance, an ISO or RTO may have actors in both the Markets and Operations domains. Similarly, a distribution utility is not entirely contained within the Distribution domain – it is likely to also contain actors in the Operations domain, such as a Distribution Management System, and in the Customer domain, such as meters

The Smart Grid Conceptual Model is presented as successive diagrams of increasing levels of detail, as shown in Figure 4. Users of the model are encouraged to create additional levels or identify particular actors at a particular level in order to discuss the interaction between parts of the Smart Grid.


### 3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model



**Figure 4 – Examining the Model in Detail**

Later sections of this document will present several priority **use cases**. A use case is a story, told in structured and detailed steps, about how actors work together to reach a goal. A use case would be represented in the conceptual model by a path connecting several actors across multiple domains, as illustrated in Figure 5.

An example is “Customers reduce demand in response to a price change”. This type of demand response use case would involve actors in the Markets, Operations, Customer and possibly the Service Provider domains. Figure 5 depicts a hypothetical use case involving the Generation, Transmission and Distribution domains.



**Figure 5 – A Smart Grid Use Case Represented by a Path through the Conceptual Model**

### 3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

The purpose of the conceptual model is to provide a framework for discussing both the existing power system and the evolving Smart Grid. The sections which follow describe the details of this model: first the overall scope, and then each of the domains individually.

#### 3.2.1 Scope of the Conceptual Model

It is important to note that the conceptual model of the Smart Grid is not limited to a single domain or a single application or use case. The use of the term “Smart Grid” has been applied in some circles to only distribution automation or in others to only advanced metering or demand response, for example. The conceptual model assumes that “Smart Grid” includes a wide variety of use cases and applications, especially (but not limited to) the four functional priorities identified by FERC.

The scope also includes cross cutting requirements including cyber security, network management, data management, and application integration, as described in the GridWise Architecture Council Interoperability Context-Setting Framework [3]. As illustrated in Figure 6, the layers of this framework can be pictured as underlying the actors, domains and interfaces pictured in the model.




Figure 6 – The Conceptual Model and the GWAC Interoperability Framework

#### 3.2.2 Customer Domain

Actors in the Customer domain enable customers to manage their energy usage and generation. Some actors also provide control and information flow between the customer and the other domains. The boundaries of the Customer domain are typically considered to be the utility meter

### *3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model*

as well as additional communication gateways such as a facility Energy Management System (EMS).

The Customer domain is usually segmented into sub-domains for home, commercial/building, and industrial. The energy needs of these sub-domains are typically set at less than 20kW of demand for Home, 20-200kW for Commercial/Building, and over 200kW for Industrial.

Each sub-domain has multiple actors and applications, which may also be present in the other sub-domains. Each sub-domain has a meter actor and an EMS that may reside in the meter or may reside in an independent gateway. The EMS is the primary service interface to the Customer domains.

The EMS may communicate with other domains via the AMI infrastructure or via another means, such as the Internet. The EMS communicates to devices within the customer premises across a Home Area Network or other Local Area Network. There may be more than one EMS—and therefore more than one communications path—per customer. The EMS is the entry point for such applications as remote load control, monitoring and control of distributed generation, in-home display of customer usage, reading of non-energy meters, and integration with building management systems and the enterprise. The EMS may provide auditing/logging for cyber security purposes.

The Customer domain is electrically connected to the Distribution domain. It communicates with the Distribution, Operations, Market, and Service Provider domains.




Figure 7 – Overview of the Customer Domain

Table 2 – Typical Applications within the Customer Domain

Application	Description
Building / Home Automation	A system that is capable of controlling various functions within a building such as lighting and temperature control.
Industrial Automation	A system that controls industrial processes such as manufacturing or warehousing.
Solar Generation	Harnesses solar energy for electricity at a customer location. May or may not be monitored, dispatched, or controlled via communications.
Wind Generation	Harnesses wind energy for electricity at a customer location. May or may not be monitored, dispatched, or controlled via communications.

### 3.2.3 Markets Domain

Actors in the Markets domain exchange price and balance supply and demand within the power system. The boundaries of the Market domain include the edge of the Operations domain where control happens, the domains supplying assets (e.g. generation, transmission, etc) and the Customer domain.




Figure 8 – Overview of the Markets Domain

Communication between the Market domain and the domains supplying energy are critical because efficient matching of production with consumption is dependent on markets. Energy supply domains include the Bulk Generation domain and Distributed Energy Resources (DER). DER resides in the Transmission, Distribution, and Customer domains. NERC CIPs consider suppliers of more than 300 megawatts to be Bulk Generation; most DER is smaller and is typically served through aggregators. DERs participate in markets to some extent today, and will participate to a greater extent as the Smart Grid becomes more interactive.

Communications for Market interactions must be reliable. They must be traceable and auditable. They must support e-commerce standards for integrity and non-repudiation. As the percentage of energy supplied by small DER increases, the allowed latency in communications with these resources must be reduced.



### 3.2BSmart Grid Conceptual Model

The high-priority challenges in the Markets domain are: extension of price and DER signals to each of the Customer sub-domains; simplification of market rules; expanding the capabilities of aggregators; interoperability across all providers and consumers of market information; managing the growth (and regulation) of retailing and wholesaling of energy, and evolving communication mechanisms for prices and energy characteristics between and throughout the Market and Customer domains.

**Table 3 – Typical Applications in the Markets Domain**


<b>Example</b>	<b>Description</b>
Market Management	Market managers include ISOs for wholesale markets or NYMEX for forward markets in many ISO/RTO regions. There are transmission and services and demand response markets as well. Some DER Curtailment resources are treated today as dispatchable generation.
Retailing	Retailers sell power to end customers and may in the future aggregate or broker DER between customers or into the market. Most are connected to a trading organization to allow participation in the wholesale market.
DER Aggregation	Aggregators combine smaller participants (as providers or customers or curtailment) to enable distributed resources to play in the larger markets.
Trading	Traders are participants in markets, which include aggregators for provision and consumption and curtailment, and other qualified entities. There are a number of companies whose primary business is the buying and selling of energy.
Market Operations	Make a particular market function smoothly. Functions include financial and goods sold clearing, price quotation streams, audit, balancing, and more.
Ancillary Operations	Provide a market to provide frequency support, voltage support, spinning reserve and other ancillary services as defined by FERC, NERC and the various ISO. These markets function on a regional or ISO basis normally.

#### 3.2.4 Service Provider Domain

Actors in the Service Provider domain perform services to support the business processes of power system producers, distributors and customers. These business processes range from traditional utility services such as billing and customer account management to enhanced customer services such as management of energy use and home energy generation.

The service provider must not compromise the cyber security, reliability, stability, integrity and safety of the electrical power network when delivering existing or emerging services.

# Service Provider



**Figure 9 – Overview of the Service Provider Domain**

The Service Provider domain shares interfaces with the Market, Operations and Customer domains. Communications with the Operations domain are critical for system control and situational awareness; communications with the Market and Customer domains are critical for enabling economic growth through the development of “smart” services. For example, the Service Provider domain may provide the interface enabling the customer to interact with the market(s).

Service providers will create new and innovative services and products to meet the new requirements and opportunities presented by the evolving smart grid. Services may be performed by the electric service provider, by existing third parties, or by new participants drawn by the new business models. Emerging services represent an area of significant new economic growth.

The priority challenge in the Service Provider domain is to develop the key interfaces and standards that will enable a dynamic market-driven ecosystem while protecting the critical power infrastructure. These interfaces must be able to operate over a variety of networking technologies while maintaining consistent messaging semantics.

Some benefits to the Service Provider domain from the deployment of the Smart Grid include:

### 3.2.3 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

1. The development of a growing market for 3rd parties to provide value-added services and products to customers, utilities and other stakeholders at competitive costs.
2. The decrease in cost of business services for other smart grid domains.
3. A decrease in power consumption and an increase in power generation as customers become active participants in the power supply chain.

**Table 4 – Typical Applications in the Service Provider Domain**

<b>Example</b>	<b>Category</b>	<b>Description</b>
Customer Management	Core Customer Services	Managing customer relationships by providing point-of-contact and resolution for customer issues and problems.
Installation & Maintenance	Core Customer Services	Installing and maintaining premises equipment that interacts with the Smart Grid.
Building Management	Enhanced Customer Services	Monitoring and controlling building energy and responding to Smart Grid signals while minimizing impact on building occupants.
Home Management	Enhanced Customer Services	Monitoring and controlling home energy and responding to Smart Grid signals while minimizing impact on home occupants.
Billing	Core Business Services	Managing customer billing information, sending billing statements and processing received payments.
Account Management	Core Business Services	Managing the supplier and customer business accounts.
Others	Emerging Services	All of the services and innovations that have yet to be created. These will be instrumental in defining the Smart Grid of the future.

### 3.2.5 Operations Domain

Actors in the Operations domain are responsible for the smooth operation of the power system. Today, the majority of these functions are the responsibility of a regulated utility. The smart grid will enable more of them to be outsourced to service providers; others may evolve over time. No matter how the Service Provider and Markets domains evolve, there will still be basic functions needed for planning and operating the service delivery points of a “wires” company.

### 3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

Representative applications within the Operations domain are described in Table 5. These applications are derived from the IEC 61968-1 Interface Reference Model (IRM) for this domain<sup>13</sup>.




Figure 10 – Overview of the Operations Domain

Table 5 – Typical Applications in the Operations Domain

Application	Description
Network Operations	The Network Operations domain (actually a sub-domain) within Operations includes the applications:

<sup>13</sup> To review and comment on a more detailed breakdown of the IRM, please refer to the IEC 61968-1 document available under the Shared Documents directory at <http://osgug.ucaiuug.org/utilityami/AMIENT>

### 3 2B Smart Grid Conceptual Model

<b>Application</b>	<b>Description</b>
Monitoring	Network Operation Monitoring actors supervise network topology, connectivity and loading conditions, including breaker and switch states, and control equipment status. They locate customer telephone complaints and field crews.
Control	Network control is coordinated by actors in this domain, although they may only supervise wide area, substation, and local automatic or manual control.
Fault Management	Fault Management actors enhance the speed at which faults can be located, identified, and sectionalized and service can be restored. They provide information for customers, coordinate with workforce dispatch and compile information for statistics.
Analysis	Operation Feedback Analysis actors compare records taken from real-time operation related with information on network incidents, connectivity and loading to optimize periodic maintenance.
Reporting and Stats	Operational Statistics and Reporting actors archive on-line data and to perform feedback analysis about system efficiency and reliability.
Calculations	Real-time Network Calculations actors (not shown) provide system operators with the ability to assess the reliability and security of the power system.
Training	Dispatcher Training actors provide facilities for dispatchers that simulate the actual system they will be using. (not shown on diagram)
Records and Assets	The Records and Asset Management actors track and report on the substation and network equipment inventory, provide geospatial data and geographic displays, maintain records on non-electrical assets, and perform asset investment planning.
Operational Planning	Operational Planning and Optimization actors perform simulation of network operations, schedule switching actions, dispatch repair crews, inform affected customers, and schedule the importing of power. They keep the cost of imported power low through peak generation, switching, load shedding or demand response.
Maintenance and Construction	Maintenance and Construction actors coordinate inspection, cleaning and adjustment of equipment, organize construction and design, dispatch and schedule maintenance and construction work, capture records gathered by field personnel and permit them to view necessary information to perform their tasks.
Extension Planning	Network Extension planning actors develop long term plans for power system reliability, monitor the cost, performance and schedule of construction, and define projects to extend the network such as new lines, feeders or switchgear.
Customer Support	Customer Support actors help customers to purchase, provision, install and troubleshoot power system services, and relay and record customer trouble reports.

Application	Description
Meter Reading and Control	Meter Reading and Control actors perform a variety of functions on the metering system including data collection, disconnect/reconnect, outage management, prepayment point of sale, power quality and reliability monitoring, meter maintenance and asset management, meter data management including validation, estimation and editing (VEE), customer billing, and load management, including load analysis and control, demand response, and risk management.
Supply Chain and Logistics	Supply Chain and Logistics actors manage the processes for acquiring necessary supplies; tracking acquired and ordered supplies; and allocating them.
Financial	Financial actors measure performance across the whole organization, including the evaluation of investments in capital projects, maintenance, or operations. They track risk, benefits, costs and impact on levels of service.
Communications Network	The planning, operations and maintenance of all communications network asset that are required to support Operations.
Security Management	The management of security policies, distribution and maintenance of security credentials, and centralized authentication and authorization as appropriate.
Premises	Information regarding the location of a service. This set of functions includes: Address management; Right of ways, easements, grants; and Real estate management.
Human Resources	Human Resources actors manage personnel information and activities including safety, training, benefits, performance, review, compensation, recruiting and expenses.
Business Planning and Reporting	These actors perform strategic business modeling, manpower planning, reporting, account management, and both assess and report on risk, performance and business impact.
Stakeholder Planning and Management	These actors perform track and manage the needs and concerns of various utility stakeholders by monitoring customer input, regulators, service standards, and legal proceedings.

### 3.2.6 Bulk Generation Domain

Applications in the Bulk Generation domain are the first processes in the delivery of electricity to customers. Electricity generation is the process of creating electricity from other forms of energy, which may vary from chemical combustion to nuclear fission, flowing water, wind, solar radiation and geothermal heat. The boundary of the Generation domain is typically the Transmission domain.

The Bulk Generation domain is electrically connected to the Transmission domains and shares interfaces with the Operations, Markets and Transmission domains. Communications with the

### 3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

Transmission domain are the most critical because without transmission, customers cannot be served.

The Bulk Generation domain must communicate key performance and quality of service issues such as scarcity (especially for wind and sun) and generator failure. These communications may cause the routing of electricity onto the transmission system from other sources. A lack of sufficient supply may be addressed directly (via Operations) or indirectly (via Markets).

New requirements for the Bulk Generation domain include green house gas emissions controls, increases in renewable energy sources, provision of storage to manage the variability of renewable generation.

Actors in the Bulk Generation domain may include various devices such as protection relays, remote terminal units, equipment monitors, fault recorders, user interfaces and programmable logic controllers. They typically perform the applications shown in Figure 11 and discussed in the table below.




Figure 11 – Overview of the Bulk Generation Domain

Table 6 – Bulk Generation Categories

3 2B Smart Grid Conceptual Model

Category	Description
Variable	Generation from wind, sun, wave power, etc. that can vary with time.
Non-Variable	Generation from continuous process, coal, uranium, water, etc
Renewable	Generation from a source that can be replenished, e.g. wind, water, biomass
Non-Renewable	Generation from a source that cannot be replenished, e.g. coal, oil, uranium

Note that similarity exists in the common applications for Bulk Generation, Transmission, and the Distribution Domains. These common kinds of applications are summarized in Table 7 which follows. These applications, therefore, apply to each of the three power conduction path Domains.

**Table 7 – Common Applications in Bulk Generation, Transmission, and Distribution Domains**

Application	Description
Control	Performed by actors that permit the Operations domain to manage the flow of power and reliability of the system. An example would be the use of phase angle regulators within a substation to control power flow between two adjacent power systems
Measure	Performed by actors that provide visibility into the flow of power and the condition of the systems in the field. In the future measurement might be found in built into meters, transformers, feeders, switches and other devices in the grid. An example would be the digital and analog measurements collected through the SCADA system from a remote terminal unit (RTU) and provide to a grid control center in the Operations domain.
Protect	Performed by Actors that react rapidly to faults and other events in the system that might cause power outages, brownouts, or the destruction of equipment. Performed to maintain high levels of reliability and power quality. May work locally or on a wide scale.
Record	Performed by actors that permit other domains to review what has happened on the grid for financial, engineering, operational, and forecasting purposes.
Asset Management	Performed by actors that work together to determine when equipment should have maintenance, calculate the life expectancy of the device, and record its history of operations and maintenance so it can be reviewed in the future for operational and engineering decisions.



Application	Description
Stabilize and Optimize	Performed by actors that ensure the network is operating with the appropriate tolerances across the system. They may gather information to make control decisions that ensure reliable and proper operations (stability) or more efficient operations (optimization). Measurement and control form a feedback loop that allows grid operators to stabilize the flow of energy across the electric network or safely increase the load on a transmission path.

### 3.2.7 Transmission Domain

Transmission is the bulk transfer of electrical power from generation sources to distribution through multiple substations. A transmission network is typically operated by a Regional Transmission Operator or Independent System Operator (RTO/ISO) whose primary responsibility is to maintain stability on the electric grid by balancing generation (supply) with load (demand) across the transmission network.

Examples of actors in the transmission domain include remote terminal units, substation meters, protection relays, power quality monitors, phasor measurement units, sag monitors, fault recorders, and substation user interfaces. They typically perform the applications shown in the diagram and described in Table 7 above.

The transmission domain may contain Distributed Energy Resources such as electrical storage or peaking generation units. Energy and supporting ancillary services (capacity that can be dispatched when needed) are procured through the Markets domain and scheduled and operated from the Operations domain, and finally delivered through the Transmission domain to the distribution system and finally to the Customer Domain.

Most activity in the Transmission domain is in a substation. An electrical substation uses transformers to change voltage from high to low or the reverse across the electric supply chain. Substations also contain switching, protection and control equipment. The figure depicts both step-up and step down sub-stations connecting generation (including peaking units) and storage with distribution. Substations may also connect two or more transmission lines. Transmission towers, power lines and field telemetry such as the line sag detector shown make up the balance of the transmission network infrastructure.

The transmission network is typically monitored and controlled through a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system composed of a communication network, monitoring devices and control devices.

# Transmission




Figure 12 – Overview of the Transmission Domain

## 3.2.8 Distribution Domain

The Distribution domain is the electrical interconnection between the Transmission domain, the Customer domain and the metering points for consumption, distributed storage, and distributed generation. The electrical distribution system may be arranged in a variety of structures, including radial, looped or meshed.

The reliability of the distribution system varies depending on its structure, the types of actors that are deployed, and the degree to which they communicate with each other and with the actors in other domains. Historically distribution systems have been radial configurations, with little telemetry, and almost all communications within the domain was performed by humans. The primary installed sensor base in this domain is the customer with a telephone, whose call initiates the dispatch of a field crew to restore power.

Historically, many communications interfaces within this domain were hierarchical and unidirectional, although they now generally can be considered to work in both directions, even as the electrical connections are beginning to do. Distribution actors may have local inter-device (peer-to-peer) communication or a more centralized communication methodology.

In the smart grid, the Distribution domain will communicate more closely with the Operations domain in real-time to manage the power flows associated with a more dynamic Markets domain and other environmental and security-based factors. The Markets domain will communicate with Distribution in ways that will effect localized consumption and generation. In turn, these behavioral changes due to market forces may have electrical and structural impacts on the Distribution domain and the larger grid. Under some models, third party Customer Service Providers may communicate with the Customer domain using the infrastructure of the Distribution domain; such a change would change the communications infrastructure selected for use within the Domain.




Figure 13 – Distribution Domain Diagram

Actors in the Distribution domain include capacitor banks, sectionalizers, reclosers, protection relays, storage devices, and distributed generators. They typically perform the applications shown in the diagram and described in Table 7 above.

### 3.2.9 Use of the Conceptual Model within this Document

The remaining sections of this document will find the technical analysis infused with the concepts in the Conceptual Model.

Specifically, in section 4 summary descriptions of use cases were constructed to observe the requirements for standards in their implementation. In each use case, the scenario described sought to identify the actors in their domains, define the information exchanges that fulfilled the scenario, and finally specified the relevant standards that could carry these information exchanges.

In section 9 Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain, the standards are presented according to the GWAC Stack layered interfaces and is categorized via the domains in which the actors were discovered in the use case.

## 3.3 Cyber Security Risk Management Framework and Strategy

### 3.3.1 Understanding the Risk

In the past, the energy sector concern was focused on managing the energy sector infrastructure; but now the information technology (IT) and telecommunications infrastructures are critical to the energy sector infrastructure. Therefore, the management and protection of systems and components of these infrastructures must also be addressed by the energy sector. This reliance on IT and telecommunications will increase with the implementation of the Smart Grid. The role of cyber security in ensuring the effective operation of the Smart Grid is documented in legislation and in the Department of Energy (DOE) Energy Sector Plan.

- *Energy, Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources, Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, May 2007.* The vision statement for the energy sector is: “The Energy Sector envisions a robust, resilient energy infrastructure in which continuity of business and services is maintained through secure and reliable information sharing, effective risk management programs, coordinated response capabilities, and trusted relationships between public and private security partners at all levels of industry and government.”
- As stated in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, “It is the policy of the United States to support the modernization of the Nation's electricity transmission and distribution system to maintain a reliable and secure electricity infrastructure that can meet future demand growth and to achieve each of the following, which together characterize a Smart Grid:
  - (1) Increased use of digital information and controls technology to improve reliability, security, and efficiency of the electric grid.
  - (2) Dynamic optimization of grid operations and resources, with full cyber security. ....”
- As specified in 18 CFR, Part 1 (Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)), Ch. 39, “*Reliable Operation* means operating the elements of the Bulk-Power System within equipment and electric system thermal, voltage, and stability limits so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of such system will not occur as a result of a sudden disturbance, including a cyber security Incident, or unanticipated failure of system elements.”

### 3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

Cyber security is a critical issue due to the increasing potential of cyber attacks and incidents against this critical sector as it becomes more and more interconnected. Cyber security must address not only deliberate attacks, such as from disgruntled employees, industrial espionage, and terrorists, but inadvertent compromises of the information infrastructure due to user errors, equipment failures, and natural disasters. Vulnerabilities might allow an attacker to penetrate a network, gain access to control software, and alter load conditions to destabilize the grid in unpredictable ways. The need to address potential vulnerabilities has been acknowledged across the Federal government including NIST, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Energy (DOE) and FERC.

Additional risks to the grid include:

- Increasing the complexity of the grid that could introduce vulnerabilities and increase exposure to potential attackers and unintentional errors;
- Interconnected networks can introduce common vulnerabilities;
- Increasing vulnerabilities to communication disruptions and introduction of malicious software that could result in denial of service or compromise the integrity of software and systems;
- Increased number of entry points and paths for potential adversaries to exploit; and
- Potential for compromise of data confidentiality, include the breach of customer privacy.

With the adoption and implementation of the Smart Grid, the IT and telecommunication sectors will be more directly involved. These sectors have existing cyber security standards to address vulnerabilities and assessment programs to identify known vulnerabilities in these systems; these vulnerabilities need to be assessed in the context of the Smart Grid. In addition, the Smart Grid has additional vulnerabilities due to its complexity, large number of stakeholders, and highly time-sensitive operational requirements.

The following definitions of cyber infrastructure and cyber security from the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) are included to ensure a common understanding.

- **Cyber Infrastructure:** Includes electronic information and communications systems and services and the information contained in these systems and services. Information and communications systems and services are composed of all hardware and software that process, store, and communicate information, or any combination of all of these elements. Processing includes the creation, access, modification, and destruction of information. Storage includes paper, magnetic, electronic, and all other media types. Communications include sharing and distribution of information. For example: computer systems; control systems (e.g., SCADA); networks, such as the Internet; and cyber services (e.g., managed security services) are part of cyber infrastructure.
- **Cyber security:** The prevention of damage to, unauthorized use of, exploitation of, and, if needed, the restoration of electronic information and communications systems and services (and the information contained therein) to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and availability.

### 3.3.2 Smart Grid Cyber Security Strategy

The overall cyber security strategy for the Smart Grid must examine both domain-specific and common requirements when developing a mitigation strategy to ensure interoperability of solutions across different parts of the infrastructure.

Implementation of a cyber security strategy will require the development of an overall cyber security risk management framework for the Smart Grid. This framework will be based on existing risk management approaches developed by both the private and public sectors. This risk management framework will establish the processes for combining impact, vulnerability, and threat information to produce an assessment of risk to the Smart Grid. Risk is the potential for an unwanted outcome resulting from an incident, event, or occurrence, as determined by its likelihood and the associated impacts. Because the Smart Grid includes systems and components from the IT, telecommunications and energy sectors, the risk management framework will be applied on an asset, system, and network basis, as applicable. The goal is to ensure that a comprehensive assessment of the systems and components of the Smart Grid is completed.

The following initial list of documents will be used in developing the risk management approach for the Smart Grid (Additional documents may be used as this task continues):

- National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP), 800-39, *DRAFT Managing Risk from Information Systems: An Organizational Perspective*, April 2008;
- Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 200, *Minimum Security Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems*, March 2006;
- FIPS 199, *Standards for Security Categorization of Federal Information and Information Systems*, February 2004;
- North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), *Security Guidelines for the Electricity Sector: Vulnerability and Risk Assessment*, 2002;
- *National Infrastructure Protection Plan*, 2009;
- The IT, telecommunications, and energy sectors sector specific plans (SSPs), published in 2007 and updated annually;
- ANSI/ISA-99, *Manufacturing and Control Systems Security, Part 1: Concepts, Models and Terminology*, 2007 and *Part 2: Establishing a Manufacturing and Control Systems Security Program*, 2009; and
- *The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) System Security Requirements*, 2008.

In a typical risk management process, assets, systems and networks are identified; risks are assessed (including vulnerabilities, impacts and threats); cyber security requirements are specified and cyber security controls are selected, implemented, assessed for effectiveness,

### 3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

authorized<sup>14</sup>, and then monitored over the lifecycle of the system. In contrast, the final product of this effort will be a set of recommended cyber security requirements that will be allocated to interfaces of the Smart Grid<sup>15</sup>. These requirements will be selected based on a risk assessment and will apply to the Smart Grid as a whole. The requirements will not be allocated to specific systems, components, or functions. In specifying the cyber security requirements, any gaps will be identified.

The tasks for this Smart Grid phase include:

- (1) Selection of use cases with cyber security considerations<sup>16</sup>;
- (2) Performance of a risk assessment of the Smart Grid, including assessing vulnerabilities, threats and impacts;
- (3) Development of a security architecture linked to the Smart Grid conceptual architecture; and
- (4) Identification of cyber security requirements and risk mitigation measures to provide adequate protection<sup>17</sup>.

The tasks listed above can be performed in parallel, with significant interactions among the groups addressing the tasks. Each task is further detailed below.

- (1) Select use cases with cyber security considerations:

The set of use cases will provide a common framework for performing the risk assessment, developing the security architecture, and specification of the cyber security requirements. These are included in Section Appendix D: Key Use Cases for Cyber Security Considerations of this document.

- (2) Perform a risk assessment:

The risk assessment, including identifying vulnerabilities, impacts and threats will be done from a high-level architectural and functional perspective. The output from these components will be used in the selection of cyber security requirements and the identification of requirements gaps. Because the impact of a security compromise may vary across the domains and interfaces of the Smart Grid, different baselines of security requirements will be considered. For example, in the federal government, FIPS 199 identifies three impact levels: low, moderate and high. The impact is based on the

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<sup>14</sup> Security authorization is the step where the designated official accepts the risk to the mission.

<sup>15</sup> The full risk management process should be applied to legacy systems and when Smart Grid owners and operators implement new systems or augment/modify existing systems.

<sup>16</sup> A use case is a method of documenting applications and processes for purposes of defining requirements.

<sup>17</sup> The cyber security requirements will not be allocated to specific domains, mission/business functions, and interfaces of the conceptual Smart Grid architecture.

### 3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

potential impact of the security breach of confidentiality, integrity, and availability. FIPS 200 establishes the minimum security requirements for federal information and information systems. These minimum requirements are further defined by a set of baseline security controls in SP 800-53 that are based on the impact levels in FIPS 199.

Both top-down and bottom-up approaches will be used. The top-down approach will focus on the use cases and the overall Smart Grid functionality. The bottom-up approach will focus on well-understood problems that need to be addressed.

Also, interdependencies among Smart Grid domains/systems should be considered when evaluating the impacts of a cyber or physical security incident. An incident in one infrastructure can cascade to failures in other domains/systems.

Included in section Appendix E: Vulnerability Classes is a preliminary list of vulnerability categories.

#### (3) Develop a security architecture linked to the Smart Grid conceptual architecture:

The Smart Grid conceptual architecture will provide a common view that will be used to develop the Smart Grid security architecture. The Smart Grid security architecture will overlay this conceptual architecture and security requirements defined in the Smart Grid security architecture will be allocated to specific domains, mission/business functions and/or interfaces included in the Smart Grid conceptual architecture. The objective is to ensure that cyber security is addressed as a critical cross-cutting requirement of the Smart Grid.

#### (4) Specification of cyber security requirements:

There are many requirements documents that may be applicable to the Smart Grid. Currently, only the NERC Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) documents are mandatory for a specific domain of the Smart Grid. The following documents have been identified by members of the Smart Grid Cyber Security Coordination Task Group (CSCTG) as having security requirements relevant to one or more aspects of the smart grid.

The following standards are directly Relevant to Smart Grid:

- NERC CIP 002, 003-009
- IEEE 1686-2007, *IEEE Standard for Substation Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) Cyber Security Capabilities*
- AMI System Security Requirements, 2008
- *UtilityAMI Home Area Network System Requirements Specification*, 2008
- IEC 62351 1-8, Power System Control and Associated Communications - Data and Communication Security

The following documents are applicable to control systems and close corollary:



### 3.2 Smart Grid Conceptual Model

- ANSI/ISA-99, Manufacturing and Control Systems Security, Part 1: Concepts, Models and Terminology and Part 2: Establishing a Manufacturing and Control Systems Security Program
- NIST SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems, Dec. 2007
- NIST SP 800-82, DRAFT Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security, Sept. 2008
- DHS Procurement Language for Control Systems
- ISA SP100, Wireless Standards

The cyber security requirements in these documents are not unique across the documents. To assist in assessing and selecting the requirements, a cross-reference matrix is being developed. This matrix will map the requirements from the various documents listed above to the controls included in the *Catalog of Control Systems Security: Recommendations for Standards Developers*, published by the Department of Homeland Security in 2008. This matrix is included in section Appendix F: Crosswalk of Cyber Security Standards of this Interim Roadmap.

### 3.3.3 Cyber Security Issues

There are many cyber security issues that need to be considered in specifying the cyber security requirements for the Smart Grid. These issues will help focus the discussion. Following is a preliminary list of technical issues:

- (1) Legacy equipment: One issue for the Smart Grid and the implementation of cyber security standards is the concern that legacy equipment may be difficult to modify to meet the new standards developed. The issue of legacy equipment is not unique to the Smart Grid. There are many industrial control systems and IT systems that do not have the most current suite of cyber security controls. In addition, the life cycle for information technology, particularly software, is very short -- 6 months for applications -- and the knowledge and skill of adversaries to these systems continues to increase. To address this issue, the Smart Grid cyber security strategy must address the addition and upgrade of cyber security controls and countermeasures to meet these needs. These new controls and countermeasures may be allocated to stand-alone components within the overall Smart Grid architecture.

## 4 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

As described previously in 3.2 The Smart Grid Conceptual Model, use cases are a method through which to describe applications and through their description evidence the requirements needed to support them. This section describes at a high level the use cases that were the subject of the interim roadmap discussions and workshops, and, through which the actors (and their interfaces), information objects, and ultimately requirements and standards were derived. Subsequent work is recommended to further refine these results to normalize the nomenclature, the population of the Domains, and the summary of more detailed requirements as suggested in section 6.3.1 Completion of the NIST Standards Evaluation Process.

For each of the six application areas, define the following:

<b>Description:</b>	A description of the application area
<b>Use Cases:</b>	A summary of the use cases analyzed
<b>Actors:</b>	A table of the actors discovered in the use cases
<b>Requirements drivers:</b>	The significant drivers of requirements for use cases in the section
<b>Communications diagram:</b>	A summary diagram showing the actors and their interactions derived from the Use Cases in this application grouping.

Finally, a summary description of a subsequent requirements analysis that should be performed as one of the action results of this Interim Roadmap (see 6.3.1.1).

### 4.1 Diagramming Use Cases and Actors

The diagrams of the conceptual model shown in this document in section 3.2 are very detailed graphically and represent a top level and individual detail levels. However, it is often useful to focus on a single use case and the specific actors and their domains, and, the information exchanges in which they participate.

The figure below illustrates how a Smart Grid communications diagram for a use case involving actors in more than one domain could be represented in Unified Modeling Language (UML) [3] format, a common and standardized means for representing these concepts. Domains and actors are represented by rectangles. A line connecting two Actors is an Association or Connector representing the two Logical Interfaces (at each end of the line) to the Actors. A numbered arrow represents each message in the sequence of messages exchanged by the Actors.

Figure 14 – A Smart Grid Use Case Represented by a UML Communication Diagram shows a generic example of how to draw this kind of diagram. In a real use case, all the actors, interfaces and messages would also be labeled with their names. The UML specification defines “associations” and considers actors to be a type of “object”. The UML specification also has several other kinds of diagrams that can be used to represent use cases from the Smart Grid conceptual model, such as Use Case and Sequence diagrams.




Figure 14 – A Smart Grid Use Case Represented by a UML Communication Diagram

In the sections which follow, diagrams of this form, with only Actors, Associations/Interfaces, and Domains are presented for each grouping of applications discussed.

## 4.2 Relevance of FERC Four Priority Functionalities to Smart Grid

Because of the limited time available to develop the Interim Roadmap, the project team is not able to study and analyze all smart grid applications but only a limited subset. The applications that the team has chosen to study are the "Four Priority Functionalities" that have been identified by FERC in their draft "Smart Grid Policy" issued March 19. These "FERC Four" functionalities are Wide-Area Situational Awareness (WASA), Demand Response, Electric Storage and Electric Transportation. In addition, AMI and Distribution Grid Management (DGM) were added as a result of stakeholder feedback, for a total of 6 functional priorities.

For each of the 6 functional priorities, use cases were collected, reviewed for “architectural significance”, and a representative subset was chosen. These use cases were rigorously exercised and introduced to workshop participants to modify and complete, and are included in this chapter. Workshop participants also performed requirements and gap analysis whose results are captured in the appendices:

- Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain
- Appendix B: Alphabetical Standards List
- Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

## 4.3 Wide-Area Situational Awareness (WASA)

### 4.3.1 Description

Wide Area Situational Awareness (WASA) represents the monitoring of the power system across wide geographic areas. These broad area perspectives are necessary to maintain system knowledge and decisions that go beyond conventions of individual companies or even regional transmission organization (RTO) boundaries. The requirements for WASA are architecturally significant from the standpoint of requiring uniformity across traditional systems operation boundaries. Enabling WASA based applications brings forward unique requirements and

## 4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

challenges for the Smart Grid infrastructure. WASA requirements are influenced by answers to questions that include:

- What is the state of the power system components? This is situational awareness!
- What are the capabilities and behavior of the power system components? How does each relate to the entire power system state as a whole? How do you manage each? This is situational understanding!
- How will different situations and control commands affect the overall system? What are the optimal solutions to efficiently manage the system, correct system disturbances, or restore interrupted electrical services? This is situational prediction.

Modern power systems are extremely large and complex physical objects to control. They, in turn, consists of a number of also large and complex components, such as bulk generation, transmission, distribution, and customer systems. These systems are interconnected and have strong interrelationships. With the significant advances of active components in the customer systems (DER, PEV, etc), the customer component will also significantly impact transmission system. The situational understanding of the transmission system cannot be comprehensive without information from the distribution and customer systems.

In order to properly define the requirements for the WASA we need to find the optimal proportion of the information, which should be provided to the automated monitoring and control systems and to the operator, which is always the “person in charge”. In the sense of the volume of data, the automated systems will process the bulk of data, and the operators should be provided by concise and optimally visualized information to be able to direct the automated systems to the changing operational objectives within changing optimization constraints, remaining outside of the loop that is fast processing huge amount of data.

### 4.3.2 Use Cases

The following use cases are representative of architecturally-significant samples for WASA.

#### 4.3.2.1 Contingency Analysis

Contingency analysis (CA) is an Energy Management System (EMS) application that analyzes the security (i.e. the capability to withstand outages of element of the critical infrastructure) of a power system. It calculates, identifies, and prioritizes: current and power flow overloads in equipment, voltage violations at buses, and system stability problems that would occur if contingency events (i.e. equipment failures or outages) happen in the future. Contingency analysis simulates the effects of removing equipment and calculates the results using a model of the power system.

#### 4.3.2.2 Inter-Area Oscillation Damping

Low frequency Inter-area oscillations are detrimental to the goals of maximum power transfer and optimal power flow. An available solution to this problem is the addition of power system stabilizers to the automatic voltage regulators on the generators. The damping provided by this technique provides a means to minimize the effects of the oscillations. Although Power System Stabilizers exist on many generators, they effect is only on the local area and do not effectively

damp out inter-area oscillations. It can be shown that the inter-area oscillations can be detected through the analysis of phasor measurement units (PMU) located around the system. In a typical implementation, one or more of the generators in a system are selected as Remote Feedback Controllers (RFC). The RFC received synchronized phasor measurements from one or more remote phasor sources. The RFC analysis the phase angles from the multiple sites and determines if an inter-area oscillation exists. If an oscillation exists, a control signal is sent to the generator's voltage regulator that effectively modulates the voltage and effectively damps out the oscillations.

#### **4.3.2.3 Wide Area Control System for Self Healing Grid Applications**

The objective of the Wide Area Control applications is to evaluate power system behavior in real-time, prepare the power system for withstanding credible combinations of contingencies, prevent wide-area blackouts, and accommodate fast recovery from emergency state to normal state. The Wide area control system functions comprise a set of computing applications for information gathering, modeling, decision-making, and controlling actions. These applications reside in central and in widely distributed systems, such as relay protection, remedial automation schemes (RAS), local controllers, and other distributed intelligence systems. All these applications and system components operate in a coordinated manner and adaptive to the actual situations. The application is based on a consistent real-time model of the system topology and operational parameters validated by a State Estimator utilizing Wide-Area Measurement System (WAMS).

#### **4.3.2.4 Voltage Security**

The Voltage Security function is designed to detect severe low voltage conditions based on phasor measurements of Power and Voltage and upon detection, initiate corrective action such as load shed. The Voltage Security function also includes additional decision system inputs, including phasor measurements from other utilities, real time line capacity from SCADA/EMS, available customer dispatchable loads from DMS, available generation capacity from MOS, EMS, and DMS, and dispatchable VAR sources from EMS and DMS.

#### **4.3.2.5 Monitoring Distribution Operations as a Part of WASA**

The objectives of this function as a component of WASA are to monitor in the near-real time and in close look-ahead time the behavior of distribution operations under normal and emergency operating conditions, analyze the operations, and provide the transmission automated management systems and the transmission operator with the results of the analysis aggregated at the demarcation lines between distribution and transmission.

#### **4.3.2.6 Voltage, Var, and Watt Control (VVWC)**

The following objectives, relevant to WASA are supported by the application: Reduce load while respecting given voltage tolerance (normal and emergency); Conserve energy; Reduce or eliminate overload in transmission lines; Reduce or eliminate voltage violations on transmission lines; Provide reactive power support for transmission/distribution bus; Provide spinning reserve support; Minimize cost of energy.

#### 4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

The application calculates the optimal settings of voltage controller of LTCs, voltage regulators, Distributed Energy Resources, power electronic devices, capacitor statuses, and may enable demand response means for optimizing the operations following current objectives. The application takes into account operational constraints if both distribution and transmission operations, and, if so opted, it takes into account real-time energy prices, when the objective is cost minimization.

### 4.3.3 Actors

The following table is a summary of the key Actors and which domains they participate in.

**Table 8 – Actors in Wide Area Situational Awareness**

<b>Actor</b>	<b>Domains</b>	<b>Description</b>
RTO/ISO	Markets	RTO: An independent organization that coordinates, controls, and monitors the operation of the electrical power system and supply in a particular geographic area; similar to Independent System Operator.  ISO: An independent entity that controls a power grid to coordinate the generation and transmission of electricity and ensure a reliable power supply.
Wholesale Market	Markets	Market for energy products, including bulk generation, distributed generation, electric storage, electric transportation, and demand response.
Aggregator	Service Provider	A person (company) joining two or more customers, other than municipalities and political subdivision corporations, into a single purchasing unit to negotiate the purchase of electricity from retail electric providers. Aggregators may not sell or take title to electricity. Retail electric providers are not aggregators.
Plant Control System	Bulk Generation	Distributed Control System for a generating plant.
AMI / Customer EMS	Customer	Customer Energy Management System can receive pricing and other signals for managing customer devices, including appliances, DER, electric storage, and PEVs.
IED	Distribution	A microprocessor-based controller of power system equipment, for monitoring and control of automated devices in distribution which communicates with SCADA, as well as distributed intelligence capabilities for automatic operations in a localized distribution area based on local information and on data exchange between members of the group.

Actor	Domains	Description
IED	Transmission	A microprocessor-based controller of power system equipment for monitoring and control of automated devices in transmission which communicates with SCADA, as well as distributed intelligence capabilities for automatic operations.
Transmission Actuator	Transmission	Actuator device used for control of devices in the transmission system.
Power System Control Center	Operations	Power system central operations.
EMS	Operations	A system of computer-aided tools used by operators of electric utility grids to monitor, control, and optimize the performance of the generation and/or transmission system. EMS also provides DMS with transmission/generation-related objectives, constraints, and input data from other EMS applications.
SCADA	Operations	A computer system monitoring and controlling power system operations. SCADA database is updated via remote monitoring and operator inputs. Required scope, speed, and accuracy of real-time measurements are provided, supervisory and closed-loop control is supported.
Wide Area Measurement and Control System	Operations	Measurements from phasor measurement units located in a wide area of power systems and determining actions to perform with transmission actuators.
DMS	Operations	The system that monitors and controls the distribution system equipment based on computer-aided applications, market information, and operator control decisions.

#### 4.3.4 Requirements Drivers

Phasor Measurement Units must have voltage (3-phase) and time synchronization in order to compute phasors. Time synchronization must be tight enough to maintain acceptable drift in local time keeping devices and maintained to IEEE 1588 Standards or better.

Wide area communications must meet latency and real-time applications requirements for WASA based applications.


Remote Feedback Controller must have valid secure communications from the remote sites; the controlled generator must be up and running with validation of status.

#### *4 3B Smart Grid Applications and Requirements*

Topology and other processing must be able to integrate data from field equipment up to EMS systems and environments.



### 4.3.5 Communications Diagram



#### Wide-Area Situational Awareness (WASA) Use Cases: Actors and Logical Interfaces

IED: Intelligent Electronic Device  
 DMS: Distribution Management System  
 EMS: Energy Management System  
 SCADA: Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition  
 AMI: Advanced Metering Infrastructure




Figure 15 – Wide-Area Situational Awareness Applications Summary Communications Diagram

## 4.4 Demand Response

FERC states that further development of key standards around Demand Response will enhance interoperability and communications between system operators, demand response resources (also called curtailment resources), and the systems that support them. The following discussion on Demand Response supports FERC's request to identify use cases and relevant standards, particularly around dispatchable curtailment to address loss or unavailability of other resources and the potential for dispatchable Demand Response to increase power consumption during over-generation situations.

### 4.4.1 Description

Demand Response is a temporary change in electricity consumption by Demand Resources in response to market or reliability conditions. Demand Resources are loads or aggregation of loads capable of measurably and verifiably providing temporary changes in consumption. Distributed Energy Resources (DERs) are small-scale energy generation/storage sources capable of providing temporary changes in electricity supply. Demand Resources are sometimes clumped in with DERs in Smart Grid discussions. Both types of devices may be used to support electricity demand or supply management opportunities for reliability or economic reasons. By managing loads through Demand Response and supplies from non-traditional small-scale generation, the opportunity exists to:

- Engage the consumer by allowing market participation and consumption/billing choices;
- Introduce new markets for aggregators, micro-grid operators, distributed generation, vendors, and consumers;
- Control peak power conditions and limit or remove brownout/blackout instances;
- Flatten consumption curves and shift consumption times;
- Respond to temporary grid anomalies;
- Maximize use of available power and increase system efficiencies through time-of-use (TOU) and dynamic pricing models.

### 4.4.2 Use Cases

This section lists the architecturally significant use cases for Demand Response that were analyzed for the Interim Roadmap.

#### 4.4.2.1 Direct Load Control

Studies indicate that customers want to know when direct load control measures are in effect. The DR solution shall provide the ability to manage direct load control programs. It accomplishes this by managing the transmission of direct load control actions to direct-load-control-enabled devices, shown as device, HAN device, and smart appliances. This solution will also provide interactions with customers to convey direct load control information.

#### **4.4.2.2 Demand Response Management System Manages Demand in Response to Pricing Signal**

Studies indicate that customers who understand the cost of electricity reduce their usage, especially when prices are high. The DR solution shall provide the ability to manage pricing signal programs designed to reduce load. It accomplishes this by managing the transmission of price signal information to DR-enabled devices. This solution shall also provide interactions with customers to convey price signal information; communication is shown via the meter or the Facility EMS/Gateway.

#### **4.4.2.3 Customer Reduces Their Usage in Response to Pricing or Voluntary Load Reduction Events**

Customer awareness of energy scarcity and customer attention to energy use, each maintained by economic signals, are key benefits of the smart grid. The most expensive use of the grid is to cover short term shortages in energy supply. Today such shortages are caused as buildings respond to weather or as the grid responds to unplanned outages. Tomorrow, as we rely more on intermittent energy sources such as sun and wind, they will occur more frequently.

The grid can share responsibility for peak load management with customers by sharing economic incentives to reduce load. These incentives may be shared in advance by day-ahead pricing or in real time during a critical event. Energy customers will develop a variety of strategies to respond once the economic incentives are in place.

To enable customers to meet this need, the smart grid must provide them with timely price, event, and usage information. For competitive markets in software and equipment to assist customers, there must be national system market based upon information standards.

#### **4.4.2.4 External Clients Use the AMI to Interact With Devices at Customer Site**

The Smart Grid will enable third parties, such as energy management companies, to use the communication infrastructure as a gateway to monitor and control customer equipment located at the customer's premise. The communication will be required to enable on-demand requests and support a secure environment for the transmission of customer confidential information, and would take place via an AMI or communication through the Facility EMS/Gateway.

#### **4.4.2.5 Customer Uses an Energy Management System (EMS) or In-Home Display (IHD)**

The Smart Grid will facilitate customers becoming actively involved in changing their energy consumption habits by connecting their personal control and display devices to the utility grid. This technology also makes it possible for the utility to obtain vital information to maintain power quality and reliability on their systems. There are a variety of programs that the customer can enroll in, that in conjunction with their Smart Appliances and Plug-in Electric Vehicles, enable them to better manage their energy usage and costs. Providing customers with the means to visually monitor information about their energy use from their residence or business helps them to make more educated energy related decisions. Customers with access to EMS and IHD

are more inclined to install energy efficient equipment on their premises and participate in load reduction programs. This use case describes how customers and the utility use these new technologies for improved load management.

#### 4.4.2.6 Utility procures energy and settles wholesale transactions

Operations for the Retail Market receives and prepares bids and offers into the wholesale energy market and evaluates the incoming bids from the wholesale market against the needs and the cost of operation. To facilitate this process, the Retail Market needs to know what resources, such as distributed generation or demand response, are available and for how long. Some time after a wholesale transaction has been completed, the Retail Market settles the transaction using actual usage data gathered by the metering system during the period specified in the transaction. The data is used to prepare bills and invoices to multiple parties involved in the transaction based on contracts and tariffs.

#### 4.4.2.7 Dynamic Pricing— Energy Service Provider Energy and Ancillary Services Aggregation

A Demand Response Service Provider collects energy and ancillary services bids and offers from Dynamic Pricing and other DER subscribing customers. The Service Provider combines those bids into an aggregate bid into the market operations bid/offer system. When accepted, the Service Provider notifies the end customer of the status and requests scheduling of the services.

#### 4.4.2.8 Customer Uses Smart Appliances

The Smart Grid allows customers to become actively involved in changing their energy consumption habits by connecting their personal Smart Appliances to the utility grid. This use case describes how the customer installs and begins using Smart Appliances to manage their energy usage and costs. Communication is through the Facility EMS/Gateway or the metering system.

#### 4.4.2.9 VVWC with DR, DER, PEV, and ES

The application calculates the optimal settings of voltage controller of LTCs, voltage regulators, DER, power electronic devices, capacitor statuses, and may enable Demand Response to amplify the effect of load-reducing volt/var control.

### 4.4.3 Actors

The following table is a summary of the key Actors and which domains they participate in.

Table 9 – Actors in Demand Response

Actor	Domains	Description
Retail Market	Market	The Retail Market clears bids and offers, or otherwise sets retail prices.


#### 4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

Actor	Domains	Description
Aggregator	Markets	An Aggregator combines the curtailment or demand or DER of two or more customers into a single purchasing unit to negotiate the purchase or sale of electricity in the retail market. Aggregators act in retail and wholesale markets.
Grid Operations	Operations	Grid operations manage services for the distribution of electricity (and gas and water) to and from customers and may serve customers who do not choose direct access.
Distribution Management	Operations	Controls distribution of energy. May alternatively be considered part of Grid Operations in the Operations domain.
DR Service Provider	Service Provider	A Demand Response Service Provider may serve as an aggregator (in the Markets domain), or otherwise provide distribution of DR signals. The source of those signals is not shown in the diagram.
Meter	Customer	Unless otherwise qualified, a device used in measuring watts, vars, var-hours, volt-amperes, or volt-ampere-hours. Called a Smart Meter when part of an advanced metering infrastructure (AMI). Today typically located at the customer facility and owned by the distributor or retail provider.
Facility EMS/Gateway	Customer	A logical or physical device typically located at the customer facility and used as a communication gateway. The Energy Management System may or may not provide the Gateway function. To simplify the exposition these two functions are labeled EMS in the diagram.
Display	Customer	An In-Home Display (for Homes) or facilities console for other customers (e.g. commercial buildings, industrial facilities, or vehicles) shows information related to energy management.
Distributed Generation	Customer	Distributed Generation, often called Distributed Energy Resources (DER), includes small-scale generation or storage of whatever form. This is in contrast to centralized or bulk generation and/or storage of electricity.
Device, HAN Device, or Smart Appliance	Customer	Devices that can react to remote management, whether to price, grid integrity, or other energy management signaling. May be controlled by a Facility EMS, a Facility Gateway, though a Smart Meter (serving as a Facility Gateway), or other means such as direct communication of price or other information. Communication to the device might be via a Home-Area Network or other means; we use the terms interchangeably.

#### **4.4.4 Requirements Drivers**

Demand Response is characterized by interactions between the actors that must traverse many Domains in order to function. Information is exchanged between devices of varied complexity, ownership, and access rights.

### 4.4.5 Communications Diagram



#### Demand Response Use Cases: Actors and Logical Interfaces

HAN: Home Area Network  
 EMS: Energy Management System  
 DR: Demand Response




Figure 16 – Demand Response Applications Summary Communications Diagram

## 4.5 Electric Storage

FERC points out that investment in large amounts of electricity storage could ultimately address both the resource adequacy and resource management concerns, but that technical and economic issues remain to be addressed before such investment is likely to become significant. If electricity storage technologies could be more widely deployed, they would present another important means of addressing some of the difficult issues facing the electric industry. Electricity storage technologies can be deployed in a distributed manner (e.g. local storage that can be aggregated) or as bulk storage (direct interfaces to system energy management functions).

### 4.5.1 Description

To date, the only significant bulk electricity storage technology has been pumped storage hydroelectric technology. Distributed storage exists (e.g. local storage for UPS systems, etc.) but it is not aggregated or available for any system benefits. New storage technologies are under development and in some cases are being deployed, and could also potentially provide substantial value to the electric grid.

Electric storage is recognized to have value at all levels in the modern power system, from central generation to point of use. Examples of storage functionalities are:

- At Generation level – frequency control, spinning reserve, supply-ramping, demand-leveling, minimum loading
- At Transmission level – stability, VAR support, power quality and transfer-leveling, and reliability
- At Substation/Distribution – peak shaving, voltage support, power quality, capacity investment deferral, and reliability
- At End-Use level – demand control, interruption protection, voltage support and power quality

### 4.5.2 Use Cases

#### 4.5.2.1 Energy Storage (ES) Owners Store Energy from the Power System

ES owners store energy when it is at its lowest cost and when it has least possibility to be detrimental to the power system operations.

#### 4.5.2.2 Energy Storage (ES) Owners Discharge Energy into the Power System

ES owners discharge energy when it is economically advantageous to do so and/or when it can improve reliability, efficiency, or power quality of the power system operations.

#### 4.5.2.3 Building Energy Usage Optimization using Electric Storage

Energy storage is used as one mechanism to optimize building energy usage in response to real-time pricing (RTP) signals. The RTP system provides the pricing schedule through email or direct transfer to the Building Automation System (BAS) that can perform the necessary activities to optimize the building energy usage.



#### 4.5.2.4 RTO/ISO Directly Dispatches Electric Storage to Meet Power Demand

Using either market-based energy scheduling or emergency control capabilities, the RTO/ISO directly dispatches stored electric energy to meet local or regional power demand. The market-based energy schedule would include the electric storage devices that are under dispatch control of the RTO/ISO for the purpose of meeting scheduled demand.

Separately, depending upon the structure of the electric market, the RTO/ISO could also schedule and control the charging of the electric storage devices. The devices could also be controlled to provide for scheduled VAR demand.

#### 4.5.2.5 Utility Dispatches Electric Storage to Support Intentional Islanding

A utility determines that an electric island (microgrid) could be intentionally established and dispatches electric storage as well as other DER generation and load management capabilities to support this islanding.

#### 4.5.2.6 Electric Storage Used to Provide Fast Voltage Sag Correction

Electric storage provides fast voltage sag correction.

#### 4.5.2.7 Impact on Distribution Operations of Plug-in Electric Vehicles as Electric Storage

The objectives of this use case are to demonstrate that the distribution monitoring and controlling functions a) take into account the near-real time behavior of the ES as loads and as Source of Energy and b) have the needed input information for the close look-ahead times reflecting the behavior of the ES as loads and as Source of Energy.

### 4.5.3 Actors

The following table is a summary of the key Actors and which domains they participate in.

**Table 10 – Actors in Electric Storage**

Actor	Domains	Description
Aggregator	Market	A person joining two or more customers, other than municipalities and political subdivision corporations, into a single purchasing unit to negotiate the purchase of electricity from retail electric providers. Aggregators may not sell or take title to electricity. Retail electric providers are not aggregators.
Utility EMS	Operations	The entities that continue to provide regulated services for the distribution of electricity (and gas and water) to customers and serve customers who do not choose direct access. Regardless of where a consumer chooses to purchase power, the customer's current utility will deliver the power to the consumer's home or business.

#### 4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

Actor	Domains	Description
Utility Energy Management Service	Operations	A service that provides supervisory storage management on behalf of the customers.
Meter	Customer	Unless otherwise qualified, a device of the utility used in measuring watts, vars, var-hours, volt-amperes, or volt-ampere-hours.
EMS	Customer	Customer owned energy management system
Storage System	Customer	Storage of electric energy at either the distribution grid level, often at customer sites, or at the transmission grid level, often connected in a substation.
PEV	Customer	A PEV can also be an element of energy storage.


#### 4.5.4 Requirements Drivers

Effective applications of energy storage must have information on energy balance, requirements for ancillary services and related market values.

In the case of longer term storage (minutes to hours) for energy arbitrage, load following and ramping, market information on both the current value of energy and the expected future value will be required to effectively schedule charging and discharging. Since all storage systems will have both a capital and an operational cost component, its dispatch will depend primarily on capacity and on energy value. Also the capacity and energy limits of the storage systems will need to be communicated back to either a dispatcher or aggregator.

In the case of short-term storage (seconds to minutes) for ancillary services, including frequency regulation, reactive supply and voltage support, requires fast and secure communications that allow for automatic control of the resource. Storage acting as spinning or operating reserves will require communication to verify the requirement to operate and to confirm the available capacity in the seconds-to-minutes timeframe.

### 4.5.5 Communications Diagram



### Electric Storage Use Cases: Actors and Logical Interfaces

PEV: Plug-in Electric Vehicle  
 EMS: Energy Management System  
 DR: Demand Response




Figure 17 – Electric Storage Applications Summary Communications Diagram

## 4.6 Electric Transportation

Both FERC and the Obama administration recognize electric transportation as a key area of focus for the Smart Grid community. Electric transportation could significantly reduce our dependency on foreign oil, increase the use of renewable sources of energy, and also dramatically reduce our carbon footprint. The current grid and market infrastructure cannot support mass deployments of PEVs. There are very special issues to consider when designing for massive PEV support. The introduction of millions of mobile electricity charging and discharging devices provides unique challenges to every domain on the Smart Grid. A thorough and careful analysis of PEV introduction is necessary, and the Smart Grid architects and standards organizations must take special care to consider it in their designs.

### 4.6.1 Description

Two major scenarios are envisioned with the advent of plug-in electric vehicles (PEV), with one or the other or both actually playing out:

- PEV will add significantly to the load that the power system will have to serve, and if no regulation, coordination, and/or incentives are included, then PEV could significantly increase the cost of peak power.
- PEV, although still adding to the load, will help balance on- and off-peak loads through shifting when they are charged and also eventually by providing storage and discharging capacity. Additional ancillary services could also improve energy efficiency and power quality. These shifting strategies will result from carefully tailored pricing and market incentives.

Many stakeholders will be involved, with many interactions between them. The following use cases illustrate the types of interactions across these interfaces, and the interoperability standards, cyber security requirements, and system management that will be needed to realize these Smart Grid visions.

### 4.6.2 Use Cases

#### 4.6.2.1 Customer Does Not Enroll in Any PEV-Specific Program

The customer plugs a PEV into electrical connections that do not have smart meters or any other communications capabilities. The PEV may or may not be registered in a program, but cannot take full advantage of it without a smart meter. The utility has neither direct knowledge of the PEV load nor any real-time or near-real-time information on PEV charging, due to the lack of communications.

The customer plugs a PEV into electrical connections that are interfaced to smart meters but do not include any PEV-specific interfaces such as the EVSE. Although possibly aware of incentives for enrolling in PEV-specific programs or that charging PEVs may have varying pricing during different time periods, some customers may still choose not to participate in any of these programs for any variety of reasons. The utility therefore has no direct knowledge of the PEV load, but can still monitor the overall customer load in real-time or near-real-time, and possibly make estimates on what the PEV load is.

#### **4.6.2.2 Utility/ESP Develops Different Tariffs and Service Programs**

The utility or Energy Services Provider develops a variety of PEV programs, based on different tariffs, different types and levels of services, different PEV response capabilities and requirements, as well as different rate structures for Time-of-Use (TOU), Real-Time Pricing (RTP), Critical Peak Pricing (CPP), Peak Demand Limited, Customer Demand Limited, Unlimited, Pre-Payment, No Roaming, etc.

#### **4.6.2.3 PEV Charges After Customer Establishes Charging Parameters**

PEV customers have different methods for establishing how and when their PEVs are charged, depending upon their location and constraints.

#### **4.6.2.4 PEV Charges at Different Locations: Roaming Scenarios**

The customer plugs the PEV into the grid at a location different from their “home” location. Different scenarios address who and how the PEV charging will be accounted for and billed. These roaming scenarios include:

- The customer connects their PEV to the energy portal at another premise. The premise customer pays for the energy use.
- The customer connects their PEV to the energy portal at another premise. The PEV customer pays for the energy use directly with the utility, such as with a credit or debit card. In this scenario, the customer would get billed at the rates in their PEV tariff.
- The customer connects their PEV to the energy portal at another premise outside the enrolled utility's service territory. In addition to the previous 2 scenarios, the customer could become a “guest” of the external utility and pay rates as such a guest, or could indicate the PEV program they are enrolled in at their “home” utility, and pay those rates. The external and “home” utilities would then make a settlement between them on any differences.
- The customer with a PEV that is not enrolled in any program (or cannot prove enrollment) connects their PEV to the energy portal at another premise. Either private party arrangements would be needed (first scenario) or “guest” arrangements (third scenario) would be used for payment.
- The customer connects their PEV to the energy portal at a public location, multi-family dwelling, or workplace infrastructure. Either private party arrangements (first scenario) or direct utility interactions (second scenario), or “guest” arrangements (third scenario) would be used for payment.

#### **4.6.2.5 PEV Roaming, Assuming Unbundled Retail Electricity Reselling**

One possible scenario may occur if regulators decide to unbundle retail electricity. This would permit customers to store electricity during low price times (e.g. at night) and resell it to PEVs during higher price times (e.g. during hot afternoons) for a profit

Another consideration could be the unbundling of the driver from the PEV, so that PEVs are not billed, but the driver of the PEV is billed – a scenario more in line with current practices for gasoline vehicles.

#### **4.6.2.6 PEV for On-Premise Backup Power or Other Use of Storage**

Customers may use the electric storage available from PEVs for uses other than powering the vehicle. These other applications include:

- V to G: Electric utility may be willing to purchase energy from customer during periods of peak demand
- V to H: Use of the PEV as a home generator during periods of electrical service outage
- V to L: Use of the PEV storage to provide power to a remote site or load that does not otherwise have electrical service. Examples include construction sites or camp sites.
- V to V: Use of the PEV storage to transfer electrical energy to another PEV

#### **4.6.2.7 Utility Provides Accounting Services to PEV Customer**

Based on the PEV program and tariff that the PEV customer has enrolled in, the utility or other accounting entity will issue bills to those PEV customers as well as providing other customer accounting services. These bills will be based on on-premise and off-premise meter (and/or sub-meter) readings for the appropriate time periods with the appropriate prices applied.

#### **4.6.2.8 Impact of PEV as Load on Distribution Operations**

Distribution operations will need to access all available sources of information on when, where, and how fast PEVs are charging, particularly as this load becomes increasingly more significant at local and more global levels. Sources of this information will include:

- AMI retrieval of near-time information on charging of PEVs that have communications interfaces to smart meters.
- Distribution feeder equipment sources, such as voltage regulators, capacitor banks, and automated switches. This load data will necessarily be aggregated, combining PEV charging loads with non-PEV loads.
- In the future, distribution transformers serving just a handful of customer might also be able to provide load information closer to the actual location of the load.
- Load forecasts, updated with estimates of where these mobile PEV might be charging, when they are expected to charge, what rate they will charge at, and the total charging needed.
- Up-to-date electrical connectivity models of the distribution system.
- State and measurements from power system equipment.

### 4.6.2.9 PEV Network Testing, Diagnostics, and Maintenance

As part of PEV Program services, the ESP provides services for testing, running diagnostics, and providing maintenance for the customer’s PEV interface system (EVSE) and battery.

### 4.6.3 Actors

The following table is a summary of the key Actors and which domains they participate in.

**Table 11 – Actors in Electric Transportation**

Actor	Domains	Description
ISO/RTO	Operations	ISO: An independent entity that controls a power grid to coordinate the generation and transmission of electricity and ensure a reliable power supply.  RTO: An independent organization that coordinates, controls, and monitors the operation of the electrical power system and supply in a particular geographic area; similar to Independent System Operator.
Federal Agency	Agency	Federal agency that requires information on interactions involving electric transportation
Energy Market Clearinghouse	Market	Market for energy products, including bulk generation, distributed generation, electric storage, electric transportation, and demand response.
Aggregator, Energy Services Company	Service Provider	A person or company combining two or more customers into a single purchasing unit to negotiate the purchase of electricity from retail electric providers or the sale to these entities. Aggregators may not sell or take title to electricity. Retail electric providers are not aggregators.
3rd Party	Service Provider	Any entity that has authorization to exchange information with customers and their systems.
SCADA/DMS	Operations	The system that monitors and controls the distribution system equipment based on Distribution Management System applications, market information, and operator control decisions.
Utility Apps	Operations	Software applications and models used to assess the impacts of electric transportation on distribution operations and help manage these devices through pricing and other signals.
Metering, Billing, Utility Back Office	Operations	The systems used for collecting metering information, validating it, settling bills across accounting entities, and issuing bills to customers.

#### 4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

Actor	Domains	Description
Meter	Customer	Unless otherwise qualified, a device of the utility used in measuring watts, vars, var-hours, volt-amperes, or volt-ampere-hours.
Energy Services Interface (ESI) /Gateway	Customer	Provides cyber security and, often, coordination functions that enable secure interactions between relevant Home Area Network Devices and the Utility. Permits applications such as remote load control, monitoring and control of distributed generation, in-home display of customer usage, reading of non-energy meters, and integration with building management systems. Provides auditing/logging functions that record transactions to and from Home Area Networking Devices. Can also act as a gateway.
Sub meter	Customer	A meter that measures a sub load, such as a plug-in electric vehicle.
End Use Measurement Device (EUMD)	Customer	End Use Measurement Device (EUMD) is a device that measures energy consumed by a PEV and communicates the information to the ESI.
Customer EMS	Customer	Customer Energy Management System can provide communication interface to PEV for communication of PEV status information (e.g. charging state, state-of-charge, charging rate, time to complete charge) on Customer viewable displays.
Electric Vehicle Service Element (EVSE)	Customer	The EVSE provides the direct interface with the PEV, including a charger and information exchange capabilities. The charger can either be on-board the vehicle or off-board. On-board chargers require AC energy transfer to the vehicle (either 120 or 240V single phase) and Off-board chargers are within the EVSE and require DC energy transfer to the vehicle.
PEV	Customer	Plug-in Electric Vehicle. Plugs into an Energy Portal (see actor definition below) at a premise to charge vehicle. A PEV is also an EV (Electric Vehicle) that relies only on electric propulsion. A PEV is also a PHEV (Plug-In-Hybrid Vehicle) that also includes an alternative source of propulsion power.



#### 4.6.4 Requirements Drivers

PEVs will require reliable and secure communications with the equipment within customer premises and with utilities and energy service providers, in order to manage the different tariffs and service programs which would allow PEVs to participate in demand response and other interactive programs.

In addition to PEV management, distribution operations will need to access all available sources of information on when, where, and how fast PEVs are charging, particularly as this load becomes increasingly more significant at local and more global levels. Sources of this information will include:

- AMI retrieval of near-time information on charging of PEVs that have communications interfaces to smart meters.
- Distribution feeder equipment sources, such as voltage regulators, capacitor banks, and automated switches. This load data will necessarily be aggregated, combining PEV charging loads with non-PEV loads.
- In the future, distribution transformers serving just a handful of customer might also be able to provide load information closer to the actual location of the load.
- Load forecasts, updated with estimates of where these mobile PEV might be charging, when they are expected to charge, what rate they will charge at, and the total charging needed.
- Up-to-date electrical connectivity models of the distribution system.
- State and measurements from power system equipment.

Distribution operations will also need power system models and appropriate analysis tools. First the raw load data (and any load forecast data) must be mapped to the power system model. Then the analysis tools will need to estimate the real load (and power system topology and facilities connectivity). From this distribution operations model, many different analyses can be performed, such as:

- Contingency analysis to detect possible overloads, imbalanced phases, or other power system problems
- Voltage, Var and Watt management of feeders for improved efficiency
- Bus load modeling
- Multi-level feeder reconfiguration (MFR) assessment to determine if switching sections of feeders to other feeders could avoid overloads or other problems
- Thermal overload analysis: to what extent are component normal and emergency ratings exceeded (number of occurrences, typically overload asset classes, duration and magnitudes)
- Transformer loss of life analysis: how do the varying and mobile PEV loads affect the overall aging and loss of life of distribution and substation transformers?
- Harmonic analysis

#### *4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements*

- Statistical analysis

Additional distribution operational analysis functions can also help determine the effect of PEVs on the operation of the distribution system.

### 4.6.5 Communications Diagram




Figure 18 – Electric Transportation Applications Summary Communications Diagram

## 4.7 AMI Systems

### 4.7.1 Description

Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) systems are the primary means for utilities to interact with their meters at customer sites. However, in addition to basic meter reading, AMI systems provide two-way communications that can be used by many functions and, as authorized, by third parties to exchange information with customer devices and systems.

### 4.7.2 Use Cases

#### 4.7.2.1 External Clients Use AMI System to Interact with Devices at Customer Site

A third party vendor wants to identify what customer equipment (e.g. air conditioning, pool pumps, compressors, etc) is running and how much power each piece of equipment is drawing during a particular time of day. The vendor may also want to control or program specific equipment (e.g. turn on/off, adjust thermostat). The third party vendor makes an on-demand status and/or control request of the customer equipment. The monitoring or status request is received by the Customer EMS, the requestor and destination is authenticated and then the request is transmitted to the specific customer site. The customer equipment receives the request and provides a response back to the Customer EMS and the Customer EMS transmits the information back to the third party. If the on-demand request is a control request, the customer equipment will adjust operations as requested and provide an acknowledgement of receipt and processing through the Customer EMS back to the third party.

The third-party monitoring and control capabilities described in this use case may provide customers with increased options for programs and services that might not normally be provided by the utility and also may offset some of the AMI costs. These proposed services will enable customers to more easily participate in utility and non-utility demand reduction programs, by allowing third parties to help them monitor and control their equipment.

#### 4.7.2.2 Demand Response Management System Manages Demand Through Direct Load Control

A major benefit of the Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is that it supports customer awareness of their instantaneous kWhr electricity pricing and it can support the utilities in the achievement of its load reduction needs. As we see increased electricity demand on the grid, it may result in energy shortages, therefore triggering the need for utilities to reduce energy consumption in support of grid stability. The AMI will help facilitate load reduction at the customer's site by communicating instantaneous kWhr pricing and voluntary load reduction program events to the customer and to various enabling devices at the customer's site. Voluntary load reduction events may be scheduled with a large amount of advanced notice (24 hrs) or near real-time. For the utility to receive the desired customer response, we must provide them timely pricing, event and usage information.

Related to this scenario is the measurement of the response to financial incentives, energy price adjustments and other voluntary demand response programs. The customer responses will be

used to determine how and/or if they have responded to a pricing event, if the utility needs to launch other demand response events to achieve the needed demand reduction and help the utility determine how to structure future voluntary load reduction programs, to ensure the utility receives the best customer response.

#### **4.7.2.3 Building Automation Software/System Optimization using Electric Storage**

Energy storage, distributed generation, renewables, and demand response are used as mechanisms to optimize building loads in response to both dynamic pricing (DP) signals and system operational needs. The DP system provides the DP schedule through mechanisms such as email, pager, bulletin board, or direct transfer. The DP operator for the customer must enter the schedule into the building automation software (BAS) and perform the necessary optimization activities to implement the DP goals. The building operator may choose to adjust how their equipment responds to pricing and operational signals. Note that EMS or Energy Management System is often used interchangeably with BAS.

For example, a large industrial customer that can curtail large loads during peak hours will get a different rate than a small commercial customer with less ability to modify its load. The ESP and/or Grid operator sends signals (e.g. price / reliability) to the customers it serves, using the AMI system and receives information from the customer

The customer's Building Automation System (BAS) optimizes its loads and distributed energy resources (DER), based on the pricing and reliability signals it receives, the load requirements and constraints, and any DER requirements, capabilities, and constraints. The BAS understands the nature and opportunity for altering consumption based on economic and comfort drivers, and the physical dynamics of the specific customer premises. The BAS then issues (or updates existing) schedules and other control mechanisms for loads and for DER generation. These control actions may be automatically implemented or may be reviewed and changed by the customer.

The BAS system uses the site-optimized algorithms to forecast its load and DER generation. It also determines what additional ancillary services it could offer, such as increased DER generation or emergency load reduction, and calculates what bid prices to offer these ancillary services at. The BAS then submits these energy schedules and ancillary services bids to the ESP (or Scheduling Coordinator, depending upon market structure), as input to the RTO/ISO market operations.

#### **4.7.2.4 Outage Detection and Restoration using AMI**

The AMI system should provide capabilities to detect and map outages to the customer portion of the power grid. It should provide interfaces to interact with the DA system to enable automated, remote restoration [or to confirm restoration occurred].

AMI System has to have access to a model of the connectivity of the system (or to provide it to an external system) to be able to detect and map outages.

#### 4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

- Power outage occurs, due to single customer problem, back hoe fade – small number of customers, transformer outage, phase outage, feeder outage, substation outage, transmission outage, cross-system outage.
- Detection begins via last gasp messages, DA (distribution automation) monitoring, customer report, polling (status system), triggered polling, control monitoring. There can be different durations and situations, including: momentary, short term outages, outages > 1 hour, false positives, critical customer, customer with backup power
- Mapping of extent occurs through “Hole detection” – who isn’t responding to AMI? Power levels – feeder line drops from 5 to 1 MW, root cause analysis – where did it start?.
- Responsibility determined, although the outage may be large enough that AMI provides no immediately useful [too much] data for restoration. May bring it back in at end as part of restoration verification.
- Restoration begins with different situations, including prioritization, sub-outage restoration, and verification of restoration

#### 4.7.3 Actors

The following table is a summary of the key Actors and which domains they participate in.

**Table 12 – Actors in AMI Systems**

Actor	Domains	Description
RTO/ISO	Market	RTO: An independent organization that coordinates, controls, and monitors the operation of the electrical power system and supply in a particular geographic area; similar to Independent System Operator.  ISO: An independent entity that controls a power grid to coordinate the generation and transmission of electricity and ensure a reliable power supply.
Energy Market Clearinghouse	Market	Wide-area energy market operation system providing high-level market signals for operations.
3rd Party, External Systems (e.g. Weather)	Service Provider	Public information systems outside the utility, provides the utility with information on weather and major event relevant to utility operations.
Billing	Service Provider	Provides consolidated bills to customers

#### 4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

Actor	Domains	Description
Aggregator/Energy Services Company	Service Provider	A person or company combining two or more customers into a single purchasing unit to negotiate the purchase of electricity from retail electric providers, or the sale to these entities. Aggregators may not sell or take title to electricity. Retail electric providers are not aggregators.
Utility EMS	Operations	The entities that continue to provide regulated services for the distribution of electricity (and gas and water) to customers and serve customers who do not choose direct access. Regardless of where a consumer chooses to purchase power, the customer's current utility will deliver the power to the consumer's home or business.
DMS Applications	Operations	Calculation and analysis of power flow/state estimation results with the inclusion of distribution automation capabilities, demand response signaling, distributed energy resources, electric storage, PEVs, and load management
MDMS	Operations	Provides meter data validation and verification so that reliable information can be used at bill settlement.
Web Site	Operations	Provided to enable customer access to usage and billing records.
Metering System	Operations	The systems used for collecting metering information.
Load Management System (LMS)	Operations	Controlling DR, DER, PEV and ES charging/discharging; processing and storing data on load management programs, contracts, relevant historic information, creating behavioral models, collecting, processing, and storing customer-specific power quality and reliability characteristics, etc.
Geographic Information System (GIS)	Operations	Repository of distribution system assets, their relationships (connectivity), ownerships, and activities. AM/FM system contains the geographical information of the distribution power system circuit connectivity, as well as the parameters describing the power system facilities. Conceptually, the AM/FM/GIS database can contain transmission connectivity and facility data and relevant to distribution operations customer-related data.

#### 4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

Actor	Domains	Description
Customer Information System (CIS)	Operations	Repository of customer information related to distribution company services. CIS contains load data for customers that are estimated for each nodal location on a feeder, based on billing data and time-of-day and day-of-week load shapes for different load categories.
Outage Management System (OMS)	Operations	Management of outage events and corrective actions.
SCADA	Operations	Distribution SCADA database is updated via remote monitoring and operator inputs. Required scope, speed, and accuracy of real-time measurements are provided, supervisory and closed-loop control is supported.
Field Devices	Distribution	Field equipment with local intelligence for monitoring and control of automated devices in distribution which communicates with SCADA, as well as distributed intelligence capabilities for automatic operations in a localized distribution area based on local information and on data exchange between members of the group.
Workforce Tool	Distribution	Manual operations of field devices, repair and construction work, patrolling facilities, recording changes in facility parameters, connectivity, in mobile computers, transferring data to the operator, and corresponding database administrators
Meter	Customer	Unless otherwise qualified, a device of the utility used in measuring watts, vars, var-hours, volt-amperes, or volt-ampere-hours.
Energy Services Interface (ESI)	Customer	Provides cyber security and, often, coordination functions that enable secure interactions between relevant Home Area Network Devices and the Utility. Permits applications such as remote load control, monitoring and control of distributed generation, in-home display of customer usage, reading of non-energy meters, and integration with building management systems. Provides auditing/logging functions that record transactions to and from Home Area Networking Devices. Can also act as a gateway.
Customer EMS	Customer	Customer Energy Management System can receive pricing and other signals for managing customer devices, including appliances, DER, electric storage, and PEVs.




#### 4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

Actor	Domains	Description
Customer appliances, DER, PEV, and Electric Storage	Customer	Equipment and systems at the customer site that could participate in demand response and other programs
Sub-Meter	Customer	A meter that measures a sub load, such as a plug-in electric vehicle.
Electric Vehicle	Customer	Plug-in Electric Vehicle. Plugs into an Energy Portal (see actor definition below) at a premise to charge vehicle. A PEV is also an EV (Electric Vehicle) that relies only on electric propulsion. A PEV is also a PHEV (Plug-In-Hybrid Vehicle) that also includes an alternative source of propulsion power.

#### 4.7.4 Requirements Drivers

The Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is characterized by interactions between the actors that must traverse between the Customer Domain and the Operations Domain, although these same Actors may interact over other infrastructures. Information is exchanged between devices of varied complexity, ownership, and access rights.

### 4.7.5 Communications Diagram



#### AMI Systems Use Cases: Actors and Logical Interfaces

MDMS: Meter Data Management System  
 DMS: Distribution Management System  
 EMS: Energy Management System

LMS: Load Management System  
 GIS: Geographic Information System  
 CIS: Customer Information System  
 OMS: Outage Management System




Figure 19 – AMI Systems Applications Summary Communications Diagram

## **4.8 Distribution Grid Management**

### **4.8.1 Description**

The existing distribution power systems consist of hundreds of distribution feeders, thousands of distribution transformers supplying millions of customers and contain a large number of locally and remotely controllable devices. Even now, they present large and complex objects to control. With significant penetration of AMI, Demand Response, Distributed Energy Resources, and PEVs, the distribution systems become active participant in the overall power system operations and can become capable energy market participants.

In order to maximally utilize the potentials of the advanced distribution operation applications and their integration with customer and transmission systems operations, a large amount of information should be exchanged between the field IEDs, transmission SCADA/EMS, Distribution SCADA/DMS, and customer systems (AMI, DER, DR, PEV, and Electric Storage). A large amount of input data comes from corporate databases and models.

Most of the DMS Advanced Applications are integrated in a system based on a common DMS database, which, in turns is integrated with corporate databases, Utility SCADA/EMS and interfaced with AMI and other customer EMS, including DER systems.

Close functional integration with Transmission/Generation Operations via corresponding EMS will significantly enhance the efficiency and reliability of both distribution and transmission grids and will provide a comprehensive Wide-Area Situational Awareness.

The use cases listed below describe the functions of Automated Distribution Operations that are architecturally significant for the interoperability in Smart Grid environment. The list includes the real-time applications

### **4.8.2 Use Cases**

#### **4.8.2.1 Monitoring Distribution Operations with DR, DER, PEV, and ES**

The objectives of this function are to monitor in the near-real time and in close look-ahead time the behavior of distribution operations under normal and abnormal operating conditions, analyze the operations, and provide the operator and other applications with the results of the analysis in a concise manner. The scope of the function includes monitoring the operations of distribution and immediate transmission systems including all elements connected to the distribution primaries and loads connected to the distribution secondaries, comprising conventional loads, loads with demand response (DR), distributed energy resources (DER), plug-in electric vehicles (PEV), and electric storage devices (ES).

#### **4.8.2.2 Service Restoration**

**The objectives** of this use case are to demonstrate that the distribution Service Restoration Functions a) take into account the near-real time behavior of the DR, DER, ES, and PEV as loads and as Electric Storage and utilizes these technologies for improvement of reliability, and b) have the needed input information for the close look-ahead Contingency Analysis reflecting the

## 4.3 Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

utilization of the DR, DER, ES, and PEV as loads and as Electric Storage to account for the effect on current operations.

### 4.8.2.3 VVWC with DR, DER, PEV, and ES

**The following objectives**, which could be selected by the distribution operator for different times of the day, are supported by the application: Minimize kWh consumption at voltages beyond given voltage quality limits (i.e., ensure standard voltages at customer terminals); Minimize feeder segment(s) overload; Reduce load while respecting given voltage tolerance (normal and emergency); Conserve energy via voltage reduction; Reduce or eliminate overload in transmission lines; Reduce or eliminate voltage violations on transmission lines; Provide reactive power support for transmission/distribution bus; Provide spinning reserve support; Minimize cost of energy based on the financial impact of coordinated volt/var/watt control, taking into account the real-time energy prices and real-time commercial requirements; Reduce technical losses; Provide compatible combinations of above objectives.

### 4.8.2.4 Coordination of Emergency and Restorative Actions in Distribution

**The objectives** of this use case are to demonstrate that the advanced DMS application are capable of a) providing the WACS with updated in near real-time information about the ownership and available load shedding, load management, and load swapping means in case of a wide-area emergency situation. b) coordinating the controllable load management means (VVWC, DR, DER, ES, and PEV, to reduce the impact of intrusive load shedding under emergency conditions, and c) coordinate the restoration of services after the emergency situation is mitigated .

### 4.8.2.5 Impact of PEV as Load and Electric Storage on Distribution Operations

**The objectives** of this use case are to demonstrate that the distribution monitoring and controlling functions a) take into account the near-real time behavior of the PEV as loads and as Electric Storage and b) have the needed input information for the close look-ahead monitoring and controlling DMS functions reflecting the behavior of the PEV as loads and as Electric Storage.

## 4.8.3 Actors

The following table is a summary of the key Actors and which domains they participate in.

**Table 13 – Actors in Distribution Grid Management**

Actor	Domains	Description
Energy Market Clearinghouse	Market	Wide-area energy market operation system providing high-level market signals for operations.

#### 4 BSmart Grid Applications and Requirements

Actor	Domains	Description
Distribution Operator	Operations	Person in charge of distribution operations during the shift
Distribution SCADA	Operations	Distribution SCADA database is updated via remote monitoring and operator inputs. Required scope, speed, and accuracy of real-time measurements are provided, supervisory and closed-loop control is supported.
DMS functions: DOMA, VVWS, FLIR, MFR, OMS, WMS, etc	Operations	Calculation and analysis of power flow/state estimation results with the inclusion of distribution automation capabilities, demand response signaling, distributed energy resources, electric storage, PEVs, and load management
Load Management System	Operations	Controlling DR, DER, PEV and ES charging/discharging; processing and storing data on load management programs, contracts, relevant historic information, creating behavioral models, collecting, processing, and storing customer-specific power quality and reliability characteristics, etc.
Distribution Field Crews, Mobile Computing	Operations	Manual operations of field devices, repair and construction work, patrolling facilities, recording changes in facility parameters, connectivity, in mobile computers, transferring data to the operator, and corresponding database administrators
Transmission SCADA/EMS	Operations	Transmission and generation management system providing DA with transmission/generation-related objectives, constraints, and input data. EMS system contains the transmission power system model, and can provide the transmission connectivity information for facilities in the vicinity of the distribution power system facilities and with outputs from other EMS applications.
ISO/RTO	Operations	Wide-area power system control center providing high-level load management and other signals for distribution companies.
Distribution Engineering	Operations	Planning distribution systems, operations, arranging data gathering, design of constructions, selection and placement of equipment, etc.
Distribution Field RTUs, IEDs, and Distributed Intelligence Capabilities	Distribution	Field equipment with local intelligence for monitoring and control of automated devices in distribution which communicates with SCADA, as well as distributed intelligence capabilities for automatic operations in a localized distribution area based on local information and on data exchange between members of the group.

#### 4 3B Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

Actor	Domains	Description
Metering, Billing, Utility Back Office	Distribution	The systems used for collecting metering information, validating it, settling bills across accounting entities, and issuing bills to customers.
Geographic Information System AM/FM	Distribution	Repository of distribution system assets, their relationships (connectivity), ownerships, and activities. AM/FM system contains the geographical information of the distribution power system circuit connectivity, as well as the parameters describing the power system facilities. Conceptually, the AM/FM/GIS database can contain transmission connectivity and facility data and relevant to distribution operations customer-related data.
Customer Information System (CIS)	Distribution	Repository of customer information related to distribution company services. CIS contains load data for customers that are estimated for each nodal location on a feeder, based on billing data and time-of-day and day-of-week load shapes for different load categories.
AMI Headend	Distribution	Interface to the Advanced Metering Infrastructure
Aggregator/Energy Services Company	Service Provider	A person or company combining two or more customers into a single purchasing unit to negotiate the purchase of electricity from retail electric providers, or the sale to these entities. Aggregators may not sell or take title to electricity. Retail electric providers are not aggregators.
3rd Party, External Systems (e.g. Weather)	Service Provider	Public information systems outside the utility, provides the utility with information on weather and major event relevant to utility operations.
Meter/HAN Gateway	Customer	The gateway to the meter and the home area network at the customer site
Customer EMS	Customer	Customer Energy Management System can receive pricing and other signals for managing customer devices, including appliances, DER, electric storage, and PEVs.
Customer appliances, DER, PEV, and Electric Storage	Customer	Equipment and systems at the customer site that could participate in demand response and other programs

### 4.8.4 Requirements Drivers

The distribution power systems comprise a multitude of information sources. These information sources reside inside and outside the customer premises, along the primary distribution feeders, at the transmission-to-distribution substations, in SCADA/EMS databases, in asset management, work management, outage management, and customer information system databases. New management systems will need to be developed with significant penetration of AMI, demand response, PEV, electric storage, and distributed generation. These management systems will analyze the behavior of the above mentioned technologies on a node-by-node basis, and will process the data according to the standard object models providing the distribution operation applications with updated node-specific input data. A portion of the application results will be used directly in the distribution domain for situational awareness of the distribution system (monitoring) and for close-loop and advisory control of the distribution operations. Another portion of the application output will go directly to the customers, e.g., load management, reliability price signals, etc. Another portion of the application results will be provided to the transmission domain for use in its operational decision making processes. There will be information exchange with other domains, like market/aggregator and external systems. On the other hand, distribution operation applications will need information support from the customer domain directly, e.g., for outage detection and fault location, critical power quality distortions, significant changes of DER operations, etc. The distribution operation applications will also need input from the transmission domain, like operational limits, real-time prices, load management requests, etc. With so many sources of information, the interoperability issue becomes critical to the implementation of the Smart Grid concept in power distribution systems.

### 4.8.5 Communications Diagram




Figure 20 – Distribution Grid Management Applications Summary Communications Diagram



## **4.9 Requirements Analysis**

The process described herein seeks to meet the following requirements of the NIST Interim Roadmap:


- Select a set of standards and requirements targeted for the Smart Grid.
- Identify gaps in those standards to allow the definition of needed enhancements.
- Identify boundaries between standards to allow harmonization efforts to be defined and pursued.
- While perfect objectivity is a goal, never an achievement, devise an objective process around which consensus can be gathered.

The Interim Roadmap was developed using a time concentrated sequence of analysis and writing steps interspersed with inputs from the NIST DEWGs and other stakeholders through a series of two workshops.

The first document draft and first workshop exposed initial thinking and experiences surrounding the exposition of a set of Smart Grid standards.

The second draft and workshop went to the next level and analyzed a series of Use Cases as a means to derive standard enumerating profiles for the Domains introduced in section 9 Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain.

The figure that follows, Figure 21 – Interim Roadmap Analysis Process, illustrates the steps in the second workshop and the requirements analysis of the results which follow. As shown, the second draft followed by workshop II performs the collection of Use Cases and Standards prospecting to be used for Smart Grid Release 1. These Use Cases are analyzed to identify their Actors, Information exchanges, and unique requirements. This results in the description of an initial set of Domain Profiles that can be further analyzed in the requirements analysis which is done next.



**Figure 21 – Interim Roadmap Analysis Process**

The classic systems engineering analysis process recognizes that the appropriate elements of a selection process such as this are to:

- 1) Identify Use Cases that impact the interfaces where standards are needed, and that illustrate how the results will be utilized
- 2) Derive Requirements that satisfy the Use Cases
- 3) Select Standards that afford the capabilities to satisfy the Requirements

This classic waterfall approach to system’s engineering is appropriate to our goals. However, in the Smart Grid Standards selection process there are on the order of 1000 existing Use Cases; with thousands of identified Requirements and hundreds of potentially appropriate Standards for selection. So to great extent, we focus on harvesting the existing knowledge and coordinating its analysis to achieve our results.

The present requirements analysis process, therefore, begins with a collection activity to organize the most relevant requirements in each category. It further correlates the Use Cases with Requirements and the Requirements with the Standards. This way, the set of Requirements can be considered building blocks with reflect the Use Cases and drive the Standards. Finally, these sets are correlated in an assessment function which identifies “goodness of fit” of the Standards to the Use Cases via the Requirements, resulting in the Domain Profiles presented in section 9 Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain.

The following figure illustrates this arrangement:




Figure 22 – Relating Use Cases, Requirements, and Standards

The Hierarchy of “Standardized” Requirements is used to collate Requirements from a variety of relevant sources and organize them according to type of Requirement. This effort is proposed to develop a master list of requirements from the stakeholders.

The requirements in this hierarchy include those from recommended practices, systems, software and communications engineering as well as from utility Use Cases and Requirements documents. This master collection of requirements once completed can be used as a set of metrics against which to evaluate either standards or the use cases.

Note that some Requirements are very high level. And some are very detailed.

A standards based definition of a requirement is from IEEE STD 610.12:

*Requirement: (1) A condition or capability needed by a user to solve a problem or achieve an objective. (2) A condition or capability that must be met or possessed by a system or system component to satisfy a contract, standard, specification, or other formally imposed documents.*

Note that to be a good requirement, it must address one and only one thing, and the statement that the Requirements makes must be testable in a straightforward manner.

In order to accommodate Requirements from varied sources, an organizational means is required. Each organization that has produced documents containing explicit Requirements has chosen a specific level of abstraction at which to relate its needs. For example, one organization may say that “it is a requirement to use open source implementations”. Another relevant requirement might be “the meter must be able to store 1 minute load profile”. Both kinds (and many more for

#### 4 3B Smart Grid Applications and Requirements

that matter) of Requirements are relevant to the Smart Grid. How then to arrange these sets of somewhat orthogonal, and, somewhat overlapping Requirements? There is a need to recognize both the differing nature of the Requirements, as well as, their level of specificity.

The resulting organization is a tree structure. The branches are the outline heading levels, for example 1.1.2.1.1 Pricing Requirements. The Requirements, themselves, represent the leaves of the tree. The Branches and the leaves represent either recommended practices or the Requirements or should have attribution to the origin of the standard.

Once the requirements have been collected and arranged, they can be utilized to evaluate the Domain Profiles ability to satisfy the Use Cases.

Here is the step by step cookbook process to achieve the goal:

- 1) Collection of Requirements
- 2) Preliminary analysis (What is missing)
- 3) Complete initial collection (Fill gaps discovered)
- 4) Complete analysis
- 5) Refine Domains to optimize contents
- 6) Assess remaining Requirements mismatches
- 7) Describe the gaps in the Standards

## 5 Cyber Security Considerations for the Smart Grid

The energy sector is one of the national critical infrastructures that now will increase dependency upon the information and telecommunications infrastructures. This Smart Grid will have many complex cyber security requirements. This section includes the deliverables identified in Section 3.3 of this document, including a requirements matrix, list of vulnerability classes, and potential impacts.

### 5.1 *Smart Grid Use Cases That Are Architecturally Significant for Cyber Security*

Before finalizing any set of cyber security requirements for the Smart Grid, it is critical to understand the Smart Grid functions and the energy sector operational environments. For this purpose, key Use Cases have been selected that are architecturally significant for cyber security requirements (see Section 12 Appendix D: Key Use Cases for Cyber Security Considerations for the Use Cases). This is a preliminary set, and will be revised as the program continues.

The full set of Security Relevant Use Cases includes selections from the following:

1. **IntelliGrid Use Cases** (IntelliGrid web site: [http://intelligrid.ipower.com/IntelliGrid\\_Architecture/Use\\_Cases/Fun\\_Use\\_Cases.htm](http://intelligrid.ipower.com/IntelliGrid_Architecture/Use_Cases/Fun_Use_Cases.htm)). There are over 700 of these Use Cases, but only the power system operations Use Cases and Demand Response/AMI ones are of particular interest for cyber security.
2. **AMI Business Functions** which were extracted from Appendix B of the AMI-SEC Security Requirements Specification [18].
3. **Benefits and Challenges of Distribution Automation – Use Case Scenarios** (White Paper for Distribution on T&D DEWG, extracted from CEC document which has 82 Use Cases)
4. **EPRI Use Case Repository** (<http://www.smartgrid.epri.com/usecaserepository.html>) which is a compilation of IntelliGrid and SCE Use Cases, plus others
5. **SCE Use Cases** (<http://www.sce.com/usecases>)

### 5.2 *Matrix for Key Cyber Security Requirements*

#### 5.2.1 Results from the Smart Grid Workshop #1

The following documents were discussed at the April Smart Grid workshop, and it was agreed that they could have security requirements relevant to one or more aspects of the Smart Grid.

- Directly Relevant to Smart Grid
  - NERC CIP 002, 003-009
  - IEEE 1686
  - AMI-SEC System Security Requirements

## 5.4 Cyber Security Considerations for the Smart Grid

- OpenHAN SRS
- IEC 62351
- Control Systems and close corollary
  - ISA SP99
  - NIST SP 800-53
  - NIST SP 800-82
  - DHS Procurement Language for Control Systems
  - ISA SP100

### 5.2.2 Requirements Matrix

These documents will be included in a requirements matrix, using the requirements specified in the DHS *Catalog of Control Systems Security: Recommendations for Standards Developers*. The draft that is included in this roadmap will be revised as the program continues (see section 14 Appendix F: Crosswalk of Cyber Security Standards).

### 5.3 Vulnerability Classes

To perform a risk assessment on the Smart Grid, vulnerabilities need to be identified. The following table is a preliminary list of vulnerability classes. The draft that is included in this roadmap will be revised as the program continues (see section 13 Appendix E: Vulnerability Classes).

## 6 Prioritized Actions

This section presents near-term actions that NIST can take to develop the smart grid interoperability framework. Sections 6.1 and 6.2 identify the highest priority standards-related issues that are limiting the wide-spread deployment of the smart grid and recommends specific actions for NIST to take to address these issues. These issues were identified at the May 19-20 workshop or by the Project Team. Additional actions are listed in section 11 Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan.

Section 6.3 defines the steps needed to further develop the roadmap for creating the smart grid interoperability framework.

### 6.1 *Cross-cutting and Overarching Issues*

This section presents recommended actions for NIST to take to address cross-cutting and overarching issues identified at the May 19-20 workshop or by the Project Team.

Interactions between actors drive the recommendation and selection of standards. A specific actor may interoperate in several ways depending on the nature of the interaction and the domain of the partner. Common semantic and information models at an appropriate level of detail will improve the quality and cost of interoperation. To support cross-domain integration scenarios, shallow interfaces carry the key information.

The design of the actor interfaces is not determined by the actor's domain – for example, as in the next section, you should be able to exchange a price that is universally understood regardless of the domain.

#### 6.1.1 Common Pricing Model Standard

The need for a common pricing model crosses all domains that use price. Price is more than a simple number; it carries market context, and information such as quantity, units, time for use, and characteristics including source type and potentially carbon characteristics. A common and interoperable pricing model is a key to Demand-Response systems, Dynamic Pricing in all its forms, and energy markets and trading including forward markets.

The complexity of tariff structures and content means that to fully understand a price one needs to fully understand thousands of pages of tariffs for each jurisdiction. Driving toward simplified tariffs or (at minimum) machine-readable descriptions of tariffs would lead to more efficient markets. For example, the machine-readable tags for end user license agreements have simplified licensing decisions; a similar markup language for tariffs would allow better decisions in markets without implicit knowledge beyond price.

Key Actions:

- (1) **Develop and standardize a pricing model** – NIST should work with IEEE, IEC, OASIS, ASHRAE, NAESB and other relevant SDOs to develop an approach for developing a common pricing model to traverse the entire value chain. The model must include price, currency, delivery time, and product definition.

### 6.1.2 Common Time Synchronization and Management

The Smart Grid will be a dynamic marketplace with many participants. Common time synchronization at a fine resolution is a key to common scheduling and reaction to and post mortem analysis of contingencies.

For interactions with buildings and markets, lower resolution, synchronization with fine-grained time signals, and semantic compatibility with calendar models as described in the following section is important.

Consideration must be given to data validity in ensuring that time references obtained are correct and not tampered with.

Key Action:

- (1) **Develop or adopt application or role based synchronization guidelines** –NIST should organize a meeting between standards groups IETF, NASPI, IEC TC57 and IEEE PSRC and other stakeholders with the objective of developing processes for aligning applications and guidelines around IEEE 1588, Network Time Protocol and IRIG-B and other time requirements. Ensure processes will be applicable to devices, groups of devices, regions and combinations of regions. Ensure efforts include common scheduling, non-technical data sources (weather, markets), operational issues, recovery from loss of synchronization, and post mortem analysis.

### 6.1.3 Common Semantic Model

A common semantic model for application level communications is necessary in several areas of the Smart Grid. Key areas, for example, are the integration of utility T&D Field operations with Information Technology and Back Office Systems.

Several applications require integration and harmonization across these operating environments. In addition convergence on common semantics for communications with Consumers including but not limited to pricing and control signals exchanged with consumer equipment would minimize the complexity of adding services to the Smart Grid.

Several organizations are working independently on consumer communications semantics for a variety of applications. These activities need to be brought together under specific focused work in concert with SDO and Consortia activities. The structure of this task should maintain mutual respect for the domain knowledge in each of the activities and seek to diplomatically bring the work together and develop contributions to the appropriate SDOs and consortia.

Key Actions:

- (1) **Develop a Common Semantic Model** – NIST should work with IEC TC57, NEMA, ASHRAE SPC 135, and OASIS to devise a common semantic model using XML Schema and XML. The objective will be to unify the models of CIM (IEC61970, IEC61968) and IEC 61850 including correspondences with ANSI C12.19 and ASHRAE 135 to form a common representation of information models constructed by these standards efforts for the Smart Grid.



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Sections 6.1.3.1 and 6.1.3.2 discuss but two of a number of important cross-domain information models that should be developed.

### 6.1.3.1 Common Meteorological and Geospatial Models

Weather has a major influence on electricity demand and, in the case of renewable energy resources such as wind and solar, may also influence supply. A common mechanism for communicating current and predicted weather would help in managing electricity supply and demand in real time as well as for planning purposes. Most forward-looking energy markets are based on assumptions about weather. Detailed knowledge of local weather and micro-climates is used by service providers and building operators to influence their operational decisions. IEC 61850 has a weather model included, but that standard is primarily used for substation communication and is not used across all Smart Grid domains.

Digital Weather Markup Language (DWML)<sup>18</sup> is an existing specification developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). NOAA offers SOAP access to its National Digital Forecast Database (NFDS); one can submit a longitude and latitude and receive in reply a DWML forecast. There are no plans to develop DWML as a standard at this time.

A common weather information model should include a format for observations as well as for forecasts. This model could be used when querying local weather stations and even personal weather systems. A standard weather information model would encourage the development of software markets that analyze weather and micro-climates to inform energy market decisions.

Such a standard might reference UnitsML<sup>19</sup> (for internationalization) as well as time interval (section 6.1.3.2). NOAA might be encouraged to formulate the DWML specification into a standard; such a standard would also be of interest to the Emergency Response community.

Many aspects of smart grid information exchanges require the specification of the physical location of assets, events, and other objects. This is best accomplished using well defined geospatial information models. One example is the work of the Open Geospatial Consortium, Inc (OGC) - an international industry consortium participating in a consensus process to develop publicly available interface standards. The OpenGIS® Standards provide the tools and information models necessary to empower technology developers to make complex spatial information and services accessible and useful with all kinds of applications.

Key Actions:

- (1) **Develop or adopt generic models for weather, pricing, Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and scheduling, using the Common Semantic Model** – NIST should work with IEC TC57, NEMA, ASHRAE SPC 135, OGC/OpenGIS and OASIS to assemble and existing approaches to the representation of meteorological and geospatial information. The resulting common information would be represented in the common

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<sup>18</sup> <http://www.nws.noaa.gov/xml/>

<sup>19</sup> <http://unitsml.nist.gov/>

semantic model and then forwarded back to the individual standards bodies for harmonization

### 6.1.3.2 Common Scheduling Mechanism

The Smart Grid will be a dynamic marketplace with many participants. Synchronized activities are dependent upon shared schedules. Scheduling activities, prices, maintenance, etc. will help level the playing field across the participants and support a dynamic, competitive, and efficient environment.

ICALNDAR (IETF RFC 2445) [19] is a calendar exchange specification for time intervals. It is used for appointment and meeting invitations in personal calendars. This same functionality is needed for pricing, market bidding, weather predictions, building management, and other decisions.

A web services standard, or WS-Calendar, could provide calendar functions to the Smart Grid. Development of the WS-Calendar standard could be quick since the requirements are well understood. WS-Calendar should be developed outside the Smart Grid effort as its anticipated uses extend into many business interactions. Development in a larger e-commerce sphere will lead to wider adoption and more benefit.

Key Actions:

- (1) **Communicate with Smart Grid stakeholders on scheduling standard** – NIST shall communicate with Smart Grid stakeholders to determine if existing scheduling specifications may be used or whether new standards need to be created.
- (2.a) **If existing specifications may be used, then Create a scheduling standard** – NIST to communicate with specification owner and coordinate activities necessary to make it a Smart Grid standard. SDO shall convert specification into a Smart Grid standard.
- (2.b) **On the other hand, if new standards are needed, identify a SDO to create a new Smart Grid scheduling model** – NIST communicate with IEEE, IEC, UCA, OASIS, OpenADR to identify and select scheduling model SDO. NIST shall choose a SDO based on meeting results. SDO shall develop requirements for scheduling standard. Chosen SDO develop common scheduling model that meets Smart Grid requirements.

### 6.1.4 Application of Internet-Based Networking Technology

The IP network or the Internet consists of a set of protocols to transport data messages using IP packets, as well as a set of protocols to manage and control the network, such as routing, mapping of IP addresses, device management, etc. This protocol suite enables distributed network architecture and allows distributed applications to run over the network.

The workshop process as well as other industry activities has clearly illustrated that specific protocols within the Internet Protocol Suite are fundamental to networking in general and smart grid application networking infrastructure specifically. Protocols within the Internet Protocol Suite such as IPv4, IPv6, TCP, UDP, TLS/SSL, IPSec and others are being implemented now in utility specific networks and will likely continue to do so.

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These suites of protocols are combined into what are often known as networking “stacks” or “profiles”. These profiles provide the networking infrastructure for a given set of applications. There are many protocols and supporting documents, known as Requests for Comment (RFCs), that would comprise a given networking profile. For several of the advanced networks required for the smart grid it is important to understand the capabilities of any given profile as well as its ability to meet the application requirements. For interoperable networks it is important to reach agreement on the composition of networking profiles for any given application or set of applications.

What is missing is a comprehensive mapping of smart grid application requirements to the capabilities of protocols and technologies in the Internet Protocol Suite by experts well versed in the applications and the protocols. Such an analysis would permit selected Internet protocol Suite subsets to be identified as important for various applications in the various domains of the NIST Conceptual Model of a Smart Grid.

Key Actions:

- (1) **Educate the Smart Grid Community on the Internet Protocol Suite.** NIST should sponsor workshops to educate a wide smart grid stakeholder audience on what the Internet Protocol Suite is - its constituent protocols and technologies, their capabilities, and how their attributes should be compared to smart grid application non-functional requirements to facilitate appropriate protocol selection.
- (2) **Perform a rigorous mapping of common smart grid application requirements against Internet Protocol Suite protocols.** NIST should convene a meeting of representatives from the IETF, IEEE, and selected industry groups to organize a cross industry group to perform this analysis. The analysis should be segmented by Conceptual Model Domain and sub-domains to address domain specific requirements in addition to cross domain networking requirements. The analysis should identify those protocols that are clearly applicable in specific application contexts (e.g. use of IPV4, IPv6, and TCP in enterprise applications) in addition to identifying any existing gaps.
- (3) **Develop recommended Internet Protocol Suite Network Profiles for Smart Grid domains.** NIST should direct or encourage the group doing the requirements analysis to create a standards level body within the IETF, IEEE, or other SDO to develop smart grid domain specific application profiles based on that analysis.

### 6.1.5 Communications Interference in Unlicensed Radio Spectrums

The Smart Grid provides mission-critical capabilities to the US economy and infrastructure. Communications is a key aspect of ensuring interoperability and increased efficiencies. Yet wireless Smart Grid device manufacturers and system integrators struggle with communication interference issues with other devices in unlicensed radio spectrums. Usage is not uniform across states further complicating the interoperability of networks.

At the workshops, a recurring theme emerged desiring licensed spectrum for Smart Grid communications (for example the 700MHz D block). This would alleviate many communication issues currently experienced in the industry and provide a private communication highway for the mission-critical inter-operations of the Smart Grid.

## 6.5B Prioritized Actions

Additionally, during the plenary, a representative of the FCC indicated sensitivity to the potential requirements of the Smart Grid in this area. This opportunity should be pursued.

Key Actions:

- (1) **Determine the need for dedicated spectrum** – NIST should commission a group of experts to study the issue of communications interference in unlicensed radio spectrums for smart grid applications and develop business and technical requirements on the optimal requirements for wireless spectrum usage for Smart Grid communications. The objective is to produce the necessary arguments to identify the preferred usage of spectrum throughout North America.

## 6.2 Priority Functionality Issues

This section presents recommended actions for NIST to take to address issues associated with the 6 applications assessed in this Interim Roadmap.

### 6.2.1 Demand Response & Consumer Energy Efficiency (DRCEE)

There are 3 key gaps or issues (other than the pricing model, which was discussed in 6.1.1) within DRCEE. The first gap is in standardizing the DR signals to DER devices. There are competing standards and specifications that include OpenADR, NAESB, and others. A common standard for communicating to both load control and supply control devices will help accelerate DR implementations at the utilities and DER device manufacturing with products.

Market information is currently not available to the customer domain. Without this information, customers cannot participate in the wholesale or retail markets. In order to include customers in the electricity marketplace, they need to understand when opportunities present themselves to bid into the marketplace and how much electricity is needed. Once a bid is made, the contractual obligation to commit the accepted amount of electricity for the set period of time needs to also be communicated in a standard way.

As DER devices become pervasive and consumers can buy them at retail stores, the complexity of provisioning and tracking all the DER devices must be automated. The DERs may be provisioned at the premise energy management system (EMS) and allow the EMS to aggregate and report total premise DER baseline capabilities. Or the DERs may announce themselves to the service provider or utility or perhaps even the ISO. Both of these approaches use device discovery and profiles. Regardless, these reporting and management issues need to be resolved and an automated mechanism for announcing, configuring, and removing devices must be standardized or we limit opportunities for wide-spread adoption of DER and limit the amount of efficiency we can create in the system. Measurement and verification of demand reduction is of growing importance, with many issues such as what is the baseline, or is the device actually off.

Key Actions:

- (1) **Develop or adopt standard DR signals** – NIST shall organize a meeting with IEC TC57, OASIS, NAESB, and AMI-ENT to specify a process for developing a common semantic model for standard DR signals. The effort shall ensure DR signal standards support load control, supply control, and environmental DERs.

## 6.5B Prioritized Actions

- (2) **Develop market signal standards** – NIST shall organize a meeting with policy makers, market operators/ISOs, and standards committees to develop common syntax and semantics for communicating market opportunities through the value chain and all the way to the customer. The effort shall develop policies that protect customers, but allow them to participate in the market. This is not an immediate need, but is something that requires a lot of thought and situational analysis.
- (3) **Develop DER discovery and profiling standards** – NIST shall coordinate a meeting with IEC TC57, OASIS, NAESB, and AMI-ENT for developing standard mechanisms for DER device discovery and profiling, persistence checks, and registry updates. The effort shall develop standard mechanisms for DER device discovery and profiling, persistence checks, and registry updates.

### 6.2.2 Wide Area Situational Awareness

The most critical elements of wide area situational awareness can be related to time. The events captured in different places of the power system need to have a common time base. Action for Time Synchronization and Management are shown in section 6.1.2.

At the enterprise application level, situational awareness is often tied to market conditions, weather, system configuration, outage awareness, neighbor system configuration, and many other factors. In order to properly account for these, at a minimum the timely exchange of system model data must be achieved. There are several standards that address this problem, but much more work is needed on model development, harmonization, exchange, etc.

A third topic is the requirement to have topology of the power network available in the different systems that require it in real time. Information captured needs to be associated with the current topology and with the place within the power network that information was acquired. Some mechanisms are in place today, but additional investigations are required on harmonization and extensions of these mechanisms.

Key actions:

- (1) **Develop application or role based synchronization guidelines** – NIST should organize a meeting between NASPI, IEC TC57 WG10 and IEEE PSRC with the objective of dealing with applications and guidelines around IEEE 1588, Network Time Protocol and IRIG-B as applied to power systems. Ensure efforts are applicable to devices, groups of devices, regions and combinations of regions. Ensure efforts include recovery from loss of synchronization.
- (2) **Develop map of IEC 61850 objects to DNP3** – IEC TC57 and DNP3 Users Group need to create mapping to provide for support of DNP3 protocols with the objectives of minimizing impact of existing installed asset base.
- (3) **Develop and extend IEC 61850 and IEC 61970 for data and messaging** – IEC TC57 WG19 should direct efforts of WG10 and WG13 to extend IEC 61850 from the substation to other substations and to the control centers as well as develop interoperable messaging for IEC 61970. Ensure standards support lossless model exchange between actors (substations and control centers, and others) and create standardized mechanism

## 6.5B Prioritized Actions

for mapping information models to communication formats and messages. Drive efforts toward use for near real time updates of power system models as this allows tools based on those models to support the presumed dynamism of demand response and storage. Include support for market signals, weather and other non-technical actionable information.

### 6.2.3 Electric Storage

Electric Storage is a new and emerging technology that has been identified by FERC as a functionality of smart grid. Due to the infancy of this technology there are few standards that exist to capture how it should be utilized on the Smart Grid. For example, to-date there exist no guidance or standards to address large or small mobile storage such as PHEVs. Electric Storage is treated as a distributed energy resource in some standards, but there may be distinctions between electric storage and connected generation.

The IEEE 1547 is an interconnection standard for interconnecting distributed energy resources (DER) with the electric power system. This standard defines DER as a small-scale electric generator located next to and connected to the load being served either with or without an electric grid interconnection. The standard does specify a distinction between electric storage devices within the DER portfolio. Also, there is no standardization for functioning during islanding.

FERC Order 719 currently prohibits generation of power within islanding. Distribution systems are beyond the purview of FERC and regulation does not exist for authorizing the application and dispatch of storage. ISOs and regulatory bodies today have a tendency to treat storage as a generation device and struggle with seeing transmission or distribution entities owning storage.

Key actions:

- (1) **Develop storage device electrical interconnection guidelines.** NIST should issue a request to IEEE SCC 21 that the IEEE 1547 working group recruit domain experts in energy storage devices and update or augment the 1547 standards series as appropriate to accommodate energy storage system specific requirements. Coordination with UL and SAE may be required for electric vehicle based storage systems.
- (2) **Develop storage device specific common information model.** NIST should issue a request to IEC TC 57 WG17 to recruit domain experts in energy storage devices and update or augment the 61850-7-420 standard as appropriate to accommodate energy storage system specific requirements.

### 6.2.4 Electric Transportation

There are three principle gaps in the area of Electric Transportation and the Smart Grid. We focus on vehicles such as Plug-In Electric [Hybrid] automobiles, trucks, and buses.

Models for settlement of energy costs and payments are developing slowly, with significant technical and policy/regulatory barriers. Proposals range from complex schemes for billing back to the driver's (or the owner's) home utility, simple charging as with current gasoline stations, to

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mixtures of prepaid and billed services as with cellular phones. When charging stations are ubiquitous, these issues will become even more important.

Similarly, mobile loads stress the distribution infrastructure. Similar approaches to those used for non-mobile loads point to two related gaps: a common model for Demand-Response signals (grid safety, and pricing for demand shaping), and a common model for price, energy characteristics, and time for use. There are alternatives, including very specific demand control mechanisms, but the benefits of applying economic demand shaping appear to be much greater, particularly given the growth of Demand-Response use in other customer areas.

We recognize that electric transportation will have a dual role as both a load to be managed and as a potential power source. Additionally, the impact of the PEVs on the planning and the management distribution system and its impact on system protection should be considered.

Key actions:

- (1) **Develop and standardize common object models** – SAE is developing the requirements as well as providing the definitions for data exchanges of PEVs, chargers, metering equipment, registration equipment, and other PEV-related equipment. However, they need to pass these data requirements and definitions to a standards organization for mapping into actual object models. NIST shall communicate with SAE, IEEE, IEC, UCA, OASIS to identify and select SDO for pricing model (see Section 6.1.1), DR signal standards (see Section 6.2.1), and scheduling standard (see Section 6.1.3.2).

### 6.2.5 Advanced Metering Infrastructure

The principle gap in this area is the substantial overlap without uniformity between metering models in use including ANSI C12.19, IEC 61850, IEC 61968, SEP 1, SEP2, COSEM/DLMS. Current protocols support primarily unidirectional relationships between the AMI head end and the meter. Other applications both within and external to customer premises seek to interact with the “meter” in near real-time on an as needed basis.

The primary goal of standards activities, should therefore, be the coercion of at least a subset of these models into cleanly nested complexity levels with common semantics for each shared subset.

The next highest priority is determining how to infuse a common set of cross-cutting requirements into these standards to facilitate exchange of confidential and authentic information across standards. Currently each AMI standard has its own distinct set of cyber security protocols and capabilities making sharing of information exceedingly complex and limited by the least common denominator.

A common theme raised with regard to ANSI C12.22 mixes the roles of various communications layers for functionality beyond what is traditionally the application layer. Extremely detailed knowledge of the standard is required to recognize where the boundaries exist for the application layer and, perhaps, where it replicates the functions of lower layer functionalities. Most commonly cited are the availability of segmentation and message routing capabilities. As is the common case in open SDO standards processes, there is often a need for implementation

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agreements done in a user forum that can constrain some of the flexibilities that the standard expresses and what users need.

Finally, while ANSI C12.19 is an extremely flexible revenue metering model, it leaves so large a set of degrees of freedom available that a consumer of this information needs to be fairly complex to resolve simple meter information such as a total KWH. ANSI C12.19 2008 has a mechanism by which table choices can be described, termed Exchange Data Language (EDL). This can be used to constrain oft utilized information into a well known form.

Key Actions:

- (1) **Translate ANSI C12.19 into the form of the common semantic model (See section 6.1.3)** -- NIST should work with NEMA to take on this task. The objective is to allow the lossless translation from the common form to the various syntactic representations prevalent in each Domain. Details will include the representation of the Decade/Table/Element model, as well as, the table-independent representation of key measurements of a revenue meter.
- (2) **Extend ANSIC12.19 and ANSI C12.22 to support common cyber security requirements** – NIST should complete a common set of cyber security requirements through its Cyber Security Task Group. When complete NIST should engage NEMA in a normalization activity to capture results into ANSI C12.22 and C12.19 so that they have the capabilities to satisfy the requirements.
- (3) **Define a conformance classification for ANSI C12.22 to constrain its scope** – NIST should work with NEMA to define, in their conformance testing standard C12.23, a set of conformance classifications that permit the varied capabilities of C12.22 to be selected and specified. Then work with UCAIug to define an implementation agreement to select subsets of ANSI C12.22 for use when integrating with other Smart Grid standard protocols.
- (4) **Design one or more standard meter profiles using ANSI C12.19 Exchange Data Language** – NIST should work with NEMA to utilize EDL to represent one or more meter profiles with distinct information locations and formats to simplify client access to commonly shared information.

## 6.2.6 Distribution Grid Management Initiatives

The key gaps or issues within DGM are primarily around standards harmonization (IEC 61968 and MultiSpeak®) and standards extensions (IEC 61968, MultiSpeak, IEC 61850, and IEEE 1547). Also, the implication of integrating information from individual customers, widespread sensors, and large numbers of PEVs with the real time operation of the grid needs study and modeling.

There is a clear need for developing a common semantic representation for distribution assets, equipment, interfaces, and characteristics. This would include building a semantic bridge between the two most widely implemented standard data models in DGM -- MultiSpeak and IEC 61968 CIM. Working Group 14 of IEC TC57 has already developed a roadmap for development of the IEC 61968 CIM to support distribution smart grid applications. This includes



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implementing a CIM profile for MultiSpeak. Accelerating this development will permit interoperability between a wide variety of smart grid applications that require access to common data and information and will also provide interoperability between MultiSpeak- and CIM-compliant applications. Such interoperation will make it easier for electric utilities to leverage investment in enterprise applications.

For actual device level communications and interfaces, DNP3 is typically used now and it is expected that this will continue for some time. In the short term, standardized approaches for network management, cyber security, and managing point lists using DNP3 are needed. This would essentially apply some of the important principles of IEC 61850 to DNP3 applications. In the longer term, migration to IEC 61850 for distribution management applications will require a number of important extensions and developments.

Key Actions:

- (1) **Accelerate the work of developing the Common Information Model (CIM)** for distribution applications, including integration of a CIM profile for MultiSpeak interoperability. Use the IEC TC57 WG 14 roadmap as a starting point for this effort.
- (2) **Develop neutral hosted vendor interoperability testing to demonstrate interoperability based on the CIM profiles.** Ensure that requirements developed by groups such as UCAIug AMI-ENT are included. Ensure that profiles account for capabilities inherent in both.
- (3) **Amend and extend IEC 61968, IEC 61850, and IEEE 1547** – NIST should bring together IEC TC57 WG14, WG10, IEEE SCC21 and OASIS architects to develop the framework for the amendment and extension of these standards to account for device profiles and discovery. Ensure that web services methods are harmonized among the candidate standards. Ensure that the standards are scalable for systems such as AMI and HAN.
- (4) **Develop processes to model PEV impact on the grid operations along with impacts of other widespread distributed resource impacts (local storage, high penetration PV, demand response as a distribution resource, etc.)** – NIST to work with DOE to explore the business and technical impact of these widely distributed resources (including aspects of PEV as highly portable demand/storage) on the grid with the objective of mitigating severe contingencies due to the widespread adoption and use of these technologies. Ensure that work includes transactional elements (settlement when charging/discharging away from “home”).

### 6.2.7 Cyber Security Strategy

The key actions are to complete the tasks identified in Section 3.3.2 of this document.

## 6.3 Further 2009 Roadmap Activities

This section summarizes actions to be taken beyond the initiation of the tasks listed in sections 6.1 and 6.2. These tasks are of more general and greater scope than the specific actions

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enumerated already in this report. They are necessary to complete the picture guiding the roadmap to completion and for achieving an active maintainable and evolving Smart Grid.

### 6.3.1 Completion of the NIST Standards Evaluation Process

This section identifies additional recommended work to conduct a more complete standards evaluation process. The work builds from the Interim Roadmap project including the input received from both workshops. These are in recognition that some key areas were not covered to the depth necessary to cover the full landscape of standards that could be applied to the Smart Grid.

To understand the full landscape of the Smart Grid applications landscape a selected set of additional priority use cases based on priority areas not selected for the workshops should be developed as part of the standards evaluation process.

In turn, through a more complete process, all the use cases can become fully developed for moving to the designs and implementations of equipment.

These raw materials should be imported into the NIST IKB to enable a growing ontology and applications database to be used for further analysis, elaboration, and application development.

Key Action:

- (1) **Additional Smart Grid Application Use Cases** – NIST should convene the DEWGS to summarize a list of use cases and assemble them according to the process devised for the Interim Roadmap. Identify and implement additional architecturally significant use cases within critical application areas not covered in the Interim Roadmap
- (2) **Bring all Roadmap Use Cases to common basis of completion** – NIST should facilitate completion of the body of Roadmap Use Cases. This includes the completion of the narratives, lists of actors, information objects, a diagram, and the allocation of standards and requirements to GWAC Stack layers.
- (3) **Import the results into the NIST IKB.** – NIST should task the managers of the IKB to perform the import.

#### 6.3.1.1 Requirements Analysis

The workshops and initial team analysis uncovered some of the significant requirements but the work needs to be continued to get to the details necessary to reveal key requirements. Critical areas include not only refining the applications requirements but developing full sets of cyber security and management requirements.

Section 4.9 Requirements Analysis identifies the suggested process for performing a detailed analysis of the Use Cases and the standards.

Key Action:

- (1) **Requirements Analysis** – NIST should authorize a project to execute this task. Implement the requirements analysis process of section 4.9. The objective of this task is

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to analyze Use Cases and Requirements so that they can quantitatively analyze the fit of proposed domain profiles to the Use Cases.

- (2) **GAPS/Overlaps Resolution Process** – NIST should authorize a project to perform this task. The objective of this task is to evaluate the adequacy of the candidate standards domain profiles and optimize them to select specific standards for specific GWAC layers. Use the requirements analysis to perform an evaluation of the standards and recommended practices proposed for the Smart Grid. Additionally, this analysis is used to elucidate the remaining gaps and overlaps not discovered by the “inspection process” of the workshops and Interim Roadmap analysis.

### 6.3.2 Architecture Framework Development and NIST IKB

Architecture development processes can develop the mechanisms to effectively integrate the development of standards and recommended practices across the greater Smart Grid industry. Architecture development by definition covers the top four categories of the GridWise Architecture Council (GWAC) Stack, the use cases for specific applications, and virtually all of the cross cutting issues in the GWAC documents. In addition Architecture development includes the development of methods, tools and strategies by which the greater Smart Grid industry can converge on not only business, policy and governance topics but can also assist in the resolution of many of the technical issues that have resulted from narrowly focused but well intended bodies of work.

The industry can benefit from a systematic approach to integrating key policies from regulators and key stakeholders. In addition forms of governance and policy management should be developed to effectively establish a National infrastructure in critical areas such as management and cyber security.

This roadmap has served as an initial form of industry baseline for standards. This baseline has shown that the industry has substantial good work but much of it remains largely fragmented. This is where Architecture development concepts are useful. Baseline development itself is one of several architecture related technical activities.

The following are recommendations for evaluating and adopting a more formal and structured approach to industry architecture.

Key Action:

- (1) **Define scoping tasks to substantiate the need for Interoperability Architecture for the Smart Grid** - NIST working with key stakeholders establishes a project to evaluate and, pending a positive result, define an architectural framework for Smart Grid at about the level of FEA or DODAF for their respective communities. Then, integrate work from established SDO and technical organizations that have been working on Architecture development processes. Develop cooperative relationships between Federal and State Agencies as well as Stakeholder communities.
- (2) **Interoperability Architecture Process Adoption** - The Smart Grid requires a systematic approach to the integration of technical standards and recommended practices. Pending the successful determination of task (1), above, NIST should oversee the development of

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an Interoperability Architecture to guide the work described in this interim roadmap. NIST should rely on existing work including: The Open Group Architecture Framework Version 9, IEEE 1479, ISO 10746, and other published work on interoperability.

### 6.3.3 Policy and Regulatory

We must understand the affect of policy and regulatory choices on technology choices.

For example, a regulatory decision that merely permits resale of electricity can enable a new (or extended) business for charging Plug-in Electric Vehicles that follows the model for gasoline sale with customers paying cash or using credit/debit cards to pay for charging, while using Automated Demand Response and grid safety signals to ensure the continued reliability of the electricity distribution infrastructure.

A further set of regulations and policy changes would be needed to support identity-based charge-back for energy use and supply to the “home” utility, but requires augmentation of the users’ expectations – and a great deal of additional complexity to allow identification, billing, clearing, and related issues.

Policy makers and regulators should carefully consider the complexity and costs of the induced technology changes, and whether changes are critical to Smart Grid evolution. For example, a generative approach might take the minimal changes and allow the development of unregulated business models, while a more complex chargeback scheme may require deep and rigid technologies—just because we can execute a technological solution does not necessarily mean that we should.

- (1) **Development of Architecture Governance and Policy Integration Processes.** This task should also include consistent approaches to energy industry business models where they are critical to the development of Smart Grid components and equipment such as revenue meters, and consumer owned equipment.
- (2) **Consideration of changes in regulation to enable new business models and complex technologies.** Minor differences in regulation may require major investment in technology to satisfy requirements. The standard cost-benefit analyses made by regulators need to address broader economic and stakeholder issues.

## 7 Definitions

### 7.1 Terms

*Note that it is impossible to write a document of broad scope such as this without encroaching on definitions understood to have accepted but different meanings in more than one constituent audience. Therefore, for the purposes of considered understanding, the definitions in this section represent the intended meanings of the authors when used within this document.*

Availability	<p>“Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information...” [44 U.S.C., SEC. 3542]</p> <p>A loss of availability is the disruption of access to or use of information or an information system.</p>
Architecture	<p>The Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework defines architectures as “<i>the structure of components, their interrelationships, and the principles and guidelines governing their design and evolution over time.</i>”[12].</p>
Capability	<p>The ability of a standard to satisfy a Requirement</p>
Confidentiality	<p>“Preserving authorized restrictions on information access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information...” [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]</p> <p>A loss of confidentiality is the unauthorized disclosure of information.</p>
Customer	<p>The consumer of energy or services</p>
Domain	<p>The definition of a profile of standards organized by Interface and Requirements.</p>
Integrity	<p>“Guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation and authenticity...” [44 U.S.C., Sec. 3542]</p> <p>A loss of integrity is the unauthorized modification or destruction of information.</p>
Interface	<p>The place at which two systems meet and act on or communicate with each other.</p>
Requirement	<p>(1) A condition or capability needed by a user to solve a problem or achieve an objective. (2) A condition or capability that must be met or possessed by a system or system component to satisfy a contract, standard, specification, or other formally imposed documents.</p>
Standards	<p>A technical specification, usually produced by a Standards Development Organization (SDO).</p>

## **7.2 ACRONYMS**

ACSE	Association Control Service Element
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
AMI	Advanced Metering Infrastructure
AMR	Automated Meter Reading
ANSI	American National Standards Institute
API	Application Program Interface
ASD	NII DoD CIO - Assistant Secretary of Defense - Networks & Information Integration - CIO Office
ASHRAE	American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air Conditioning Engineers
BAS	Building Automation System
CA	Contingency Analysis
CEIDS	Consortium for Electric Infrastructure to Support a Digital Society
CM	Configuration Management
CIM	Common Information Model
CIGRE	International Council On Large Electric Systems
CIP	Critical Infrastructure Protection
CIS	Customer Information System
CPP	Critical Peak Pricing
CSCTG	Smart Grid Cyber Security Coordination Task Group
CSRC	Computer Security Resource Center
DA	Distribution Automation
DDNS	Dynamic Domain Name System
DER	Distributed Energy Resources
DES	Data Encryption Standard
DEWG	Domain Expert Working Group
DGM	Distribution Grid Management
DHCP	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DHS	Department of Homeland Security

## 7.6 Definitions

DLC	Direct Load Control
DMS	Distribution Management System
DNS	Domain Name System
DOD	Department of Defense
DOE	Department of Energy
DP	Dynamic Pricing
DR	Demand Response
DRCEE	Demand Response & Consumer Energy Efficiency
DWML	Digital Weather Markup Language
ECWG	Electronic Commerce Working Group
EDL	Exchange Data Language
EISA	Energy Independence and Security Act
EMCS	Utility/Energy Management and Control Systems
EMS	Energy Management System
EPRI	Electric Power Research Institute
ES	Energy Storage
ESP	Energy Service Provider
EUMD	End Use Measurement Device
EV	Electric Vehicle
EVSE	Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCC	Federal Communications Commission
FERC	Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FTP	File Transfer Protocol
GHG	Greenhouse Gases
GID	Generic Interface Definition
GIS	Geographic Information System

## 7.6 Definitions

GOOSE	Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event
GSA	General Services Administration
GWAC	GridWise Architecture Council
HTTP	Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
HVAC	Heating Ventilating and Air Conditioning
IATFF	Information Assurance Technical Framework Forum
ICS	Industrial Control Systems
IEC	International Electrotechnical Commission
IECSA	Integrated Energy and Communications System Architecture
IED	Intelligent Electronic Device
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
IETF	Internet Engineering Task Force
IHD	In-Home Display
IRM	Interface Reference Model
IOSS	Interagency OPSEC Support Staff
IP	Internet Protocol
ISO	International Organization for Standardization, Independent Systems Operator
IT	Information Technology
KPI	Key Point of Interoperability
LAN	Local Area Network
LMS	Load Management System
MDMS	Meter Data Management System
MGI	Modern Grid Initiative
MIB	Management Information Base
MIME	Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
MFR	Multi-level Feeder Reconfiguration
MMS	Manufacturing Messaging Specification
NAESB	North American Energy Standards Board



## 7.6 Definitions

NARUC	National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
NEMA	National Electrical Manufacturers Association
NERC	North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NIAP	National Information Assurance Partnership
NIPP	National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NIETP	National IA Education and Training Program
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
NSA	National Security Agency
NSM	Network and System Management
OASIS	Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
OGC	Open Geospatial Consortium
OID	Object Identifier
OMG	Object Management Group
OMS	Outage Management System
OpenSG	Open Smart Grid
OSI	Open Systems Interconnection
OWASP	Open Web Application Security Project
PEV	Plug-in Electric Vehicles
PMU	Phasor Measurement Unit
QOS	Quality Of Service
RAS	Remedial Automation Schemes
RBAC	Role Based Access Control
RFC	Request For Comments, Remote Feedback Controller
RSA	Rivest, Shamir, Adelman
RTO	Regional Transmission Operator
RTP	Real-Time Pricing
RTU	Remote Terminal Unit

## 7.6 Definitions

SCADA	Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SCL	Substation Configuration Language
SCP	Secure Copy Protocol
SDO	Standards Development Organization
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SNMP	Simple Network Management Protocol
Sntp	Simple Network Time Protocol
SP	Special Publication
SOA	Service-Oriented Architecture
SSH	Secure Shell
SSP	Sector Specific Plan
TCP	Transport Control Protocol
TFTP	Trivial File Transfer Protocol
TOGAF	The Open Group Architecture Framework
TOU	Time-of-Use
UCA	Utility Communications Architecture
UCAIug	UCA International Users Group
UID	Universal Identifier
UML	Unified Modeling Language
VVWC	Voltage, Var, and Watt Control
WAMS	Wide-Area Measurement System
WAN	Wide Area Network
WASA	Wide Area Situational Awareness
XML	Extensible Markup Language

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## 9 Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain

This section organizes subsets of standards and specifications into Domain Profiles. As described in the conceptual model, presented in section □, information must flow across interfaces between Actors. These Actors may be within the same Domain or may be in separate domains; therefore, these interfaces may be intra-Domain or inter-Domain. Many of the same standards and specifications are used across many different interfaces, and, conversely, many interfaces must support different standards and specifications for engineering design reasons. Given this many-to-many relationship, the interfaces with similar requirements are combined, and the key standards and specifications are organized by Domain and categorized into hierarchical layers by the GWAC stack.

The word “standard” is used for all in this section, regardless of whether it was developed by a Standards Developing Organization (although as stated below, the SDO process is preferred as a means of testing a specification with broad stakeholder input). Any further description occurs in a particular listing (*e.g.*, “specification”, “requirements”, “agreement”, etc.).

For a summary of the standards referenced in this section, see section 10 Appendix B: Alphabetical Standards List.

Selection for inclusion in the Interim Roadmap was based upon the following non-exclusive criteria:

- (1) Standard was supported by an Standards Developing Organization (SDO) or via an emergent SDO process
- (2) Standard is also supported by a users community
- (3) Standard is directly relevant to the Use Cases analyzed for the Smart Grid
- (4) Consideration was given to those standards with a viable installed base and vendor community

In the tables which follow, each conceptual model domain is represented by a table of standards and specifications that represent the union of results from the analyses performed for this Interim Roadmap. As discussed in section 4.9 Requirements Analysis, these tables will be further refined as standards gaps are filled and harmonization across standards are realized.

As can be seen in the tables, there are many standards that were identified for each GWAC layer. Each of the GWAC layers represents one or more interfaces at which one or more standards can be applied. These fall into three categories:

- (1) Upper layers 4-8: These layers represent application-specific information that binds closely to the function of the Actor, as opposed to where the Actor is located. For this reason, they are largely Domain-independent. Complementary standards should be retained, and overlapping standards should be either harmonized or chosen amongst.
- (2) Layer 3 and the cross-cutting issues: These represent highly domain-specific standards. An optimized process should result in the combining and harmonization of

## 9.8B Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain

standards to minimize the options for these interfaces so that devices and applications for that domain can have a minimum of complexity.

- (3) Layers 1&2: These represent media and lower layers of communications interfaces. Although communications infrastructures should be as homogeneous as possible, engineering designs and constraints must dictate local decisions. As long as these interfaces can carry the semantics of the upper layers with the required qualities of service, the specific choice of these layers can be transparent to the Actors. Thus these interfaces can be optimized for the actual physical locations in which they are deployed.

When the tables below are viewed, the functional and performance requirements can be used to select the best sets of standards and specifications to meet those requirements.

The analysis process discussed in sections 4.9 and 6.3.1 will lead to valuing some standards over others and the harmonization of other standards to minimize the need for adaptors at interfaces. As the Smart Grid evolves, the construction of concise, non-duplicative profiles will simplify the design and need for those adaptors. Naturally, adaptors will still be necessary to allow the legacy technologies to interact in the Smart Grid. In essence this permits adaptors to be constructed to translate from the limited number of domain profile standards to the other domain profile standards, thus predominantly simplifying the many-to-many translation task to a one-to-many basis.

Finally, it can be recognized that for any Actor to communicate with any other Actor, all mismatches between standards at each GWAC interface must be resolved by adaptor devices – bridges, routers, or gateways. By decoupling the need for these adaptors from the nature of the Actors, themselves, efficiencies and simplifications can be achieved in the marketplace by devising such adaptors that can represent many Actors on either side of the Domain boundary rather than duplicated in each device itself.

### 9.1.1 Operations

**Table 14 – Standards Profile for Operations Domain**

GWAC Stack Layer	Operations
8. Policy	*IEC 61968, Measurement&Verification (NAESB WEQ015), Access to usage data, FERC Rulings, CIP Reliability Standards, FERC 888
7. Business Objectives	FERC 888
6. Business Procedures	Measurement&Verification (NAESB WEQ015), DNP3, FixML, OpenADR, CIP - 004-1 Reliability Standards, NAESB (OASIS)
5. Business Context	*ICCP (IEC 60870-6/TASE 2), MultiSpeak
4. Semantic Understanding	IEC 61968, IEC 61970, ICCP (IEC 60870-6/TASE 2), MultiSpeak, DNP3, IEC 61850, ZigBee, ASHRAE 135-2008, ISO/IEC 14908-1 etc, EMIX (OASIS), OpenADR, NAESB OASIS, DNP3
3. Syntactic Interoperability	XML/SOAP, Web Services, message queueing, ZigBee, ASHRAE 135-2008, ISO/IEC 14908-1 etc, DNP3, FixML, WS-Calendar (OASIS), OpenADR (OASIS Energy Interop), oBIX, ZigBee HomePlug Smart Energy Profile, OpenHAN, Smart Energy Profile, OpenADR, ANSI C12.22, ANSI C12.19, IEC 60870-6 (ICCP), IEC 61850, FTP, IEC 60870-6 TASE.2, IEEE C37.111-1999, IEEE 37.118, NASPI

## 9 8B Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain

2. Network Interoperability	UDP, IPSec, DSCP, MPLS, VPN, Ethernet (IEEE 802.3), IEEE 802.1 and 802.2, TCP/IP, UDP/IP, ZigBee, HomePlug, ASHRAE 135-2008, BACnet Web Services, ISO/IEC 14908-1 etc, LAN, WAN, WLAN, TCP/IP, Metropolitan Area Network (MAN) – IEEE 802.11x MAC, TCP & IPv4, IPv6 Addressing, Distributed Network Protocol (DNP3), IEEE 1379-2000 Data Link Layer, NIST 140-2
1. Basic Connectivity	ZigBee, IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE 802.11, IEEE 803, ASHRAE 135-2008, ANSI/CEA 852, ANSI/CEA 709 Series, GSM, CDMA, GPRS, DSL, LAN, WAN, WLAN, TCP/IP, GPRS, 3GPP/LTE, WiMAX, IEEE 802.20, IEEE 802.16d, WiMAX, IEEE 802.3, IEEE 1379-2000 PHY Layer, IEEE 1588
Shared Meaning of Content	ICCP (IEC 60870-6/TASE 2), MultiSpeak
Resource Identification	ICCP (IEC 60870-6/TASE 2), MultiSpeak
Time Synch & Sequencing	NTP
Security and Privacy	IPSec, SSL, TLS, AES128 for example, Access Control, Authentication, Data and Messaging Integrity, Non-repudiation, Confidentiality, Privacy, IEC 61968, IEC 61970, NIST 800-53
Logging & Auditing	SNMP v3, SysLog
Transaction State Management	
System Preservation	
Quality of Service	DSCP
Discovery & Configuration	
System Evolution & Scalability	
Network Management [non-GWAC Stack]	
Electromechanical [non-GWAC Stack]	

### 9.1.2 Markets

**Table 15 – Standards Profile for Markets Domain**

GWAC Stack Layer	
8. Policy	AMI-SEC
7. Business Objectives	
6. Business Procedures	DNP3, FixML
5. Business Context	
4. Semantic Understanding	MultiSpeak, IEC 61970, NAESB OASIS, IEC 61970
3. Syntactic Interoperability	XML, WSDL, DNP3, FixML, Web services
2. Network Interoperability	TCP/IP, SSL, ZigBee, ANSI C12.24
1. Basic Connectivity	TCP/IP
Shared Meaning of Content	
Resource Identification	

## 9.1.3 Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain

Time Synch & Sequencing	
Security and Privacy	Access Control, Authentication, Data and Messaging Integrity, Non-repudiation, Confidentiality, Privacy
Logging & Auditing	
Transaction State Management	
System Preservation	
Quality of Service	
Discovery & Configuration	
System Evolution & Scalability	
Network Management	
[non-GWAC Stack]	
Electromechanical	
[non-GWAC Stack]	

### 9.1.3 Service Provider

**Table 16 – Standards Profile for Service Provider Domain**

GWAC Stack Layer	
8. Policy	Access to usage data
7. Business Objectives	
6. Business Procedures	
5. Business Context	
4. Semantic Understanding	OpenADR/OASIS Energy Interop, ZigBee SEPs, IEC 61968, IEC 61970, Encryption and Security, OpenADR, IEC 61850
3. Syntactic Interoperability	ASHRAE 135-2008, XML, Web services, OpenADR, J2293 or similar (see PEV), ANSI C12.22, ANSI C12.19
2. Network Interoperability	ANSI C12.19, ANSI C12.22, ZigBee, HomePlug, WAN, GPRS, LAN, OpenAMI, TCP/IP
1. Basic Connectivity	DSL, T1, etc, Ethernet IEEE 802.x, Internet, WAN, GPRS, 3GPP/LTE, WiMAX, TCP/IP
Shared Meaning of Content	
Resource Identification	
Time Synch & Sequencing	
Security and Privacy	
Logging & Auditing	
Transaction State Management	
System Preservation	



## 9 8B Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain

Quality of Service	
Discovery & Configuration	
System Evolution & Scalability	
Network Management	
[non-GWAC Stack]	
Electromechanical	
[non-GWAC Stack]	

### 9.1.4 Bulk Generation

**Table 17 – Standards Profile for Bulk Generation Domain**

GWAC Stack Layer	
8. Policy	NERC Reliability
7. Business Objectives	FERC, States
6. Business Procedures	
5. Business Context	
4. Semantic Understanding	IEC 60870-6 / TASE.2 , IEC 61968, IEC 61850-7-420
3. Syntactic Interoperability	IEC 60870-6 TASE.2, IEEE C37.111-1999, IEEE 37.118, IEC 61850, NASPI, ASN.1
2. Network Interoperability	TCP/IP
1. Basic Connectivity	IEEE 802.3
Shared Meaning of Content	
Resource Identification	
Time Synch & Sequencing	
Security and Privacy	IEC 61968, IEC 61970, NIST 800-53
Logging & Auditing	
Transaction State Management	
System Preservation	
Quality of Service	
Discovery & Configuration	
System Evolution & Scalability	
Network Management	
[non-GWAC Stack]	

## 9 8B Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain

Electromechanical [non-GWAC Stack]	
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### 9.1.5 Distribution

**Table 18 – Standards Profile for Distribution Domain**

GWAC Stack Layer	
8. Policy	NERC Reliability
7. Business Objectives	
6. Business Procedures	
5. Business Context	IEC 61968-9, MultiSpeak
4. Semantic Understanding	DNP3, IEC 61850-7-3, IEC 61850-7-4, IEC 61968-9, MultiSpeak, IEC 61970, GIS Standards, SNMP, IEC 62351-7, ANSI C37.118
3. Syntactic Interoperability	DNP3, IEC 61850-7-2, W3C XML, W3C XSD, W3C SOAP, MultiSpeak, W3C EXI, W3C WSDL, ANSI C12.22, IEC 60870-6, IEC 61968, MultiSpeak v4, IEC 62351, VPN, IEEE 1686-2007, NERC-CIP (Tx), IEC 60870-6 TASE.2, IEEE C37.111-1999, IEEE 37.118, NASPI
2. Network Interoperability	IP Suite, TCP/IP
1. Basic Connectivity	IEEE 802.*, GPRS, EVDO, 1xRTT, POTS, IEEE P1901, IEEE 802.16
Shared Meaning of Content	
Resource Identification	
Time Synch & Sequencing	
Security and Privacy	IEC 62351-4, IPSec, SSL, TLS, AMI-SEC, WS-Security, TLS, IEC 61968, IEC 61970, NIST 800-53
Logging & Auditing	
Transaction State Management	
System Preservation	
Quality of Service	DSCP
Discovery & Configuration	
System Evolution & Scalability	
Network Management	
[non-GWAC Stack]	
Electromechanical [non-GWAC Stack]	

### 9.1.6 Transmission

**Table 19 – Standards Profile for Transmission Domain**

GWAC Stack Layer	
8. Policy	NERC PRC
7. Business Objectives	Reliability
6. Business Procedures	
5. Business Context	
4. Semantic Understanding	IEC 60870-6 / TASE.2, IEEE C37.118 , DNP3, IEC 61850, IEC 61968, IEC 61970, MultiSpeak V4, IEEE C37.118, IEEE C37.232, IEEE 1588, IEC 61970-452, -453, -456, ANSI C12.19
3. Syntactic Interoperability	DNP3, IEC 61850, XML, WSDL, ICCP, IEEE C37.111-1999, IEEE 1159.3, IEC 61970-552, IEC 61850, IEC 60870-6 TASE.2, IEEE 37.118, NASPI, ASN.1
2. Network Interoperability	TCP/IP, ICCP: IEC 60870-6, IEC 61850, DNP3, W3C
1. Basic Connectivity	IEC 61850, IEEE 802.3
Shared Meaning of Content	
Resource Identification	IEEE C37.2
Time Synch & Sequencing	IEEE 1588
Security and Privacy	IEEE 1686, IEC 62351, NERC CIP, IEC 61968, IEC 61970, NIST 800-53
Logging & Auditing	
Transaction State Management	
System Preservation	
Quality of Service	
Discovery & Configuration	
System Evolution & Scalability	
Network Management	
[non-GWAC Stack]	
Electromechanical	
[non-GWAC Stack]	

### 9.1.7 Customer

**Table 20 – Standards Profile for Customer Domain**

GWAC Stack Layer	CustomersHome
8. Policy	AMI-SEC, Open HAN, UL Safety Standards, ANSI C12
7. Business Objectives	ANSI C12.19, ANSI C12.1, ANSI C12.20
6. Business Procedures	Measurement & Verification (NAESB WEQ015), Web stuff-Discovery, Web

## 9 8B Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain

	Services
5. Business Context	OpenADR/OASIS Energy Interop, OpenHAN
4. Semantic Understanding	ANSI C12.19, IEC 61968, SEP 2.0, ANSI C12.22, ANSI C12.21, ANSI C12 , Measurement & Verification (NAESB WEQ015), ISO/IEC 18012, ASHRAE 135-2008, ISO/IEC 14908-1, oBIX, IEC 60929 DALI, ZigBee SEpv2 (in prep), XML, OpenADR, OASIS Energy Interop, OpenHAN, Web services, ISO/IEC 24752 (Universal Remote Console UI), ICCP, DLMS/COSEM, IEC 61850, ISO/IEC 14908-1 etc, OpenHAN, IEC 61968-9
3. Syntactic Interoperability	ZigBee SEP 2, ANSI C12.22, IEC 61850, HTTP, XML, JAVA, ANSI C12.19, W3C EXI, ZigBee Smart Energy Profile (in prep), ANSI C12.21, ANSI C12, Measurement&Verif (NAESB WEQ015), ISO/IEC 18012, ASHRAE 135-2008, ISO/IEC 14908-1, oBIX, IEC 60929 DALI, OpenADR, OASIS Energy Interop, OpenHAN, UDP, IEC 61968 XML, Web Services, DLMS/COSEM, ASHRAE 135-2008, ISO/IEC 14908-1,
2. Network Interoperability	IETF approved IPV6 or 6LoWPAN, Gateway Stds ISO/IEC 15045, SOAP, HTTP, ZigBee SEP, HOMEPLUG, ISO/IEC 14908-1 etc, ASHRAE 135-2008, ANSI C12.19, C12.22, ISO/IEC 15067-3 (EMC), ISO/IEC 18012, OpenAMI, OpenHAN, TCP/IP, WAN, LAN, WLAN, GPRS, ISO/IEC 14908-1 etc, ZigBee
1. Basic Connectivity	IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE 802.11, 802.16e or any other standardized PHY (eg: cdma, gsm), SAE J-series, IEEE P1901, ANSI C12.18, POTS, GPRS, EVDO, 1xRTT, GSM, C12.22-2008, IEEE 802.15.4 , IEEE 802.3, GSM/GPRS/EDGE/HSDPA, CDMA/EVDO, SMS, IEEE 802.x, IEEE P1901, RDS, ISO/IEC 14908-1 etc, NIC to Meter, ZigBee, IETF 6LOWPAN, LAN, WLAN, Internet, WAN, GPRS, 3GPP/LTE, WiMAX, IEEE P1901, IEEE P2030, HPAV/HPGP, SAE J2836/3, SAE J2847/3, ZigBee/HomePlug
Shared Meaning of Content	ANSI C12.19 Document/XML forms/Tables, ZigBee Smart Energy Profile, , IEEE 802.x, IEEE P1901, RDS, ISO/IEC 14908-1, NIC to Meter, XML Schema, IEC 61968, IEC 61970 Part 3
Resource Identification	ISO Registered Object IDs per NAEDRA and sub-registrars, ZigBee Resource IDs, Provisioning of meters, association with customer accts, PKI
Time Synch & Sequencing	ANSI C12.19, Zigbee SEP 2, GPS, C12.19-2008, ZigBee, NTP, 802.11, 802.15, GPS
Security and Privacy	Zigbee SEP 2, AES128, ECC , IP-SEC, TLS, WS-Security, ANSI C12.22, IEEE 802.1x, EAP, FIPS 197, RADIUS, ANSI C12.19-2008, NIST 800-53, NIST 800-82, ISO 27000 Series, IEEE 802.11x WiFi, Common Criteria
Logging & Auditing	ANSI C12.19-2008, NIST 800-53, NIST 800-82, ISO 27000 Series
Transaction State Management	C12.19-2008, C12.22-2008, AMI-SEC, SOAP/XML
System Preservation	ISO 27000 Series, NIST 800-53
Quality of Service	C12.19-2008
Discovery & Configuration	Zigbee SEP 2, C12.19-2008, C12.22-2008
System Evolution & Scalability	C12.19-2008, C12.22-2008
Network Management [non-GWAC Stack]	

## 9 8B Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain

Electromechanical [non-GWAC Stack]	C12.22-2008
<b>GWAC Stack Layer</b>	<b>CustomersCommercial</b>
8. Policy	AMI-SEC, ANSI C12
7. Business Objectives	
6. Business Procedures	Measurement & Verification (NAESB WEQ015), Web stuff-Discovery, web services
5. Business Context	
4. Semantic Understanding	ASHRAE 135-2008, MultiSpeak v4, IEC 61968, LonWorks, XML, oBIX, ANSI C12, Measurement & Verification (NAESB WEQ015), ISO/IEC 18012, ISO/IEC 14908-1, oBIX, IEC 60929 DALI, ZigBee SEpv2 (in prep), XML Schema, OpenADR, OASIS Energy Interop, ICCP, Web Services, ANSI C12.19, DLMS/COSEM, IEC 61850, ANSI C12.18
3. Syntactic Interoperability	ASHRAE 135-2008, XML, WSDL, SOAP, Web services, ICCP, IEC 61850, IEC 61968, DNP3, ModBus, ANSI C12, Measurement&Verif(NAESB WEQ015), ISO/IEC 18012, ISO/IEC 14908-1, oBIX, IEC 60929 DALI, ZigBee SEpv2 (in prep), XML Schema, OpenADR/OASIS Energy Interop, XML, DLMS/COSEM, ANSI C12.22, IEC 61849
2. Network Interoperability	ASHRAE 135-2008, TCP/IP, SSL, ZigBee, ANSI C12.22, Gateway Stds, ISO/IEC 15045, HTTP, OpenHAN, WAN, LAN, WLAN, GPRS, ISO/IEC 14908-1
1. Basic Connectivity	ASHRAE 135-2008, IEEE 802.x, LAN, WLAN, Internet, WAN, GPRS, 3GPP/LTE, WiMAX, IEEE P1901, IEEE P2030, HPAV/HPGP, SAE J2836/3, SAE J2847/3, IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE 802.16, ZigBee/HomePlug
Shared Meaning of Content	
Resource Identification	Provisioning of meters, association with customer accts
Time Synch & Sequencing	ASHRAE 135-2008
Security and Privacy	ASHRAE 135-2008, Access Control, Authentication, Data and Messaging Integrity, Non-repudiation, Confidentiality, Privacy
Logging & Auditing	ASHRAE 135-2008
Transaction State Management	ASHRAE 135-2008
System Preservation	
Quality of Service	
Discovery & Configuration	
System Evolution & Scalability	ASHRAE 135-2008
Network Management [non-GWAC Stack]	
Electromechanical [non-GWAC Stack]	

## 9B Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain

GWAC Stack Layer	CustomersIndustrial
8. Policy	AMI-SEC, ANSI C12
7. Business Objectives	
6. Business Procedures	Measurement & Verification (NAESB WEQ015), Web stuff-Discovery, web services
5. Business Context	
4. Semantic Understanding	ASHRAE 135-2008, MultiSpeak v4, IEC 61968, LonWorks, XML, oBIX, ANSI C12, Measurement & Verification (NAESB WEQ015), ISO/IEC 18012, ISO/IEC 14908-1, oBIX, IEC 60929 DALI, ZigBee SEpv2, OpenADR, OASIS Energy Interop, ICCP, Web Services, ANSI C12.19, DLMS/COSEM, IEC 61850, ANSI C12.18
3. Syntactic Interoperability	ASHRAE 135-2008, XML, WSDL, Web services, ICCP, IEC 61850, IEC 61968, DNP3, ModBus, ANSI C12, Measurement & Verification (NAESB WEQ015), ISO/IEC 18012, ISO/IEC 14908-1, oBIX, IEC 60929 DALI, ZigBee SEpv2, SOAP, OpenADR, OASIS Energy Interop, DLMS/COSEM, ANSI C12.22, IEC 61849
2. Network Interoperability	ASHRAE 135-2008, TCP/IP, SSL, ZigBee, ANSI C12.22, Gateway Stds, ISO/IEC 15045, HTTP, OpenHAN, WAN, LAN, WLAN, GPRS, ISO/IEC 14908-1
1. Basic Connectivity	ASHRAE 135-2008, IEEE 802.x, LAN, WLAN, Internet, WAN, GPRS, 3GPP/LTE, WiMAX, IEEE P1901, IEEE P2030, HPAV/HPGP, SAE J2836/3, SAE J2847/3, IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE 802.16, ZigBee/HomePlug
Shared Meaning of Content	
Resource Identification	Provisioning of meters, association with customer accts
Time Synch & Sequencing	ASHRAE 135-2008
Security and Privacy	ASHRAE 135-2008, Access Control, Authentication, Data and Messaging Integrity, Non-repudiation, Confidentiality, Privacy
Logging & Auditing	ASHRAE 135-2008
Transaction State Management	ASHRAE 135-2008
System Preservation	
Quality of Service	
Discovery & Configuration	
System Evolution & Scalability	ASHRAE 135-2008
Network Management [non-GWAC Stack]	
Electromechanical [non-GWAC Stack]	

GWAC Stack Layer	CustomersPEV
8. Policy	ANSI C12, FCC Frequency Stds
7. Business Objectives	
6. Business Procedures	Measurement & Verification (NAESB WEQ015), Web stuff-Discovery, web services

## 9 8B Appendix A: Standards Profiles by Domain

5. Business Context	
4. Semantic Understanding	ANSI C12, Measurement & Verification (NAESB WEQ015), ISO/IEC 18012, ASHRAE 135-2008, ISO/IEC 14908-1, oBIX, IEC 60929 DALI, ZigBee SEpv2, OpenADR, OASIS Energy Interop, ICCP, XML, Web Services, Financial transaction models, SAE J2836, SAE J2847
3. Syntactic Interoperability	ANSI C12, Measurement & Verification (NAESB WEQ015), ISO/IEC 18012, ASHRAE 135-2008, oBIX, IEC 60929 DALI, ZigBee SEpv2, OpenADR, OASIS Energy Interop, Web Services, XML, OpenHAN, SAE J2293, SAE J2836, ISO/IEC 14908-1 etc
2. Network Interoperability	Gateway Stds ISO/IEC 15045, SOAP, HTTP, Web services, TCP/IP, Internet, WiFi, Cellular, P1901, HomePlug, ZigBee, ISO/IEC 14908-1
1. Basic Connectivity	IEEE 802.x, SAE J1772-Power Delivery, SAE 2836, IEEE P1901, HomePlug, PLC, Wireless Communication
Shared Meaning of Content	
Resource Identification	Provisioning of meters, association with customer accts
Time Synch & Sequencing	
Security and Privacy	Access Control, Authentication, Data and Messaging Integrity, Non-repudiation, Confidentiality, Privacy, Existing standards for financial transactions, TCP/IP security suite
Logging & Auditing	
Transaction State Management	
System Preservation	
Quality of Service	
Discovery & Configuration	HomePlug
System Evolution & Scalability	
Network Management [non-GWAC Stack]	
Electromechanical [non-GWAC Stack]	IEEE 1547, SAE J1772-Power Delivery

## 10 Appendix B: Alphabetical Standards List

The information provided is a guide to standards listed elsewhere in this document. This listing contains information available and collated at “press” time on these standards. An appropriate activity for further work would be to more fully quantify this information so it may be used in the requirements analysis (see section 4.9 Requirements Analysis). These standards were all referenced in workshop 2 Use Case analysis by the participants.

For each standard listed in this section, find summarized:

<b>Application</b>	A brief description of the application area for the standard
<b>Actors</b>	List of typical actors using the standards
<b>Interfaces</b>	GWAC Stack interfaces where the standard applies
<b>Maturity</b>	A brief description of the maturity of the standard
<b>Category</b>	Nature of the organization responsible for the creation and maintenance of the standard and the organization name

### 10.1 **ANSI C12.1**

Application: Performance and safety type tests for revenue meters

Actors: Revenue meter, Utility personnel

Interfaces:

Maturity: About 100 years old and continually under revision

Category: SDO – ANSI (NEMA) Accredited Standards Committee

### 10.2 **ANSI C12.18/IEEE P1701/MC1218**

Application: protocol and optical interface for measurement devices

Actors: End devices

Interfaces: handheld computer, computer, end device

Maturity: Revision 2.0 published in 2006

Category: SDO – ANSI / IEEE / MC - American National Standard designated standard developed by ANSI (NEMA) Accredited Standards Committee (will be IEEE 1701 and MC1218)

### 10.3 **ANSI C12.19-2008/IEEE 1377-200x/MC1219-200x**

Application: End Devices, including revenue metering applications for electricity, water, and natural gas, MDMS, home appliances, load control devices, sensors; the information model

Actors: End Device (including Meters, Gateways), Metering System devices, Meter Data Management System, Enterprise, Handheld Interrogator, Testing Apparatus



## 10 9B Appendix B: Alphabetical Standards List

Interfaces: Multiple media – optical, wired, wireless, any-available; requires companion protocol for messaging and services (*e.g.*, ANSI C12.18, ANSI C12.21, ANSI C12.22) plus an underlying transport protocol (*e.g.*, TCP/IP, TCP/UDP, WiFi)

Maturity: Version 2.0 (2008) published March 2009, has certification and testing, industry-wide implementations.

Category: SDO – ANSI (NEMA) / IEEE / MC – American National Standard designated standard developed by ANSI Accredited Standards Committee, IEEE Standard, Measurement Canada Standard

### **10.4 ANSI C12.20**

Application: Revenue metering accuracy specification and type tests

Actors: Revenue meters

Interfaces: Revenue meter, certification personnel, billing systems

Maturity: Many revisions, under ballot for next revision.

Category: SDO – ANSI (NEMA) Accredited Standards Committee

### **10.5 ANSI C12.21/IEEE P1702/MC1221**

Application: Transport of measurement device data over telephone networks

Actors: Measurement devices

Interfaces: Measurement devices, utility communications network

Maturity: Version 2.0 published in 2006

Category: SDO – ANSI (NEMA) / IEEE / MC – American National Standard designated standard developed by ANSI Accredited Standards Committee (will be IEEE 1702 and MC1222)

### **10.6 ANSI C12.22-2008/IEEE P1703/MC1222**

Application: End Device Tables communications over any network

Actors: End Device (including Meters), Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI), Head End, AMI Collector, Handheld Interrogator

Interfaces: Multiple media – optical, wired, and wireless

Maturity: Version 1.0 published March 2009, has certification and testing.

Category: SDO – ANSI (NEMA) / IEEE / MC – American National Standard designated standard developed by ANSI Accredited Standards Committee (will be IEEE 1703 and MC1222)

### **10.7 ANSI C12.24**

Application: VA calculation algorithm catalog

Actors: Measurement devices, sensors, MDMS, enterprise applications

Interfaces: Multiple

Maturity: In development

Category: SDO – ANSI (NEMA)

### **10.8 ANS/CEA 709/IEC 14908 LonWorks**

Application: Building Automation, HAN, AMI

Actors: Building EMS, building infrastructure devices, meters

Interfaces: Serial, Ethernet, IP – wired and wireless, Power line communication

Maturity: Has users group, has certification and testing

Category: SDO – Consumer Electronics Association (CEA) and International Standard (ISO/IEC). Also adopted by IFSF (Gasoline station standards), IEEE Passenger Rail standards, CECED Home Appliance standards

### **10.9 ANS/CEA 852-2002**

Application: Tunneling Component Network Protocols over Internet Protocol Channels

Actors:

Interfaces:

Maturity: 2002

Category: SDO – Consumer Electronics Association

### **10.10 ASN.1 (Abstract Syntax Notation)**

Application: Used to serialize data; used in (e.g.) X.400

Actors:

Interfaces: Information exchange

Maturity: 1984, revised 1995 and 2002

Category: SDO—ISO/IEC/ITU-T

### **10.11 BACnet ANSI ASHRAE 135-2008/ISO 16484-5**

Application: building automation

Actors: Building EMS, building infrastructure devices

Interfaces: Serial, Ethernet, IP – wired and wireless

Maturity: Has users group, has certification and testing

Category: SDO – National (ASHRAE/ANSI) and International Standard (ISO)

### **10.12 DHS Cyber Security Procurement Language for Control Systems**

The National Cyber Security Division of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) developed this document to provide guidance to procuring control systems products and services - it is not intended as policy or standard. Since it speaks to control systems, its methodology can be used with those aspects of Smart Grid systems.

Application: Guidance on procuring cyber security technologies for control systems

Actors: Control systems

Interfaces: Interfaces requiring security

Maturity: Methodology is mature; detailed security technologies require on-going updates

Category: Security

**10.13 DLMS/COSEM (IEC 62056-X) Electricity metering - Data exchange for meter reading, tariff and load control.**

Device Language Message Specification/Companion Specification for Energy Metering

Application: Meters

Actors: meters and head end

Interfaces: protocol

Maturity: Deployed.

Category: UA/SDO

**10.14 DNP3**

Application: Substation and feeder device automation

Actors: Protective relays, metering devices, cap bank controllers, switches, SCADA Master, applications

Interfaces: Serial, Ethernet, IP over TCP or UDP,

Maturity: Has security built in, has users group, has certification and testing

Category: De facto, Open, Industry Standard, Deprecated for new work

**10.15 EMIX (OASIS)**

Application: Exchange of price, characteristics, time, and related information for markets

Actors: Market makers, market participants, quote streams, premises automation, and devices

Interfaces: Information carried by (e.g.) OpenADR and Dynamic Price communication

Maturity: Under development.

Category: Open, International SDO

**10.16 FERC 888 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities**

Application: Regulatory Documentation for Wholesale Competition

Actors: Various across the Smart Grid

Interfaces: Various across the Smart Grid

Maturity: Issued for several years by Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

Category: Regulator

### **10.17 FIXML Financial Information eXchange Markup Language**

Application: Data exchange for markets

Actors:

Interfaces:

Maturity: 1992. Used in financial markets including NASDAQ.

Category: Consortium maintains public domain specifications

### **10.18 Geospatial Information Systems**

See “Open Geospatial Consortium”

### **10.19 GPS**

Application: Global Positioning System

Actors:

Interfaces: Geospatial location, time

Maturity: Deployed

Category: Gov

### **10.20 HomePlug AV**

Application: Entertainment Networking Content Distribution

Actors: Consumer Electronic Equipment

Interfaces: Powerline Communications with Consumer Electronics

Maturity: HomePlug AV released 2005

Category: Consortia

### **10.21 HomePlug GP**

Application: Control and Management of Residential Equipment

Actors: Whole-house control products: Energy Management, lighting, appliances, climate control, security and other devices.

Interfaces: Residential Equipment through Power Line Physical Media Communications

Maturity: HomePlug Command and Control released 2007

Category: Consortia

### **10.22 IEC 60870-6 / TASE.2**

Application: Inter-Control Center Communications

Actors: SCADA, EMS

Interfaces: Ethernet and IP based communications, MMS

Maturity: Implemented

Category: SDO - IEC

### **10.23 IEC 60929 AC-supplied electronic ballasts for tubular fluorescent lamps – performance requirements**

Appendix E is known as DALI.

Application: Information to and from lighting ballasts for Energy Management Systems

Actors: Energy Management Systems, devices

Interfaces:

Maturity: Implemented

Category: SDO - IEC

### **10.24 IEC 61850**

Application: Substation Automation and Protection, Distribution Automation, Distributed Energy Resources, Hydro Generation, SCADA to field devices

Actors: Protective relays, SCADA Master, DER, PQ Meters, fault recorders, applications

Interfaces: Ethernet and IP based communications, with on-going work for network architecture to address environments with different network constraints

Maturity: Parts into third round of update, has users group, has certification and testing

Category: SDO - IEC

### **10.25 IEC 61968 Common Information Model (CIM)**

Application: Enterprise information representation, including transmission, distribution, back office metering

Actors: Databases, software applications

Interfaces: Application to application information exchange

Maturity: Parts in second revision, parts in first revision, parts under development, has users group, however, no certification, interoperability has not been standardized, and significant testing is required.

Category: SDO - IEC

### **10.26 IEC 61970 Common Information Model / Generic Interface Definition (GID)**

Application: Back Office Information Systems Integration

Actors: Workstations and Desktop Systems in Control Centers

Interfaces: Workstations and Desktop Systems in Control Centers

Maturity: Has users group; however, no certification, interoperability has not been standardized, and significant testing is required

Category: SDO - IEC

### **10.27 IEC 62351 Parts 1-8**

Application: Security for protocols, network and system management, role-based access control

Actors: Field devices, SCADA, networks

Interfaces: Field networks

Maturity: New standard, being implemented by field protocols, NSM being mapped to protocols

Category: SDO –IEC

### **10.28 IEC PAS 62559**

Application: Requirements development method for all applications

Actors: Many

Interfaces: Many

Maturity: Pre-standard, wide acceptance by early smart grid and AMI implementing organizations

Category: SDO - International Publicly Available Specification (IEC)

### **10.29 IEEE C37.2**

Application: Protective circuit device modeling numbering scheme

Actors: various switchgear

Interfaces: Semantic

Maturity: Mature standard

Category: SDO - IEEE

### **10.30 IEEE C37.111-1999**

Application: Applications using Transient Data from Power System Monitoring

Actors: Power System Relays, Power Quality Monitoring Field and Workstation equipment

Interfaces: Power System Relays and Field Equipment with Transient and PQ monitoring Capabilities

Maturity: Mature IEEE Standard (COMTRADE), Work items in progress

Category: SDO - IEEE

### **10.31 IEEE C37.118**

Application: Phasor Measurement Unit communications

Actors: Phasor Measurement Unit (PMU), Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC), Applications

Interfaces: Ethernet, IP, and serial based communications

Maturity: Published version 2.0 in 1005 (was IEEE Std 1344-1995), no certification or testing

Category: SDO - IEEE

### **10.32 IEEE C37.232**

Application: Naming Time Sequence Data Files  
Actors: Substation Equipment requiring Time Sequence Data  
Interfaces: Substation Equipment communications  
Maturity: Released as IEEE Standard  
Category: SDO - IEEE

### **10.33 IEEE 802 Family**

This includes 802.1, 802.2, 802.3, 802.11 and subparts, 802.15.4, 802.15.4g, 802.16 and subparts, 802.20.

- 802.1 Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks (MAC/PHY layers)
- Station and Media Access Control Connectivity Discovery
- 802.2 No reference material found
- 802.3 Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Detection Physical Layer
- 802.11 Wireless LAN Medium Access Control and Physical Layer (MAC/PHY). Subparts are different network speeds and MAC/PHY characteristics. Commonly called WiFi. IEEE 802.11b data rate is 11Mbps, IEEE 802.11g data rate is 54Mbps, IEEE 802.11i specifies security
- 802.15.1 Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPAN). Base for Bluetooth
- 802.15.4 Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs). Base for ZigBee and others
- 802.16 Fixed Broadband Wireless access systems. Base for WiMAX
- 802.20 No reference material found

Application: Networking  
Actors: Hardware devices, network interfaces  
Interfaces: Hardware  
Maturity: Mature, deployed, certification. Newer/later numbers are somewhat less mature  
Category: SDO - IEEE

### **10.34 IEEE 803**

Application: Recommended Practice for Unique Identification in Power Plants  
Actors:  
Interfaces:  
Maturity: Withdrawn/archived. Originally 1983.  
Category: SDO - IEEE

### **10.35 IEEE 1159.3**

Application: Communications with Distributed Energy Resources  
Actors: Distributed Energy Resources and Master Station Controls

## 10 9B Appendix B: Alphabetical Standards List

Interfaces: Various for DER equipment

Maturity: Issued as IEEE Standard

Category: SDO - IEEE

### **10.36 IEEE 1379-2000**

Application: Substation Automation

Actors: Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and remote terminal units (RTUs) in electric utility substations

Interfaces: IED and RTU communications

Maturity: Available as IEEE Standard

Category: SDO - IEEE

### **10.37 IEEE 1547**

Application: Physical and Electrical Interconnections between utility and distributed generation (DG); subparts for test procedures (1547.1), interconnection (1547.2) and monitoring, information exchange and control (1547.3)

Actors: Customers, vendors, utilities

Interfaces: Point of Common Coupling (PCC)

Maturity: Reaffirmed in 2008, Implementations by utilities, vendors, and their customers

Category: SDO – IEEE

### **10.38 IEEE 1588**

Application: Time Management and Clock Synchronization

Actors: Various across the Smart Grid, equipment needing consistent time management

Interfaces: Various across the Smart Grid

Maturity: IEEE 1588-2008 Now Available from IEEE SA, additional work in progress

Category: SDO - IEEE

### **10.39 IEEE 1686-2007**

Application: The IEEE 1686-2007 is a standard that defines the functions and features to be provided in substation intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) to accommodate critical infrastructure protection programs. The standard covers IED security capabilities including the access, operation, configuration, firmware revision, and data retrieval.

Actors:

Interfaces:

Maturity:

Category: SDO – IEEE



#### **10.40 IEEE P1901**

Application: Smart Grid Physical Communications Broadband over Powerline (MAC/PHY)

Actors: Various across the Smart Grid

Interfaces: Potentially applicable across the Smart Grid

Maturity: P1901 Approved as Baseline standard December 2008

Category: SDO-IEEE

#### **10.41 IEEE P2030**

Application: Smart Grid Infrastructure

Actors: Various across the Smart Grid

Interfaces: Potentially applicable to across the Smart Grid

Maturity: First meeting June 2007. States will build on prior IEEE work

Category: SDO-IEEE

#### **10.42 IETF Standards**

See “Networking Profiles Standards and Protocols.”

#### **10.43 Internet-Based Management Standards (DMTF, CIM, WBEM, ANSI INCITS 438-2008)**

Application: Data Communications Networking, Routing, Addressing, Multihoming, Faults, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, Security and other management

Actors: Routers, Intermediate and Edge Devices

Interfaces: Routers, Intermediate and Edge Devices

Maturity: Broadly deployed. Support in NICs for secure distributed management.

Category: SDO – National Standard ANSI INCITS 438-2008. DMTF Server Management listed in DOE/EPA Energy Star for Servers

#### **10.44 Internet-Based Management Standards (SNMP vX)**

Application: Data Communications Networking, Routing, Addressing, Multihoming, Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, Security and other management

Actors: Routers, Intermediate and Edge Devices

Interfaces: Routers, Intermediate and Edge Devices

Maturity: SNMPv1 mature and in widespread use, SNMP v3 added security features and released in 2003 as Standard.

Category: SDO – Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)

#### **10.45 ISA SP99**

Application: Cyber security mitigation for industrial and bulk power generation stations.

International Society of Automation (ISA) Special Publication (SP) 99 is a standard that explains

## 10 9B Appendix B: Alphabetical Standards List

the process for establishing an industrial automation and control systems security program through risk analysis, establishing awareness and countermeasures, and monitoring and improving an organization's cyber security management system. Smart Grid contains many control systems that require cyber security management.

Actors: Industrial automation systems

Interfaces: Affects various interfaces in an industrial automation system

Maturity: Published and in use

Category: SDO – ISA

### **10.46 ISA SP100**

Application: Wireless communication standard intended to provide reliable and secure operation for non-critical monitoring, alerting, and control applications specifically focused to meet the needs of industrial users.

Actors: Industrial meters and edge devices

Interfaces: ISA100.11a provides extensions to the 802.15.4 MAC layer and defines network layer through application layer functions and services.

Maturity: ISA 100.11A is in final draft form, being balloted for approval. Projected completion: June 2009.

Category: SDO – ISA

### **10.47 ISO27000**

Application: Security Management Infrastructure

Actors: Various across IT environments, could be applied to field systems

Interfaces: Potentially applicable to many Smart Grid systems

Maturity: 27000 series standards are in their infancy, identified related standards in British and other SDOs

Category: SDO- International Standard ISO

### **10.48 ISO/IEC DIS 14908 Open Data Communication in Building Automation, Controls and Building Management (LonWorks)**

Application: Building Automation, HAN, AMI

Actors: Building EMS, building infrastructure devices, meters

Interfaces: Serial, Ethernet, IP – wired and wireless, Power line communication

Maturity: Has users group, has certification and testing

Category: SDO – National (ANSI) and International Standard (ISO/IEC). Also adopted by IFSF (Gasoline station standards), IEEE Passenger Rail standards, CECED Home Appliance standards

### **10.49 ISO/IEC 15045 Home Electronic Systems Gateway**

Application: The Residential Gateway (RG) is a device of the Home Electronic System (HES) that connects home network domains to network domains outside the house. It supports

## 10 9B Appendix B: Alphabetical Standards List

communications among devices within the premises, and among systems, service providers, operators, and users outside the premises.

Actors: Residential Gateway, HAN devices, non -premise systems

Interfaces: Interfaces between the RG and other devices and systems

Maturity: Published 2004

Category: HAN Gateways – SDO – ISO/IEC

### **10.50 ISO/IEC TR 15067-3 Home Electronic Systems (HES) application model -- Part 3: Model of an energy management system for HES**

Application: Home Electronic Systems (HES) application model -- Part 3: Model of an energy management system for HES

Actors: Energy management system, HAN devices

Interfaces: HAN

Maturity: Published 2000

Category: HAN – SDO – ISO/IEC

### **10.51 ISO/IEC 18012 home electronic systems - guidelines for product interoperability**

Application: Specifies requirements for product interoperability in the area of home and building automation systems, with sufficient detail needed to design interoperable Home Electronic System products.

Actors: HAN devices

Interfaces: HAN

Maturity: Published 2004

Category: HAN – SDO – ISO/IEC

### **10.52 ISO/IEC 24752 user interface – universal remote control**

Application: Facilitates operation of information and electronic products through remote and alternative interfaces and intelligent agents. The series of standards, ISO/IEC 24752: 1-5, defines a framework of components that combine to enable remote user interfaces and remote control of network-accessible electronic devices and services through a universal remote console (URC)

Actors: User interface devices

Interfaces: Language and template for user interfaces

Maturity: Published in 2008

Category: User Interface – SDO – ISO/IEC

### **10.53 MultiSpeak v4.0**

Application: Integration for utilities and vendors

Actors: Transmission and distribution components, meters.

Interfaces: Common semantics, message structure, and business process support

Maturity: Version 4 under development, has user group, has certification

Category: Consortium—National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

### **10.54 NAESB OASIS (Open Access Same-Time Information Systems)**

Application: Utility business practices

Actors: Utility and market operators

Interfaces: Business process

Maturity: Mature, has certification

Category: SDO—North American Energy Standards Board

### **10.55 NAESB WEQ 015 Business Practices for Wholesale Electricity Demand Response Programs**

Application: Utility business practices for Demand Response

Actors: Utility and market operators

Interfaces: Business process

Maturity: Released

Category: SDO—North American Energy Standards Board

### **10.56 Networking Profiles Standards and Protocols**

Recent workshops and prior work by the power industry has needed to adopt open standards for networking profiles. The Internet Protocols and standards in widespread use are supported by a significant number of documents. There is no single document that defines a networking profile for the use of the Internet Protocol. In addition the power industry will need a variety of different profiles to meet different requirements.

NIST Special Publication 500-267[16] provides an example of profiles that several Internet Protocols and their capabilities satisfying the requirements of Smart Grid applications.

### **10.57 Network Standards**

This list represents the collections of communications networking standards: 1xRTT, 3GPPP/LTE, CDMA, DLS, EDGE, EvDO, GPRS, GSM, HSDPA, POTS, RDS, SMS.

### **10.58 NERC CIP 002-009**

The National Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is a series of standards are directly relevant to the bulk power system critical cyber assets. CIP-002 states the means by which a critical cyber asset is identified. The remaining standards identify security management controls, personnel and training, electronic security perimeters, physical security of cyber assets, systems security management, incident handling and recovery planning.

### **10.59 NIST FIPS 140-2**

Application: U.S. government computer security standard used to accredit cryptographic modules.

Actors: All actors requiring security

Interfaces: Interfaces requiring security

Maturity: Security levels are used extensively

Category: Security –Gov NIST/ITL, IETF

### **10.60 NIST FIPS 197 AES**

Application: Cryptographic standard: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)

Actors: Actors using AES encryption

Interfaces: Interfaces using AES encryption

Maturity: Used widely

Category: Security –Gov NIST/ITL, IETF

### **10.61 NIST SP 800-53**

Application: NIST Special Publication 800-53 is a standard developed as a foundational level of security controls required for federal information systems. The standard provides a method for tailoring security controls to an organization. Appendix I of the document provides guidance for tailoring to industrial control systems (ICS).

Actors: Federal information systems

Interfaces: Interfaces between federal information systems

Maturity: Widely used by federal information systems

Category: Security –Gov NIST/ITL not a standard

### **10.62 NIST SP 800-82**

Application: NIST Special Publication 800-82 Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security is a draft standard covers security guidance for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, distributed control systems and other control system configurations. The standard defines ICS characteristics, potential threats and vulnerabilities to these types of systems, developing an ICS security program, network architecture and security controls.

Actors: Actors in distributed control environments

Interfaces: Interfaces in distributed control environments

Maturity: Just released

Category: Security – Gov NIST/ITL not a standard

### **10.63 oBIX**

Application: Building automation, access control

## 10.9B Appendix B: Alphabetical Standards List

Actors: Building EMS

Interfaces: Web services to embedded systems

Maturity: International deployment, but early adoption. Open source clients and servers available; identified roadmap to include scheduling component.

Category: Open specification, OASIS (SDO-International), next stage is OASIS Standard

### **10.64 OGC Standards**

See “Open Geospatial Consortium Standards.”

### **10.65 Open Automated Demand Response (OpenADR)**

Application: Demand response

Actors: Utility/ISO operations, aggregation server (“DRAS”), customer EMS/device

Interfaces: Utility/ISO to aggregation server (using SOAP), aggregation server to customer EMS/device (using SOAP or REST), various configuration/management interfaces

Maturity: V1.0 specification published in 2009 as a CEC report, used in some California DR programs with commercial/industrial customers

Category: Open specification, contributed to OASIS (SDO – International) and UCAIug (Industry Consortia Requirements and User Group) for further development. Under development in OASIS.

### **10.66 Open Geospatial Consortium Standards**

Application: Geospatial and location based services, Geographical Information System (GIS) standards.

Actors: Spatial coordinates (three dimensional)

Interfaces: Various

Maturity: Wide international deployment, integrated with many technologies including building information systems, emergency management systems, and location databases

Category: Open specification, Open Geospatial Consortium, International Consensus Standards

### **10.67 OSI (Open Systems Interconnect) Networking Profiles**

Application: Data Communications Networking, Routing, Addressing, Multihoming, Mobility and other networking services supporting functions

Actors: Routers, Intermediate and Edge Devices at layers 3 through 7 of OSI BRM

Interfaces: Routers, Intermediate and Edge Devices

Maturity: Developed but little market share, technical issues remaining

Category: SDO – International Organization for Standardization (OSI CLNP/TP4)

### **10.68 OSI-Based Management Standards (CMIP/CMIS)**

Application: Application: Data Communications Networking, Routing, Addressing, Multihoming, Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, Security and other management

## *10 9B*Appendix B: Alphabetical Standards List

Actors: Routers, Intermediate and Edge Devices

Interfaces: Routers, Intermediate and Edge Devices

Maturity: In widespread use in telecommunications infrastructure, mature technology

Category: SDO – International Organization for Standardization (OSI)

### **10.69 RFC 3261 SIP: Session Initiation Protocol**

Application: Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application-layer control (signaling) protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating sessions with one or more participants.

Actors: cross-cutting

Interfaces: syntax, semantic

Maturity: IETF Internet standards track protocol

Category: SDO - IETF

### **10.70 SAE J1772 Electrical Connector between PEV and EVSE**

Application: Electrical connector between Plug-in Electric Vehicles (PEVs) and Electric Vehicle Supply Equipment (EVSE)

Actors: PEVs, EVSEs

Interfaces: Interface between PEV and EVSE

Maturity: Under development

Category: PEVs – SDO - SAE

### **10.71 SAE J2293 Communications between PEVs and EVSE for DC Energy**

Application: Communications between PEVs and EVSE for DC energy flow

Actors: PEV, EVSE

Interfaces: Interface between PEV and EVSE

Maturity: Re-issued for DC energy flow interactions – superseded for other communications

Category: PEVs - SDO - SAE

### **10.72 SAE J2836/1-3 Use Cases for PEV Interactions**

Application: J2836/1: Use Cases for Communication between Plug-in Vehicles and the Utility Grid. J2836/2: Use Cases for Communication between Plug-in Vehicles and the Supply Equipment (EVSE). J2836/3: Use Cases for Communication between Plug-in Vehicles and the Utility Grid for Reverse Power Flow

Actors: PEV, EVSE, Utility Grid

Interfaces: PEV to EVSE to Utility

Maturity: Under development

Category: PEV - SDO - SAE

### **10.73 SAE J2847/1-3 Communications for PEV Interactions**

Application: J2847/1 Communication between Plug-in Vehicles and the Utility Grid. J2847/2 Communication between Plug-in Vehicles and the Supply Equipment (EVSE). J2847/3 Communication between Plug-in Vehicles and the Utility Grid for Reverse Power Flow

Actors: PEV, EVSE, Utility Grid

Interfaces: PEV to EVSE to Utility

Maturity: Under development

Category: PEV - SDO – SAE

### **10.74 UCAIug AMI-SEC System Security Requirements**

Application: The AMI Security (AMI-SEC) System Security Requirements (SSR) are a set of high-level requirements ratified by the utility user community in the AMI-SEC Task Force of the UCA International Users Group (UCAIug) and developed by ASAP (AMI Security Acceleration Project). These requirements are directly relevant to Smart Grid AMI and other applications. Utilities use these requirements to procure equipment. Vendors use the SSR in Smart Grid product development.

Actors: cross-cutting

Interfaces: Security

Maturity: published reference

Category: De facto, Open, Industry Consortia Requirements Specification (UCAIug)

### **10.75 UCAIug OpenHAN System Requirements Specification**

Application: Home Area Network device communication, measurement, and control

Actors: Energy Service Interface, HAN Devices

Interfaces: Technology and GridWise Architecture Council (GWAC) layers 1-3 independent

Maturity: First version, no certification or testing

Category: De facto, Open, Industry Consortia Requirements Specification (UCAIug)

### **10.76 W3C EXI (Efficient XML Interchange)**

Application: Tokenized/compressed transmission for XML

Actors: Any

Interfaces: Format

Maturity: Second Public Working Draft.

Category: Open, Industry Consortium

### **10.77 W3C Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)**

Application: XML protocol for information exchange

Actors: Any

Interfaces:



Maturity: Standard. (W3C Recommendation). Version 1.2, User groups

Category: Open, Industry Consortium

### **10.78 W3C WSDL Web Service Definition Language**

Application: Definition for Web services interactions

Actors: Any

Interfaces:

Maturity: Standard (W3C Recommendation), Version 2.0, User groups

Category: Open, Industry Consortium

### **10.79 W3C XML eXtensible Markup Language**

Application: Self-describing language for expressing and exchanging information

Actors: Any

Interfaces:

Maturity: Standard (W3C Recommendation), Version 1.0 (4<sup>th</sup> Edition), and Version 1.1 (2<sup>nd</sup> Edition), User groups

Category: Open, Industry Consortium

### **10.80 W3C XSD (XML Schema Definition)**

Application: Description of XML artifacts, used in WSDL (q.v.) and Web Services as well as other XML applications.

Actors: All

Interfaces:

Maturity: Standard (W3C Recommendation), Implemented, Version 1.0. Version 1.1 in progress.

Category: Open, Industry Consortium

### **10.81 WS-Calendar (OASIS)**

Application: XML serialization of IETF iCalendar for use in calendars, buildings, pricing, markets, and other environments

Actors: Any

Interfaces:

Maturity: Under development (OASIS)

Category: Open, SDO - International

### **10.82 WS-Security**

Application: Toolkit for building secure, distributed applications. Broadly used in eCommerce and eBusiness applications. Fine-grained security. Part of extended suite using SAML, XACML, and other fine-grained security standards.

Actors: Any

## 10 9B Appendix B: Alphabetical Standards List

Interfaces:

Maturity: Standard (OASIS), Version 1.1 (Feb 2006), Version 1.0 (March 2004), Implemented, User group

Category: Open, International SDO (OASIS)

### **10.83 ZigBee/HomePlug Smart Energy Profile 2.0**

Application: Home Area Network (HAN) Device Communications and Information Model

Actors: Meter / HAN Gateway, HAN Device

Interfaces: Multiple media – wireless and Power Line Carrier (PLC)

Maturity: Version 1.0 published by ZigBee Alliance, has users group, has certification and testing

Category: De facto, Open, Industry Consortia Specification

## 11 Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

The following tables of requirements and standards gaps were derived primarily from the results of the Smart Grid Workshop #2, with clarifications, edits, and a few additions from the Project Team. These tables form the basis for the NIST Action Plan described in Section 6 and provides the detailed actions that NIST should promote. In addition to the specific requirements and standards gaps, some issues were identified that need further discussion before concrete actions on standards can be taken.

The complete results from the Workshop #2 are shown in the Gaps Assessment Spreadsheet in a separate annex to this document.

### 11.1 Action Items Related to Demand Response and Markets

#### 11.1.1 Requirements and Standards Gaps Related to Demand Response and Markets

The following requirements and related gaps in standards were identified, where the activities can be commenced (or have already commenced) relatively quickly, after brief discussions with the organizations identified.

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<b>Common Model for Price</b> As PEVs move from area to area, a common interoperable model for price and energy characteristics and time for dynamic pricing across areas, markets, providing a consistent integration model.	NAESB, EMIX, OpenADR, IEC 61850-7-420, others	Common interoperable price formats, characteristics, time, and units are needed to abstract away the complexities of markets to actionable information for the PEV.	SAE, IEC, NEMA, NAESB, OASIS	Semantic Syntactic	Customer Operations Services Markets	PEV Customer EMS Commercial Industrial Generation

11 10BAppendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<p><b>Provide energy usage information to Customer EMS:</b> Customers and/or their energy management systems would like or require energy usage information in order to help make decisions, such as what parameters to set for demand response, whether to change DR plans, or whether to take specific actions now in anticipation of future DR events.</p>	OpenHAN Smart Energy Profile ANSI C12.19	Open access protocol needed for timely access to metering information by the premises management system	OpenHAN, ZigBee/HomePlug Alliance, NEMA	Object Modeling Messaging	Customer	Meter, Customer EMS
<p><b>Extend IEC 61850-7-420 standard for additional DER:</b> In order for DR signals to interact appropriately with all types of DER devices, additional types of DER equipment need to be modeled. These models will need to take into account how the DER could be used for demand response and/or load management, which DER information can be simple extensions to existing DER models, and which need new development.</p>	IEC 61850-7-420, OpenADR, Smart Energy Profile	Currently IEC 61850-7-420 for DER covers wind (actually IEC 62400-25), photovoltaic systems, fuel cells, diesel generators, batteries, and combined heat and power (CHP). These models need to be extended to include updates or new models of DER devices.	IEC TC57 WG17, NEMA, OASIS, ZigBee, Policy	Policy Semantic Syntactic Interoperability	Operations Service Provider Customer	Transmission EMS Distribution DMS Aggregators DER
<p><b>Extend IEC 61968 standard for DER:</b> IEC 61968 needs DER models, but should be harmonized with the existing DER object models in IEC 61850-7-420, as well as all on-going DER 61850 development. IEC 61850-7-420 has architectural issues to be addressed.</p>	IEC 61968-xx, eBusiness, others TBD	IEC 61968 needs DER models to carry the IEC 61850-7-420 models of DER and PEV to integrate with the enterprise. Address issues in IEC 61850-7-420,	IEC TC57 WG14, NEMA	Semantic Syntactic interoperability Network	Operations DER	Distribution DMS

**11.1.2 Discussion Issues Related to Demand Response and Markets**

The following table lists the topics that need to be discussed and resolved before the appropriate standards can be developed or extended, usually to ensure that standards which were already developed are used (rather than re-inventing the wheel) or that the most appropriate standard is selected to extend.

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
Customer	<p><b>Make available pricing and market information:</b> Market information must be delivered across all domains: Generation, market, DER, T&amp;D, customer, etc. (Wholesale and retail real-time pricing available to everyone.)</p> <p>IEC 61970, IEC 61968, and IEC 61850-7-420 need updates for handling prices. OpenADR needs to be vetted as if it becomes a standard, Smart Energy Profile provides communications at the Customer site.</p>	FERC's OASIS, IEC CIM for Markets, IEC 61850-7-420, OpenADR, Smart Energy Profile	FERC/PUC IEC TC57 WG13, NEMA, WG14, WG16, WG17 SAE, OASIS
Customer	<p><b>Consumer registration of out-of-the-box appliances;</b> open up and authenticate on someone's smart home network; how to authenticate – how will this happen in future</p>	IEC 61850-7-420, OpenADR, Smart Energy Profile	IEC TC57, NEMA, OASIS, SG Users Group

## 11.2 Action Items for Wide Area Situational Awareness

### 11.2.1 Requirements and Standards Gaps Related to Wide Area Situational Awareness

The following requirements and related gaps in standards were identified, where the activities can be commenced (or have already commenced) relatively quickly, after brief discussions with the organizations identified.

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<p><b>Extend IEC 61850 standard from substation to control center:</b> Since the data in the substation uses the IEC 61850 information model, this data should be reported to the control center using the same information model. This will also simplify the harmonization efforts between the models of data collected from the field and the CIM.</p>	IEC 61850	IEC 61850 models all the equipment and functions in the substation. If those models could be brought back to the control center, then this same powerful information model would be used for SCADA and other applications, thus minimizing translations and expensive and data maintenance activities that sometimes lead to insecure and/or unsafe situations.	IEC TC57 WG10 & WG19, NEMA	Object Modeling Messaging	Operations	Substations , SCADA systems, EMS, DMS

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<p><b>Extend IEC 61850 standard between substations:</b> Some protective relaying and certain other functions require communications between substations, but still rely on legacy, or proprietary protocols. Since IEC 61850 is used within substations, the same protocol should be used between substations.</p>	IEC 61850	IEC 61850 needs to be expanded to handling substation-to-substation protective relaying and other information exchanges.	IEC TC57 WG10, NEMA	Messaging Networkin g	Operations Transmission Distribution	Protective relays
<p><b>Develop interoperable messaging standards for the IEC 61970 (CIM):</b> The CIM for transmission (IEC 61970) does not specify formats or messaging methods for exchanging CIM information, thereby requiring many implementation to develop their own formats and messaging requirements. There is no interoperability between implementations unless they have explicitly worked together.</p>	IEC 61970	If CIM format and messaging standards were developed, then CIM implementations could be interoperable without custom development by vendors and lengthy interoperability tests for each implementation..	IEC TC57 WG13, NEMA	Messaging	Transmission	EMS
<p><b>Extend the time synchronization standard:</b> Time synchronization to millisecond based on GPS clock is needed by Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) for accurate timestamping. Specifically IEEE 1588, Network Time Protocol (NTP), and IRIG-B need to ensure they can handle this time synchronization, and mappings to IEC 61850 and DNP3 need to ensure they can transport the results.</p>	IEEE 1588, Network Time Protocol, IRIG-B	Timestamps at the accuracy required for PMU's are not specifically covered in the time protocols.	NASPI- PSTT IEC TC57 WG10, NEMA, IEEE PSRC H7	Time Synch & Sequencing	Operations	Field sensors
<p><b>Develop calibration rules for PMUs:</b> Standard rules for calibration &amp; update of measurement devices, common tolerances, depending on application</p>	No Standards Exist	Standard Needed for PMU, Real Time Rating System	NASPI/NER C/ NIST IEEE/IEC TC95	Business Objectives	Operations	Field sensors

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<p><b>Map IEC 61850 objects to DNP3 for legacy interfaces:</b> For transition between using DNP3 and converting to IEC 61850, the IEC 61850 object models need to be mapped to DNP3</p>	DNP3 - Application Layer	IEC 61850 object models need to be mapped to DNP objects	IEC TC57 WG03, NEMA	Object Modeling	Operations	T&D SCADA Field Equipment
<p><b>Exchanging both transmission and distribution power system models:</b> As it becomes increasingly critical for transmission and distribution operations to have clear and accurate information about the status and situations of each other, they need to be able to exchange their respective T&amp;D power system models including the merging of relevant databases for interconnected power systems.</p>	IEC 61970 & IEC 61968-11	Both transmission (IEC 61970) and distribution (IEC 61968-11) are being developed for exchanging power system models. They need to include messaging standards to be truly interoperable. No specific standards exist for merging power system databases.	IEC TC57 WG13 & WG14, NEMA, IEEE/ NASPI/ NERC/ FERC	Object Modeling Messaging	Operations	Cross-utility T&D EMS & DMS
<p><b>Broad discussion on functional integration of EMS, DMS, &amp; MOS:</b> As transmission operations and distribution operations become increasingly intermeshed with electricity markets, both to set prices and to respond to prices, there needs to be functional integration of EMS and DMS functions and market operations systems (MOS) and corresponding information exchange. At the same time, rules and regulations for these information exchanges between unbundled entities need to be established and monitored.</p>	IEC 61970, IEC 61968, IEC61850, DNP3, ANSI C37.1, ANSI C37.118, ANSI C12.19-12.22, IEC 60870-6 (ICCP)	There is a lack of coordination or understanding on to achieve functional integration of EMS, DMS, and MOS systems.	IEC TC57 WG13 & WG14 & WG16, NEMA	Policy Object Modeling Messaging	Operations Market	T&D EMS & DMS Market Operations

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<p><b>Integration of the relay settings and other field component management functions:</b></p> <p>Applications that perform an automated verification of the different settings of the components of a power system will be essential in the future to prevent system failures due to miss configurations that may create blackouts.</p>	IEC 61850	One of the required pieces to enable such applications is the standardization of relay settings and other field component management functions. One first step in that direction is the work currently done within IEEE PSRC, H5a working group.	IEEE PSRC, IEC TC57, NEMA		Operations	Protective relays
<p><b>Object models of bulk generation plants:</b></p> <p>Due to the fact that IEC 61850 is today and for the foreseeable future the communications protocol for integration of power system equipment, object models of power plants will need to be developed.</p>	IEC 61850	Bulk generation plants are not modeled in IEC 61850. Workshops with power plant domain experts from utilities involved in Smart Grid development projects and IEC 61850 modeling experts can be used in order to determine and document the functional and modeling requirements.	IEC TC57, NEMA, bulk generation experts		Operations	Bulk generation, energy management systems

**11.2.2 Discussion Issues for Wide Area Situational Awareness**

The following table identifies the issues that require further discussion before any specific work on the relevant standards can be undertaken. Often this discussion involves the identification and agreement on exactly which of the existing standards should be extended to cover the issue, while other discussions reflect resolving issues in on-going standards activities.

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
Operations	<p><b>Discuss cross-utility handling of major events:</b></p> <p>Major events, like the blackout of August 2003, could have been avoided if adequate event information had been provided to the right place within the appropriate time frame. If (and when) a major event does occur, there is an additional need to have a mechanism or system to support the restoration of communication systems across utilities, to federal and state agencies, and to first responder organizations.</p>	NASPI net, ANSI C37.118 IEC 62351-7, NEMA	NAESB, NEMA, IEC



11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
All Domains	<p><b>Systems and Network Management Infrastructure Development for the Smart Grid</b></p> <p>The Smart Grid represents a System of Systems/Networks of Networks that must be able to operate across traditional industry boundaries such as States, Service Territories, and Consumers. Development of an open systems based infrastructure that can effectively manage the envisioned networks of systems is a significant challenge that has not been resolved. The Architecture of the networks is intimately connected with its management infrastructure and this issue needs to be investigated systematically. The experts from the fields of networking, systems management, cyber security, and communications technology need to investigate Smart Grid requirements emerging from the NIST Roadmap and Workshops and industry projects as a starting place to examine the issues surrounding Management infrastructure. The topic is multidisciplinary and will take in depth work to fully understand the plausible Smart Grid build out and the scenarios for network scaling and growth. The management functions include but are not limited to Fault, Configuration, Accounting, Performance, Security, and Applications. The topic overlaps significantly with Security issues but it includes many functions that are not directly security.</p>	<p>OSI Management Standards: CMIP, CMIS</p> <p>Internet Based Management Standards: SNMP Vx</p> <p>Data Management and Directory Services Standards</p> <p>Distributed Desktop Management Task Force Standards: Common Information Model</p> <p>Applications Management Standards</p> <p>Related IEC and IEEE Management Standards associated with key networking and end device communications</p> <p>Other</p>	<p>ISO/OSI, IETF, ITU, IEEE, IEC and Associated Working Groups: UCA International Users Group</p> <p>Other</p>
Operations Customer	<p><b>Detailed architecture to be used for T&amp;D operations, down to the customer:</b></p> <p>A high level architecture was identified in this NIST roadmap document, but it needs to be extended to the actual transmission and distribution operations, including the interactions with customers who are participating in demand response, own DER units, operate PEVs, and may have electric storage facilities. What additional standards need to be developed or extended in order for systems and tools to process and aggregate data from across the grid to make it actionable? What information exchanges are needed to coordinate across all levels of the energy system, behavioral models and data sharing (i.e. between transmission, distribution, consumer, system planning, etc. including commercial data, i.e. AMI data)</p>	<p>Although applications should not be standardized, the input/output can be provided by many standards. However, there are both too few and too many standards to chose from. Which should be used for which functions?</p>	<p>IEEE/ NASPI/ NERC/ FERC UCA SG Users Group, IEEE 2030, IEC TC57 WGs, NEMA</p>

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
Operations	<p><b>Development of a common weather information model:</b></p> <p>A common weather information model needs to be developed that includes a format for observations as well as for forecasts. This model could be used when querying local weather stations and even personal weather systems. The Digital Weather Markup Language (DWML) is an existing specification developed by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). IEC 61850 has models for retrieving weather data from field equipment.</p>	DWML, IEC 61850	NOAA, IEC, NEMA
Operations Customer	<p><b>Clarification of standards to be used for data management.</b> What additional standards need to be developed or extended for supporting efficient data management, farming, analysis and reporting? Hierarchical aggregation of data; down and up the hierarchy. User-specific object models</p>	Applications should not be standardized, but input/output can be provided by IEC 61850 and CIM	IEEE/ NASPI/ NERC/ FERC UCA SG Users Group, IEEE 2030, IEC TC57 WGs, NEMA
Operations	<p><b>Transmission transfer capacity (TTC) information to Distribution Operations and C&amp;I Customers.</b> What additional standards need to be developed or extended in order for Transmission Transfer capacity to be available to T&amp;D operation (and major customers) in real time? There is a need to know impact of distribution activities on the capacity issues and deliver this knowledge to transmission.</p>	Guide in Process: CIGRE WG B2.36 Applications should not be standardized, but input/output could be provided by IEC 61850 and CIM	CIGRE/IEEE/ NEMA UCA SG Users Group, IEEE 2030, IEC TC57 WGs, NEMA
Operations	<p><b>What should the continuing role of DNP be:</b></p> <p>DNP does not support CIM or network management functions. Should it?</p>	DNP3	DNP Users Group
Operations	<p><b>Discussions are needed on the integration of COMTRADE and PQDIF</b></p>	COMTRADE	IEC TC57, NEMA
Operations	<p><b>Harmonize IEC 61850 with IEEE C37.118</b></p>	IEC 61850 IEEE C37.118	Joint work IEC TC57 WG100 and IEEE PSRC, NEMA

### 11.3 Action Items Related to Electric Storage

#### 11.3.1 Requirements and Standards Gaps Related to Electric Storage

The following requirements and related gaps in standards were identified, where the activities can be started (or have already started) relatively quickly, after focused discussions among the organizations identified.

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer/XC	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<p><b>Extend IEEE 1547 standard for Electric Storage if necessary:</b></p> <p>IEEE SCC21 needs to review whether any changes are needed in the IEEE 1547 standards for static and mobile electric storage, including both small and large electric storage facilities. In particular, the management of storage in islands needs to be studied.</p>	IEEE 1547	Need to extend the IEEE 1547 standards as necessary to include the electrical interconnection of electric storage	IEEE Standards Coordinating Committee 21 (SCC21)	Semantic Understanding; Syntactic Interoperability	Operations Service Provider Customer	Transmission EMS Distribution DMS Aggregators DER

#### 11.3.2 Discussion Issues Related to Electric Storage

The following table lists the topics that need to be discussed and resolved to guide standards work, primarily to ensure that standards which are appropriate and already developed are used (rather than re-inventing the wheel) or to select

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
Operations Customer	<p><b>What standards and models are needed for distribution management system (DMS) to send appropriate signals to electric storage?</b> Distribution management systems must be able to influence charging profiles and discharging incentives of electric storage, either through price signals or through direct control signals to energy service interfaces, to help manage the distribution system, especially during reconfiguration, unusual loading conditions, and emergencies.</p>	IEC 61850, ANSI C12.19, BACnet, OpenADR, ANSI C12.22, DLMS/COSEM, Smart Energy Profile, etc.	IEC TC57 WG17, NEMA, ZigBee/HomePlug Alliance, BACnet

## 11.4 Action Items Related to Electric Transportation

### 11.4.1 Requirements and Standards Gaps Related to Electric Transportation

The following requirements and related gaps in standards were identified, where the activities can be started (or have already started) relatively quickly, after focused discussions among the organizations identified.

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer/XC	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<p><b>Common Model for Price+:</b></p> <p>As PEVs move from area to area, a common interoperable model for price and energy characteristics and time for dynamic pricing across areas, markets, providing a consistent integration model.</p>	<p>NAESB, EMIX, OpenADR, IEC 61850-7-420, others</p>	<p>Common interoperable price formats, characteristics, time, and units are needed to abstract away the complexities of markets to actionable information for the PEV.</p>	<p>SAE, IEC, NEMA, NAESB, OASIS</p>	<p>Semantic Syntactic</p>	<p>Customer Operations Services Markets</p>	<p>PEV Customer EMS Commerc'l Industrial Generation</p>
<p><b>Common Model for DR Signals:</b></p> <p>As PEVs move from area to area, a common model for signaling DR events in addition to price is needed. This model should address signaling to other curtailment &amp; generation resources. Must be able to influence charge profiles and discharge incentives.</p>	<p>IEC 61850-7-420, OpenADR  Smart Energy Profile, SAE J2836, Price+</p>	<p>Common model for DR signals, including grid safety, environmental, and price is needed to broaden markets and decrease customization. Premises Management Systems are important partners in collaboration.</p>	<p>SAE, IEC, NEMA, ZigBee/Home Plug Alliance, OASIS, NAESB</p>	<p>Semantic Syntactic</p>	<p>Customer Operations Services Markets</p>	<p>PEV Customer EMS Commerc'l Industrial Generation Operations</p>
<p><b>Mobile Generation/Load Accounting:</b></p> <p>Determine how costs and payments for PEV are settled.</p>	<p>SAE J2847, OpenADR, SEP  Advice of Charge (Cell phone)</p>	<p>Mobility introduces billing model issues; similarity to gasoline purchase may be useful.</p>	<p>SAE, ANSI, Policy, IEC TC57, NEMA</p>	<p>Policy, business objectives</p>	<p>Distribution Customer Markets Policy</p>	<p>PEV</p>

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer/XC	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<b>Extend IEC 61850-7-420 standard for additional DER, including PEV, Storage, and Renewables:</b> Need to extend IEC 61850-7-420 for more Distributed Energy Resource (DER) equipment. Currently IEC 61850-7-420 for DER covers wind (actually IEC 62400-25), photovoltaic systems, fuel cells, diesel generators, batteries, and combined heat and power (CHP). Needs extension to PEV, additional storage devices, microturbines, gas turbines, etc., including operations and for dynamic and flexible protection systems.	IEC 61850-7-420, OpenADR, Smart Energy Profile	Need to extend IEC 61850 for more Distributed Energy Resource (DER) equipment such as Storage and PEVs, and to cover additional functions, such as dynamic protection settings, load shedding, etc.	IEC TC57 WG17, NEMA, OASIS, ZigBee, Policy	Policy Semantic Syntactic Interoperability	Operations Service Provider Customer	Transmission EMS Distribution DMS Aggregators DER
<b>Extend IEC 61968 standard for DER:</b> IEC 61968 needs DER and PEV models, but should be harmonized with the existing DER object models in IEC 61850-7-420, as well as all on-going DER 61850 development. IEC 61850-7-420 has architectural issues to be addressed.	IEC 61968-xx, eBusiness, others TBD	IEC 61968 needs DER models to carry the IEC 61850-7-420 models of DER and PEV to integrate with the enterprise. Address issues in IEC 61850-7-420,	IEC TC57 WG14, NEMA, others TBD	Semantic Syntactic interoperability Network	Operations DER	Distribution DMS

### 11.4.2 Discussion Issues Related to Electric Transportation

The following table lists the topics that need to be discussed and resolved to guide standards work, primarily to ensure that standards which are appropriate and already developed are used (rather than re-inventing the wheel) or to select to extend.

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
Operations Customer	<b>What standards and models are needed for DMS to send appropriate signals to PEVs and other DR devices?</b> Distribution management systems must be able to influence charging profiles and discharging incentives (through price signals or direct control signals to energy service interfaces) to help manage the distribution system, especially during reconfiguration, unusual loading conditions, etc.	IEC 61850, ANSI C12.19, BACnet, OpenADR, ANSI C12.22, DLMS/COSEM, Smart Energy Profile, EMIX, SAE J2836 etc.	IEC TC57 WG17, ZigBee/HomePlug Alliance, NEMA, LONWorks, BACnet, SAE IEC TC13, OASIS

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Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
Customer Operations	<b>Which standards should be used for information models of PEV?</b> A decision needs to be made on which information modeling standards should be used to model PEVs, and in which domains. Then they could be tasked to develop those models. In all cases, need harmonization across domains for PEVs	IEC 61850, IEC 61968, Smart Energy Profile, OpenADR, ANSI C12.19, eBusiness integration	SAE, IEC TC57 WG17, IEC TC57 WG14, , NEMA OpenADR
Market	<b>If regulations change, there is a need to develop new Use Cases</b> and the standards that would be derived from them if reselling stored retail power were permitted by regulators	SAE J 2836 <sup>TM</sup> , markets	SAE, SEP, OpenADR, NEMA, IEC TC57, Policy, EMIX, NAESB
Distribution	<b>PEV accounting and settlements:</b> Currently regulations do not permit electricity to be resold. This means that all the accounting and settlement issues must be handled by utilities (or energy service providers) without the middleman reseller as is the normal market method. This puts the burden on the utility or ESP to manage the complex accounting and settlement processes usually handled by credit card companies or other retail accounting providers. However, if regulations were to change to allow the unbundling of electricity so that stored electricity could be resold, then the accounting model would change dramatically, since normal retail methods could be used.  Models for the settlement of PEV charging and discharging pricing, costs, and cross-utility payments are developing slowly, with significant technical and policy/regulatory unknowns. Proposals range from complex schemes for billing back to the driver's (or the owner's) home utility, simple charging as with current gasoline stations, to mixtures of prepaid and billed services as with cellular phones. When charging stations are ubiquitous, these issues will become even more important.	SAE J 2847, others	SAE, IEC, OASIS, ZigBee Alliance, NEMA
Customer	<b>PEV charging/discharging constraints and regulations.</b> May need some type of weights and standards seal for charging/discharging ( <i>issue needs clarification</i> )	SAE J 1772 <sup>TM</sup>	SAE, PUC/Policy
Distribution	<b>Submetering for PEV.</b> May need submetering standard for non-utilities, so need policies, regulations, and testing as well as understanding whether existing standards for metering and retrieving metered data are adequate	ANSI C12.19	SAE, NEMA, OpenADR, Service Providers
Customer	<b>Role of government and emergency responders with PEV:</b> There is a missing actor, or even domain – the government agencies (state or federal); as they'll be playing active role with respect to PEVs; emergency, disaster response; charge rates, giving first-responders with priority. Elevating ability to charge PEVs. Government access in bidirectional way – getting information from, or sending information down	SAE J 1772, IEC 61968	SAE, FEMA, Emergency First Responders

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
	through the system		

## 11.5 Action Items Related to AMI Systems

### 11.5.1 Requirements and Standards Gaps Related to AMI Systems

The following requirements and related gaps in standards were identified, where the activities can be commenced (or have already commenced) relatively quickly, after brief discussions with the organizations identified.

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<p><b>Interoperability of ANSI C12.19:</b> ANSI C12.19 has too much flexibility, so that implementations of different meters are often not interoperable. Some standard meter profiles need to be developed to constrain that flexibility for common types of meters and metering requirements.</p>	ANSI C12.19-2008  Exchange Data Language	One or more standard meter profiles need to be defined using the ANSI C12.19 Exchange Data Language.	NEMA	Object Modeling	Customer	Meter
<p><b>ANSI C12.22 not meeting future requirements:</b> ANSI C12.22 is viewed as mixing the roles of various communications layers for functionality beyond what is traditionally the application layer. Extremely detailed knowledge of the standard is required to recognize where the boundaries exist for the application layer and, perhaps, where it replicates the functions of lower layer functionalities.</p>	ANSI C12.22	A conformance classification for ANSI C12.22 needs to be defined to constrain its scope	NEMA	Messaging	Operations Customer	Metering, DER, Customer EMS, PEV, etc.

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<p><b>IEC 61968 Testing:</b> Interoperability testing, along with conformance testing, is the best method for confirming that a standard is performing correctly and actually doing what it is supposed to do. These tests can also feed back to the standards group on issues where the standards are unclear, missing, or incorrect.</p>	IEC 61968-9	Interoperability testing for IEC 61968-9 needs to be performed (this is expected to take place in late 2009).	IEC TC57 WG14, NEMA	Testing	Cross-cutting	Actors needed for testing

### 11.5.2 Discussion Issues for AMI Systems

The following table lists the topics that need to be discussed and resolved before the appropriate standards can be developed or extended, usually to ensure that standards which were already developed are used (rather than re-inventing the wheel) or that the most appropriate standard is selected to extend.

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
Customer	<p><b>Should the Internet Protocol (IPv4 or IPv6) be mandated for all protocols:</b> Assuming that the issue is whether or not IPv4/v6 (rather than whether the Internet Protocol Suite of hundreds of protocols) should be specified for all protocols, what are the requirements? For instance, should ZigBee and all AMI and HAN protocols be required to use IPv4/v6? Can certain protocols get exemptions for specific justifiable reasons? What about IPv4 versus IPv6? What about IPsec?</p>	ANSI C12.22, ZigBee, HAN, Smart Energy Profile	ZigBee/HomePlug Alliance, NEMA, SAE
Customer	<p><b>Coordination and Future-proofing AMI Systems:</b> Since AMI systems are going to become widespread, they will inevitably want to be used for more than meter reading or other purely metering functions. They could be used for monitoring DER at the customer site, for DA monitoring and possibly control, for access by third parties to gateways into the customer HAN, etc. The AMI systems should be able to handle, at a minimum, the IEC 61850 object models mapped to an “appropriate” protocol (possibly IEC 61850-lite when it is developed).</p> <p>Need to ensure AMI communications systems use open standards capable of interfacing to DER and distribution automation equipment. ANSI C12.22 is being revised, Europe uses DLMS/COSEM, and AMI vendors are developing their systems over a wide range of media, from PLC, to BPL, to ZigBee meshed radios, to UtiliNet radios, to GPRS, etc.</p>	Smart Energy Profile, ANSI C12.22-2008, DLMS/COSEM	ZigBee/HomePlug Alliance, NEMA, SAE, IEC TC57 WG14, IEC TC57 WG17, IEC TC13



## 11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
Customer	<b>Concerns about unlicensed spectrum in AMI systems:</b> Use of unlicensed spectrum leaves utilities competing with other industries for bandwidth. There is risk of non-utility applications emerging that would greatly increase the utilization of unlicensed spectrum. This could result in reduction of performance of utility systems with little warning or recourse. Does the "critical infrastructure" aspect of utility systems justify the allocation of dedicated spectrum with bandwidth comparable to the unlicensed ISM bands?	AMI meshed radio systems, ZigBee, Smart Energy Profile, ANSI C12.22-2008	FCC, NEMA, ZigBee, SAE
Customer	<b>Should ANSI C12.19 be expanded for DER?</b> ANSI C12.19 may have extension requirements for distributed resource information, forecasts, etc. But should ANSI C12.19 be extended for non-metering devices or should IEC 61850-7-420 objects be used?	ANSI C12.19, IEC 61850-7-420	NEMA, IEC TC57
Service Provider	<b>Discussion on which standards third party energy providers should use.</b> What additional standards need to be developed or extended in order to transfer data across various energy providers?	No specific standard exists: CIM and/or IEC 61850 could be used	UCA SG Users Group, IEEE 2030, IEC TC57 WGs, NEMA
Customer Market	<b>Which standards should be used or extended with pricing models?</b> Ability to include real time pricing information and other pricing models in both information model standards and information transfer standards	OpenADR, IEC 61850-7-420	{SDO for Open ADR} IEC TC57 WG17, NEMA
Customer	<b>Should standard physical and mac layers be defined for AMI systems?</b> This would include standards for the common AMI approaches: wireless mesh, wireless star (point to point), and long range power line carrier. Do the benefits of vendor interoperability outweigh the risk of stifling creativity?	IEEE 802.15.TG4g Other IEEE standards	IEEE, ITU
Customer	<b>Should an open standard be developed for routing and connectivity in wireless AMI networks?</b> Notionally, such a standard would be built upon open standard phy/macs and would be a necessary part of allowing devices from multiple vendors interoperate and exchange data as part of a single network.	ANSI C12, IEEE?, ZigBee	NEMA, IEEE, ZigBee Alliance

### 11.6 Action Items Related to Distribution Management

#### 11.6.1 Requirements and Standards Gaps Related to Distribution Management

The following requirements and related gaps in standards were identified, where the activities can be commenced (or have already commenced) relatively quickly, after brief discussions with the organizations identified.

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer/XC	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<b>ICCP legacy transition:</b> ICCP standard may need information models for interaction with aggregators of distributed resources and even distributed resources directly	IEC 60870-6 (ICCP), IEC 61850-7-420	Decision by IEC TC57 needs to be made on whether ICCP or IEC 61850-7-420 should be used for DER information exchanges with Service Providers	IEC TC57 WG19, NEMA	Semantic Syntactic Network	Operations Service Provider	DER units & plants Service Providers
<b>Extend IEC 61850-6 standard:</b> The System Configuration Language (SCL) that is used for configuring the communication networks and systems for substations is not yet capable of configuring DER or distribution automation networks and systems.	IEC 61850 WS-DD WS-DP	IEC 61850-6 SCL needs expansion to distribution automation and DER, possibly in coordination with WS-DD/WS-DP	IEC TC57 WG10 & WG17, NEMA, OASIS	Discovery and configuration	Operations	DA equipment
<b>Extend IEC 61850 standard for Distribution Automation:</b> IEC 61850 has been selected by the IEC for all field communications with power system equipment. It currently has models for substation equipment, large hydro power plants, and many types of DER. However, it does not yet have object models for distribution automation equipment	IEC 61850-7-xxx	Object models for Distribution Automation equipment need to be added.	IEC TC57 WG17, NEMA	Semantic	Distribution Operations	Distribution DMS Distribution equipment

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer/XC	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<p><b>Harmonize IEC 61968 and MultiSpeak:</b> MultiSpeak and IEC 61968 overlap in many areas, but not in all areas. MultiSpeak already has a wide base of implementations, primarily with small utilities, while IEC 61968 is designed for larger utilities, but has not yet become a standard nor been implemented anywhere. MultiSpeak is working closely with the IEC 61968 effort on the overlapping areas, but further harmonization is necessary.</p> <p>As the IEC 61968 CIM profiles become available as standards, it will be important to minimize any conflicts with MultiSpeak and to develop mappings between the existing MultiSpeak interfaces and the new IEC 61968 interfaces so that products and software developed to be compatible with the different standards can interoperate.</p>	IEC 61968, MultiSpeak	The gaps and overlaps between MultiSpeak and the IEC 61968 standards under development need to be minimized and harmonized.	IEC TC57 WG14, NEMA, NRECA MultiSpeak	Semantic	Distribution	DMS, AMI Headend, OMS, Distribution computer systems, etc
<p><b>Revise and update IEC 61968 standard:</b> The IEC 61968 CIM for distribution is currently not usable except for the very latest part (Part 9), since the messaging schemes and the CIM model for the earlier parts were not well enough defined to allow vendors to implement them. However, if these older parts are revised, then interoperability of the messages may be achieved. These revisions are in the IEC TC57 WG14 roadmap, but will need significant effort to be achieved.</p>	IEC 61968	Some of the earlier parts of the IEC 61968 standards are not implementable and do not yet specify the types of interoperable messaging schemes being developed. The roadmap is expected to take a long time to achieve and could benefit from significant support.	IEC TC57 WG14, NEMA	Semantic Syntactic Network	Distribution	DMS, AMI Headend, OMS, Distribution computer systems, etc

## 11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Requirements	Standards	Gaps	Who	GWAC Layer/XC	Domains	Actors/ Interface
<b>Extend IEEE 1547 standard:</b> Voltage support specifications (electrical interconnections) for distributed resources need to be defined for scenarios where such voltage support is needed or permitted.	IEEE 1547	The IEEE 1547 standard currently states that “The DER shall not actively regulate the voltage at the PCC.” However, for islanded systems or for Area-EPS operations-approved actions, voltage support should be permitted, and specifications for these situations should be developed..	IEEE 1547, IEEE P2030	Policy, Business objective	Operations	DER units & plants Distribution power system
<b>Map IEC 61850 object models to AMI system protocols:</b> If IEC 61850 object models are going to be used to exchange information with equipment (such as DERs) at customer sites, then these models need to be mapped to AMI communications protocols	IEC 61850, ANSI C12.22, DLMS/COS EM, Smart Energy Profile	IEC 61850 objects need to be mapped to AMI communications such as ANSI C12.22. This may or may not be the same solution as IEC 61850-lite.	IEC TC57, NEMA, IEC TC13	Semantic Syntactic Network	Customer Service Provider Operations	DER, DA equipment, PEV
<b>MultiSpeak and IEC 61968 Interoperability Testing:</b> Once a mapping between MultiSpeak V4 and IEC61968, Part 9 has been finalized (planned for late 2009), then it will be critical to test for interoperability between appropriate profiles of the two standards.	IEC 61968, MultiSpeak	Perform interoperability testing on harmonized profiles between MultiSpeak and IEC 61968.	IEC TC57 WG14, NEMA, NRECA MultiSpeak	Interop Testing	Cross-cutting	Actors needed for testing

### 11.6.2 Discussion Issues for Distribution Operations and Management

The following table lists the topics that need to be discussed and resolved before the appropriate standards can be developed or extended, usually to ensure that standards which were already developed are used (rather than re-inventing the wheel) or that the most appropriate standard is selected to extend.

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
Operations Customer	<b>Develop IEC 61850-lite as efficient, compact protocol:</b> Since many communications systems still have limited bandwidth, such as those used in rural environments and/or to wide-spread distribution automation devices, one or	IEC 61850, Smart Energy Profile, NEMA C12.22, and other compact profiles	IEC TC57 ZigBee/HomePlug Alliance, NEMA,

11 10B Appendix C: Requirements, Standards Gaps, and Discussion Issues for the Action Plan

Domain	Discussion Issues	Standards Potentially involved	Who
	more efficient, compact communication protocol profiles need to be specified for IEC 61850 and other object models to be mapped to. Therefore, there is a need to develop “IEC 61850-lite” profile to which these object models can be mapped. In addition, some inexpensive devices (e.g. sensors, collectors, or “software agents”) may not want or need to implement the full IEC 61850 capabilities, in order to minimize compute constraints or development costs.		telecom providers
Distribution	<b>What GIS standards should be specified, developed, or extended?</b> The status of GIS standards not clear.	GIS standards, IEC 61968	
Distribution	<b>What standards should be developed or extended for Work Order management?</b> Could include IEC61334, IEC61968, or MultiSpeak	IEC 61968, MultiSpeak	
Operations Customer	<b>What standards should be used or need extensions to provide distribution operations with information about customer behavior and response to prices?</b> This information must be available to distribution management systems for development of accurate models that can be used to manage voltage, component loading, etc.	IEC 61850, ANSI C12.19, BACnet, OpenADR, ANSI C12.22, DLMS/COSEM, Smart Energy Profile, SAE etc.	IEC TC57 WG17, ZigBee/HomePlug Alliance, NEMA, BACnet, SAE,
Operations	<b>Transmission operations access to DER information.</b> What additional standards need to be developed or extended in order to use distribution resources in the bulk electric system infrastructure for contingency analysis, mitigation and control (incl. Restoration)?	CIM, IEC61850, DNP3, 37.1, 37.118, ANSI C12.19, 12.21, 12.22, ICCP (IEC 60870-6), IEC 61850-7-420	UCA SG Users Group, IEEE 2030, IEC TC57 WGs
Operations	<b>Distribution operations access to bulk generation information.</b> What additional standards need to be developed or extended in order for bulk generation to be available to T&D operation (and major customers) in real time. Need to know impact of distribution activities on the capacity issues and deliver this knowledge to transmission.	CIM, IEC61850, DNP3, 37.1, 37.118, ANSI C12.19, 12.21, 12.22, ICCP (IEC 60870-6), IEC 61850-7-420	NERC/FERC UCA SG Users Group, IEEE 2030, IEC TC57 WGs, NEMA
Operations Customer	<b>Discussions needed on modeling loads, given DER and mobile PEV.</b> Need to develop behavioral models to plan for diversity and allocation of loads. The aggregated model will be used in T&D. Base load profiles may be required to define benefits for demand response and alternate load profiles associated with PEV charging. This requires accurate definition of customer loads as a function of parameters. The information is needed from AMI systems and must be provided to system models and model management systems.	Load models themselves should not be standardized, but the information exchanges could involve IEC 61850, ANSI C12.19, BACnet, OpenADR, ANSI C12.22, DLMS/COSEM, Smart Energy Profile, SAE Jxxxx etc.	IEEE/ NASPI/ NERC/ FERC, UCA SG Users Group, IEEE 2030, IEC TC57, NEMA, ZigBee/HomePlug Alliance, BACnet, SAE

## 12 Appendix D: Key Use Cases for Cyber Security Considerations

<b>12.1 Category: AMI</b>		
<b>12.1.1 Scenario: Meter Reading Services</b>		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b>		
<p>AMI systems consist of the hardware, software and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and third party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and third party systems which are interfaced to the AMI systems.</p>		
<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b>		
<p>Meter reading services provide the basic meter reading capabilities for generating customer bills. Different types of metering services are usually provided, depending upon the type of customer (residential, smaller commercial, larger commercial, smaller industrial, larger industrial) and upon the applicable customer tariff.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Periodic Meter Reading</li> <li>• On-Demand Meter Reading</li> <li>• Net Metering for DER and PEV</li> <li>• Feed-In Tariff Metering for DER and PEV</li> <li>• Bill - Paycheck Matching</li> </ul>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Confidentiality (privacy) of customer metering data over the AMI system, metering database, and billing database, to avoid serious breaches of privacy and potential legal repercussions</li> <li>• Integrity of meter data is important, but the impact of incorrect data is not large</li> <li>• Availability of meter data is not critical in real-time</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>

operate efficiently		
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<p><b>12.2 Category: AMI</b></p>
<p><b>12.2.1 Scenario: Pre-Paid Metering</b></p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>AMI systems consist of the hardware, software and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and third party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and third party systems which are interfaced to the AMI systems.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Customers who either want a lower rate or have a history of slow payment can benefit from prepayment of power. Smart metering makes it easier to deploy new types of prepayment to customers and provide them with better visibility on the remaining hours of power, as well as extending time of use rates to prepayment customers.</p> <p>AMI systems can also trigger notifications when the pre-payment limits are close to being reached and/or have been exceeded.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited Energy Usage</li> <li>• Limited Demand</li> </ul>

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of meter data is critical, to avoid unwarranted disconnections due to perceived lack of pre-payment. Security compromises could have a large impact on the customer and could cause legal repercussions</li> <li>• Confidentiality (privacy) of customer metering data over the AMI system, metering database, and billing database</li> <li>• Availability to turn meter back on after payment is important, but could be handled by a truck roll if necessary</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
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**12.3 Category: AMI**

**12.3.1 Scenario: Revenue Protection**

**Category Description**

AMI systems consist of the hardware, software and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and third party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and third party systems which are interfaced to the AMI systems.

**Scenario Description**

Non-technical losses (or theft of power by another name) has long been an on-going battle between utilities and certain customers. In a traditional meter, when the meter reader arrives, they can look for visual signs of tampering, such as broken seals and meters plugged in upside down. When AMI systems are used, tampering that is not visually obvious may be detected during the analysis of the data, such as anomalous low usage. AMI will help with more timely and sensitive detection of power theft.

- Tamper Detection
- Anomalous Readings
- Meter Status



- Suspicious Meter

<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> <li>• Operates resiliently against attack and natural disasters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of meter data is important, but if tampering is not detected or if unwarranted indications of tampering are detected, there is no power system impact, just revenue impact</li> <li>• Confidentiality (privacy) of customer metering data over the AMI system, metering database, and billing database</li> <li>• Availability to turn meter back on after payment is important</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>

**12.4 Category: AMI**

**12.4.1 Scenario: Remote Connect/Disconnect of Meter**

**Category Description**

AMI systems consist of the hardware, software and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and third party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and third party systems which are interfaced to the AMI systems.

**Scenario Description**

Traditionally, utilities send a metering service person to connect or disconnect the meter. With an AMI system, the connect/disconnect can be performed remotely by switching the remote connect/disconnect (RCD) switch for the following reasons.

- Remote Connect for Move-In
- Remote Connect for Reinstatement on Payment
- Remote Disconnect for Move-Out
- Remote Disconnect for Non-Payment
- Remote Disconnect for Emergency Load Control
- Unsolicited Connect / Disconnect Event

<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b>	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> <li>• Operates resiliently against attack and natural disasters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of control commands to the RCD switch is critical to avoid unwarranted disconnections or dangerous/unsafe connections. The impact of invalid switching could be very large if many meters are involved</li> <li>• Availability to turn meter back on when needed is important</li> <li>• Confidentiality requirements of the RCD command is generally not very important, except related to non-payment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>• Customer Safety</li> </ul>

**12.5 Category: AMI**

**12.5.1 Scenario: Outage Detection and Restoration**

**Category Description**

AMI systems consist of the hardware, software and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and third party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and third party systems which are interfaced to the AMI systems.

**Scenario Description**

The AMI system detects customer outages and reports it in near-real-time to the distribution utility. The utility uses the customer information from the Customer Information System, the Trouble Call System, Geographical Information System, and the Outage Management System to identify the probable location of the fault. The process includes the following steps:

- Smart meters report one or more power losses (e.g. “last gasp”)
- Outage management system collects meter outage reports and customer trouble calls
- Outage management system determines location of outage and generates outage trouble tickets
- Work management system schedules work crews to resolve outage
- Interactive utility-customer systems inform the customers about the progress of events
- Trouble tickets are used for statistical analysis of outages

<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b>	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> <li>• Operates resiliently against attack and natural disasters</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is important to ensure outages are reported correctly</li> <li>• Availability is important to ensure outages are reported in a timely manner (a few seconds)</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>• Customer Safety</li> </ul>

**12.6 Category: AMI**

**12.6.1 Scenario: Meter Maintenance**

**Category Description**

AMI systems consist of the hardware, software and associated system and data management applications that create a communications network between end systems at customer premises (including meters, gateways, and other equipment) and diverse business and operational systems of utilities and third parties. AMI systems provide the technology to allow the exchange of information between customer end systems and those other utility and third party systems. In order to protect this critical infrastructure, end-to-end security must be provided across the AMI systems, encompassing the customer end systems as well as the utility and third party systems which are interfaced to the AMI systems.

**Scenario Description**

Meter maintenance is needed to locate and repair/replace meters that have problems, or to update firmware and parameters if updates are required. For those with batteries, such as gas and water meters, battery management will also be needed.

- Connectivity validation
- Geo-location of meter
- Smart meter battery management

<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b>	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of meter maintenance repairs and updates are essential to prevent malicious intrusions</li> <li>• Availability is important, but only in terms of hours or maybe days</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important unless some maintenance activity involves personal information</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>

**12.7 Category: AMI**

**12.7.1 Scenario: Meter Detects Removal**

**Category Description**

The AMI category covers the fundamental functions of an advanced metering system. These functions include: meter reading, use of an integrated service switch, theft detection and improved outage detection and restoration. The high level technical requirements for these functions are well understood by the industry, but the specific benefit varies from utility to utility.

Advanced functions that are often associated with AMI are demand response program support and communications to in-home devices. These functions are not exclusive to AMI and will be discussed in separate category areas.

**Scenario Description**

This scenario discusses the AMI meter's functionality to detect and report unauthorized removal and similar physical tampering. AMI meters require additional capability over traditional meters to prevent theft and tampering due to the elimination of regular visual inspection provided by meter reading.

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> <li>• Operates resiliently against attack and natural disasters</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To reduce energy theft</li> <li>• To prevent theft/compromise of passwords and key material                         <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To prevent installation of malware</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <p>Customer data privacy and security Retail Electric Supplier access Customer data access</p>
<p><b>12.8      Category: AMI</b></p>		
<p><b>12.8.1      Scenario: Utility Detects Probable Meter Bypass</b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>The AMI category covers the fundamental functions of an advanced metering system. These functions include: meter reading, use of an integrated service switch, theft detection and improved outage detection and restoration. The high level technical requirements for these functions are well understood by the industry, but the specific benefit varies from utility to utility.</p> <p>Advanced functions that are often associated with AMI are demand response program support and communications to in-home devices. These functions are not exclusive to AMI and will be discussed in separate category areas.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>AMI meters eliminate the possibility of some forms of theft (i.e. meter reversal). Other types of theft will be more difficult to detect due to the elimination of regular physical inspection provided by meter reading. This scenario discusses the analysis of meter data to discover potential theft occurrences.</p>		

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> <li>• Operates resiliently against attack and natural disasters</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To reduce theft</li> <li>• To protect integrity of reporting</li> <li>• To maintain availability for reporting and billing</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>Customer Safety</li> </ul>
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**12.9 Category: Demand Response**

**12.9.1 Scenario: Real Time Pricing (RTP) for Customer Load and DER/PEV**

**Category Description**

Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time-based or may be tariff-based, while the prices may also be operationally-based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.

**Scenario Description**

Use of Real Time Pricing for electricity is common for very large customers, affording them an ability to determine when to use power and minimize the costs of energy for their business. The extension of real time pricing to smaller industrial and commercial customers and even residential customers is possible with smart metering and in-home displays. Aggregators or customer energy management systems must be used for these smaller consumers due to the complexity and 24x7 nature of managing power consumption. Pricing signals may be sent via an AMI system, the Internet, or other data channels.

<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity, including non-repudiation, of pricing information is critical, since there could be large financial and possibly legal implications</li> <li>• Availability, including non-repudiation, for pricing signals is critical because of the large financial and possibly legal implications</li> <li>• Confidentiality is important mostly for the responses that any customer might make to the pricing signals</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>12.10 Category: Demand Response</b></p>		
<p><b>12.10.1 Scenario: Time of Use (TOU) Pricing</b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time-based or may be tariff-based, while the prices may also be operationally-based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Time of use pricing creates blocks of time and seasonal differences that allow smaller customers with less time to manage power consumption to gain some of the benefits of real time pricing. This is the favored regulatory method in most of the world for dealing with global warming.</p> <p>Although Real Time Pricing is more flexible than Time of Use, it is likely that TOU will still provide many customers will all of the benefits that they can profitably use or manage.</p>		



<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is not critical since TOU pricing is fixed for long periods and is not generally transmitted electronically</li> <li>• Availability is not an issue</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>12.11 Category: Demand Response</b></p>		
<p><b>12.11.1 Scenario: Net Metering for DER and PEV</b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time-based or may be tariff-based, while the prices may also be operationally-based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>When customers have the ability to generate or store power as well as consume power, net metering is installed to measure not only the flow of power in each direction, but also when the net power flows occurred. Often Time of Use (TOU) tariffs are employed.</p> <p>Today larger C&amp;I customers and an increasing number of residential and smaller C&amp;I customers have net metering installed for their photovoltaic systems, wind turbines, combined heat and power (CHP), and other DER devices. As plug-in electric vehicles (PEVs) become available, net metering will increasingly be implemented in homes and small businesses, even parking lots.</p>		

<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is not very critical since net metering pricing is fixed for long periods and is not generally transmitted electronically</li> <li>• Availability is not an issue</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>12.12 Category: Demand Response</b></p>		
<p><b>12.12.1 Scenario: Feed-In Tariff Pricing for DER and PEV</b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time-based or may be tariff-based, while the prices may also be operationally-based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Feed-in tariff pricing is similar to net metering except that generation from customer DER/PEV has a different tariff rate than the customer load tariff rate during specific time periods.</p>		

<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is not critical, since feed-in tariff pricing is fixed for long periods and is generally not transmitted electronically</li> <li>• Availability is not an issue</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>12.13 Category: Demand Response</b></p>		
<p><b>12.13.1 Scenario: Critical Peak Pricing</b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time-based or may be tariff-based, while the prices may also be operationally-based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Critical Peak Pricing builds on Time of Use Pricing by selecting a small number of days each year where the electric delivery system will be heavily stressed and increasing the peak (and sometime shoulder peak) prices by up to 10 times the normal peak price. This is intended to reduce the stress on the system during these days.</p>		

<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is not critical, since feed-in tariff pricing is fixed for long periods and is generally not transmitted electronically</li> <li>• Availability is not an issue</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>12.14 Category: Demand Response</b></p>		
<p><b>12.14.1 Scenario: Mobile Plug-In Electric Vehicle (PEV) Functions</b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Demand response is a general capability that could be implemented in many different ways. The primary focus is to provide the customer with pricing information for current or future time periods so they may respond by modifying their demand. This may entail just decreasing load or may involve shifting load by increasing demand during lower priced time periods so that they can decrease demand during higher priced time periods. The pricing periods may be real-time-based or may be tariff-based, while the prices may also be operationally-based or fixed or some combination. Real-time pricing inherently requires computer-based responses, while the fixed time-of-use pricing may be manually handled once the customer is aware of the time periods and the pricing.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>In addition to customers with PEVs participating in their home-based Demand Response functions, they will have additional requirements for managing the charging and discharging of their mobile PEVs in other locations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer connects PEV at another home</li> <li>• Customer connects PEV outside home territory</li> <li>• Customer connects PEV at public location</li> <li>• Customer charges the PEV</li> </ul>		

<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is not critical, since feed-in tariff pricing is fixed for long periods and is generally not transmitted electronically</li> <li>• Availability is not an issue</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not an issue, except with respect to meter reading</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>

**12.15 Category: Customer Interfaces**

**12.15.1 Scenario: Customer's In Home Device is Provisioned to Communicate With the Utility**

**Category Description**

Customers want to understand how their energy consumption habits affect their monthly energy bills and to find ways to reduce their monthly energy costs. Customers should have the ability to receive information on their usage and the price of energy on a variety of devices (in home displays, computers and mobile devices). In addition to real time and historical energy data, customers should be able to receive messages from the utility notifying them about outages.

**Scenario Description**

This scenario describes the process to configure a customer's device to receive and send data to utility systems. The device could be an information display, communicating thermostat, load control device or smart appliance.

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To protect passwords</li> <li>• To protect key material</li> <li>• To authenticate with other devices on the AMI system</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>
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**12.16 Category: Customer Interfaces**

**12.16.1 Scenario: Customer Views Pricing or Energy Data on Their In Home Device**

**Category Description**

Customers want to understand how their energy consumption habits affect their monthly energy bills and to find ways to reduce their monthly energy costs. Customers should have the ability to receive information on their usage and the price of energy on a variety of devices (in home displays, computers and mobile devices). In addition to real time and historical energy data, customers should be able to receive messages from the utility notifying them about outages.

<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b>		
<p>This scenario describes the information that should be available to customers on their in home devices. Multiple communication paths and device functions will be considered.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To validate that information is trustworthy (integrity)</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>



**12.17 Category: Customer Interfaces**

**12.17.1 Scenario: In Home Device Troubleshooting**

**Category Description**

Customers want to understand how their energy consumption habits affect their monthly energy bills and to find ways to reduce their monthly energy costs. Customers should have the ability to receive information on their usage and the price of energy on a variety of devices (in home displays, computers and mobile devices). In addition to real time and historical energy data, customers should be able to receive messages from the utility notifying them about outages.

**Scenario Description**

This alternate scenario describes the resolution of communication or other types of errors that could occur with in home devices. Roles of the customer, device vendor and utility will be discussed.

**Smart Grid Characteristics**

- Enables active participation by consumers
- Accommodates all generation and storage options
- Enables new products, services and markets

**Objectives/Requirements**

- To avoid disclosing customer information
- To avoid disclosing key material and/or passwords

**Potential Stakeholder Issues**

- Customer device standards
- Customer data privacy and security

**12.18 Category: Customer Interfaces**

**12.18.1 Scenario: Customer Views Pricing or Energy Data via the Internet**

**Category Description**

Customers want to understand how their energy consumption habits affect their monthly energy bills and to find ways to reduce their monthly energy costs. Customers should have the ability to receive information on their usage and the price of energy on a variety of devices (in home displays, computers and mobile devices). In addition to real time and historical energy data, customers should be able to receive messages from the utility notifying them about outages.

**Scenario Description**

In addition to a utility operated communications network (i.e. AMI), the internet can be used to communicate to customers and their devices. Personal computers and mobile devices may be more suitable for displaying some types of energy data than low cost specialized in home display devices. This scenario describes the information that should be available to the customer using the internet and some possible uses for the data.

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To protect customer’s information (privacy)</li> <li>• To provide accurate information</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>
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**12.19 Category: Customer Interfaces**

**12.19.1 Scenario: Utility Notifies Customers of Outage**

**Category Description**

Customers want to understand how their energy consumption habits affect their monthly energy bills and to find ways to reduce their monthly energy costs. Customers should have the ability to receive information on their usage and the price of energy on a variety of devices (in home displays, computers and mobile devices). In addition to real time and historical energy data, customers should be able to receive messages from the utility notifying them about outages.

<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b>		
<p>When an outage occurs the utility can notify affected customers and provide estimated restoration times and report when power has been restored. Smart grid technologies can improve the utility’s accuracy for determination of affected area and restoration progress.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• To validate that the notification is legitimate</li> <li>• Customer’s information is kept private</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

<p><b>12.20    <i>Category: Customer Interfaces</i></b></p>
<p><b>12.20.1    <i>Scenario: Customer Access to Energy-Related Information</i></b></p>
<p><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Customers with Home Area Networks and/or Building Energy Management Systems will be able to interact with the electric utilities as well as third party energy services providers to access information on their own energy profiles, usage, pricing, etc.</p>

**Scenario Description**

Customers with Home Area Networks and/or Building Energy Management Systems will be able to interact with the electric utilities as well as third party energy services providers. Some of these interactions include:

- Access to real-time (or near real-time) energy and demand usage and billing information
- Requesting energy services such as move-in/move-out requests, pre-paying for electricity, changing energy plans (if such tariffs become available), etc.
- Access to energy pricing information
- Access to their own DER generation/storage status
- Access to their own PEV charging/discharging status
- Establishing thermostat settings for demand response pricing levels

Although different types of energy-related information access is involved, the security requirements are similar.

<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b>	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity, including non-repudiation, is critical since energy and pricing data will have financial impacts</li> <li>• Availability is important to the individual customer, but will not have wide-spread impacts</li> <li>• Confidentiality is critical because of customer privacy issues</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>

**12.21 Category: Electricity Market**

**12.21.1 Scenario: Bulk Power Electricity Market**

**Category Description**

The electricity market varies significantly from State to State, region to region, and at local levels. The market is still evolving after some initial setbacks, and is expected to expand from bulk power to retail power and eventually to individual customer power as tariffs are developed to provide incentives. Demand response, handled in a separate section, is a part of the electricity market.

**Scenario Description**

The bulk power market varies from region to region, and is conducted primarily through Regional Transmission Operators (RTO) and Independent System Operators (ISO). The market is handled independently from actual operations, although the bids into the market obviously affect which generators are used for what time periods and which functions (base load, regulation, reserve, etc.). Therefore there are no direct operational security impacts, but there are definitely financial security impacts.

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity for pricing and generation information is critical</li> <li>• Availability for pricing and generation information is important within minutes to hours</li> <li>• Confidentiality for pricing and generation information is critical</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
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**12.22 Category: Electricity Market**

**12.22.1 Scenario: Retail Power Electricity Market**

**Category Description**

The electricity market varies significantly from State to State, region to region, and at local levels. The market is still evolving after some initial setbacks, and is expected to expand from bulk power to retail power and eventually to individual customer power as tariffs are developed to provide incentives. Demand response, handled in a separate section, is a part of the electricity market.

<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b>		
<p>The retail power electricity market is still minor, but growing, compared to the bulk power market, but typically involves aggregators and energy service providers bidding customer-owned generation or load control into both energy and ancillary services. Again it is handled independently from actual power system operations. Therefore there are no direct operational security impacts, but there are definitely financial security impacts. (The aggregator’s management of the customer-owned generation and load is addressed in the Demand Response section.)</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b>	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity for pricing and generation information is critical</li> <li>• Availability for pricing and generation information is important within minutes to hours</li> <li>• Confidentiality for pricing and generation information is critical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>12.23 Category: Electricity Market</b></p>		
<p><b>12.23.1 Scenario: Carbon Trading Market</b></p>		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b>		
<p>The electricity market varies significantly from State to State, region to region, and at local levels. The market is still evolving after some initial setbacks, and is expected to expand from bulk power to retail power and eventually to individual customer power as tariffs are developed to provide incentives. Demand response, handled in a separate section, is a part of the electricity market.</p>		

<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b>		
<p>The carbon trading market does not exist yet, but the security requirements will probably be similar to the retail electricity market.</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b>	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity for pricing and generation information is critical</li> <li>• Availability for pricing and generation information is important within minutes to hours</li> <li>• Confidentiality for pricing and generation information is critical</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>12.24 Category: Distribution Automation</b></p>		
<p><b>12.24.1 Scenario: Distribution Automation (DA) within Substations</b></p>		
<b><u>Category Description</u></b>		
<p>A broad definition of Distribution Automation includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources (DER), and automated interfaces with end-users.</p> <p>No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/var control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.</p> <p>Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.</p>		



**Scenario Description**

Distribution automation within substations involves monitoring and controlling equipment in distribution substations to enhance power system reliability and efficiency. Different types of equipment are monitored and controlled:

- Distribution SCADA System Monitors Distribution Equipment in Substations
- Supervisory Control on Substation Distribution Equipment
- Substation Protection Equipment Performs System Protection Actions
- Reclosers in Substations

<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b>	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operating efficiency</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances in a self-correcting manner</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of distribution control commands is critical for distribution operations, avoiding outages, and providing power to customers reliably and efficiently</li> <li>• Availability for control is critical, while monitoring individual equipment is less critical</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Device standards</li> <li>• Cyber Security</li> </ul>

**12.25 Category: Distribution Automation**

**12.25.1 Scenario: Distribution Automation (DA) Using Local Automation**

**Category Description**

A broad definition of Distribution Automation includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources (DER), and automated interfaces with end-users.

No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/var control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be

far more beneficial in other utilities.

Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.

**Scenario Description**

Local automation of feeder equipment consists of power equipment that is managed locally by computer-based controllers which are preset with various parameters to issue control actions. These controllers may just monitor power system measurements locally, or may include some short range communications to other controllers and/or local field crews. However, in these scenarios, no communications exist between the feeder equipment and the control center.

- Local Automated Switch Management
- Local Volt/Var Control
- Local Field Crew Communications to Underground Network Equipment

<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of distribution control commands is critical for distribution operations, avoiding outages, and providing power to customers reliably and efficiently</li> <li>• Availability for control is critical, while monitoring individual equipment is less critical</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
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## **12.26 Category: Distribution Automation**

### **12.26.1 Scenario: Distribution Automation (DA) Monitoring and Controlling Feeder Equipment**

#### **Category Description**

A broad definition of Distribution Automation includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources (DER), and automated interfaces with end-users.

No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/var control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.

Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.

#### **Scenario Description**

Operators and distribution applications can monitor the equipment on the feeders and determine whether any actions should be taken to increase reliability, improve efficiency, or respond to emergencies. For instance, they can:

- Remotely open or close automated switches
- Remotely switch capacitor banks in and out
- Remotely raise or lower voltage regulators
- Block local automated actions
- Send updated parameters to feeder equipment
- Interact with equipment in underground distribution vaults
- Retrieve power system information from Smart Meters
- Automation of Emergency Response
- Dynamic Rating of Feeders

<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of distribution control commands is critical for distribution operations, avoiding outages, and providing power to customers reliably and efficiently</li> <li>• Availability for control is critical, while monitoring individual equipment is less critical</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> <li>•</li> </ul>

**12.27 Category: Distribution Automation**

**12.27.1 Scenario: Fault Detection, Isolation, and Restoration**

**Category Description**

A broad definition of Distribution Automation includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources (DER), and automated interfaces with end-users.

No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/var control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.

Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.

**Scenario Description**

AMI smart meters and distribution automated devices can detect power outages that affect individual customers and larger groups of customers. As customers rely more fundamentally on power (e.g. PEV) and become used to not having to call in outages, outage detection, and restoration will become increasingly critical.

The automated fault location, isolation, and service restoration function uses the combination of the power system model with the SCADA data from the field on real-time conditions to determine where a fault is probably located, by undertaking the following steps:

- Determines the faults cleared by controllable protective devices:

- Determines the faulted sections based on SCADA fault indications and protection lockout signals
- Estimates the probable fault locations, based on SCADA fault current measurements and real-time fault analysis
- Determines the fault-clearing non-monitored protective device
- Uses closed-loop or advisory methods to isolate the faulted segment.
- Once the fault is isolated, it determines how best to restore service to unfaulted segments through feeder reconfiguration.

<p align="center"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<p align="center"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of outage information is critical</li> <li>• Availability to detect large scale outages usually involve multiple sources of information</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li> </ul>	<p align="center"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
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**12.28 Category: Distribution Automation**

**12.28.1 Scenario: Load Management**

**Category Description**

A broad definition of Distribution Automation includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources (DER), and automated interfaces with end-users.

No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/var control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.

Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.

**Scenario Description**

Load management provides active and passive control by the utility of customer appliances (e.g. cycling of air conditioner, water heaters, and pool pumps) and certain C&I customer systems (e.g. plenum pre-cooling, heat storage management).

- Direct load control and load shedding
- Demand side management
- Load shift scheduling
- Curtailment planning
- Selective load management through Home Area Networks

	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity of load control commands is critical to avoid unwarranted outages</li> <li>• Availability for load control is important – in aggregate (e.g. &gt; 300 MW), it can be critical</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not very important</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> <li>•</li> </ul>

**12.29 Category: Distribution Automation**

**12.29.1 Scenario: Distribution Analysis using Distribution Power Flow Models**

**Category Description**

A broad definition of Distribution Automation includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources (DER), and automated interfaces with end-users.

No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/var control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.

Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.

**Scenario Description**

The brains behind the monitoring and controlling of field devices are the DA analysis software applications. These applications generally use models of the power system to validate the raw data, assess real-time and future conditions, and issue the appropriate actions. The applications may be distributed and located in the field equipment for local assessments and control, and/or may be centralized in a Distribution Management System for global assessment and control.

- Local peer-to-peer interactions between equipment
- Normal distribution operations using the Distribution System Power Flow (DSPF) model
- Emergency distribution operations using the DSPF model
- Study-Mode Distribution System Power Flow (DSPF) model
- DSPF /DER Model of distribution operations with significant DER generation/storage

<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b>	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is critical to operate the distribution power system reliably, efficiently, and safely</li> <li>• Availability is critical to operate the distribution power system reliably, efficiently, and safely</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> <li>•</li> </ul>

**12.30 Category: Distribution Automation**

**12.30.1 Scenario: Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Management**

**Category Description**

A broad definition of Distribution Automation includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources (DER), and automated interfaces with end-users.

No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/var control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be

far more beneficial in other utilities.

Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.

**Scenario Description**

In the future, more and more of generation and storage resources will be connected to the distribution network and will significantly increase the complexity and sensitivity of distribution operations. Therefore, the management of DER generation will become increasingly important in the overall management of the distribution system, including load forecasts, real-time monitoring, feeder reconfiguration, virtual and logical microgrids, and distribution planning.

- Direct monitoring and control of DER
- Shut-down or islanding verification for DER
- Plug-in Hybrid Vehicle (PEV) management, as load, storage, and generation resource
- Electric storage fill/draw management
- Renewable energy DER with variable generation
- Small fossil resource management, such as backup generators to be used for peak shifting

	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is critical for any management/control of generation and storage</li> <li>• Availability requirements may vary depending on the size (individual or aggregate) of the DER plant</li> <li>• Confidentiality may involve some privacy issues with customer-owned DER</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>



## **12.31 Category: Distribution Automation**

### **12.31.1 Scenario: Distributed Energy Resource (DER) Management**

#### **Category Description**

A broad definition of Distribution Automation includes any automation which is used in the planning, engineering, construction, operation, and maintenance of the distribution power system, including interactions with the transmission system, interconnected distributed energy resources (DER), and automated interfaces with end-users.

No one approach is optimal for a utility or its customers. Certain distribution automation functions, such as optimal volt/var control, can be more beneficial to one utility or even a few feeders in one utility, while other distribution automation functions, such as fault detection, isolation, and service restoration, could be far more beneficial in other utilities.

Increasingly, distribution automation will entail closed-loop control, where distribution algorithms, applied to real-time models of the distribution system, will increase reliability and/or efficiency of the distribution system without direct operator involvement.

#### **Scenario Description**

Distribution planning typically uses engineering systems with access only to processed power system data that is available from the control center. It is therefore relatively self-contained.

- Operational planning
  - Assessing Planned Outages
  - Storm Condition Planning
- Short-term distribution planning
  - Short-Term Load Forecast
  - Short-Term DER Generation and Storage Impact Studies
- Long-term distribution planning
  - Long-Term Load Forecasts by Area
  - Optimal Placements of Switches, Capacitors, Regulators, and DER
  - Distribution System Upgrades and Extensions
- Distribution Financial Planners

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity not critical due to multiple sources of data</li> <li>• Availability is not important</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cyber security</li> </ul>
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**12.32 Category: Plug In Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV)**

**12.32.1 Scenario: Customer Connects Plug In Hybrid Electric Vehicle to Energy Portal**

**Category Description**

Plug in electric vehicles will have a significant impact on the future electric system and challenge the utility and customer to manage vehicle connection and charging. As adoption rates of electric vehicles increase, the utility will have to handle the new load imposed on the electrical system. Scenarios will consider customer payment issues regarding mobility, load shifting vehicle charging and the use of electric vehicles as a distributed resource.

**Scenario Description**

This scenario discusses the simple case of a customer plugging in an electric vehicle at their premise to charge its battery. Variations of this scenario will be considered that add complexity: a customer charging their vehicle at another location and providing payment or charging at another location where the premise owner pays.

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The customer’s information is kept private</li> <li>• Billing information is accurate</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vehicle standards</li> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>
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**12.33 Category: Plug In Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV)**

**12.33.1 Scenario: Customer Connects Plug In Hybrid Electric Vehicle to Energy Portal and Participates in ‘Smart’ (Optimized) Charging**

**Category Description**

Plug in electric vehicles will have a significant impact on the future electric system and challenge the utility and customer to manage vehicle connection and charging. As adoption rates of electric vehicles increase, the utility will have to handle the new load imposed on the electrical system. Scenarios will consider customer payment issues regarding mobility, load shifting vehicle charging and the use of electric vehicles as a distributed resource.

<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b>		
<p>In addition to simply plugging in an electric vehicle for charging, in this scenario the electric vehicle charging is optimized to take advantage of lower rates or help prevent excessive load peaks on the electrical system.</p>		
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer information is kept private</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vehicle standards</li> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>

**12.34 Category: Plug In Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV)**

**12.34.1 Scenario: Plug In Hybrid Electric Vehicle or Customer Receives and Responds to Discrete Demand Response Events**

**Category Description**

Plug in electric vehicles will have a significant impact on the future electric system and challenge the utility and customer to manage vehicle connection and charging. As adoption rates of electric vehicles increase, the utility will have to handle the new load imposed on the electrical system. Scenarios will consider customer payment issues regarding mobility, load shifting vehicle charging and the use of electric vehicles as a distributed resource.

**Scenario Description**

An advanced scenario for electric vehicles is the use of the vehicle to provide energy stored in its battery back to the electrical system. Customers could participate in demand response programs where they are provided an incentive to allow the utility to request power from the vehicle at times of high system load.

<u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u>	<u>Objectives/Requirements</u>	<u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved system stability and availability</li> <li>• To keep customer information private</li> <li>• To insure DR messages are accurate and trustworthy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vehicle standards</li> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>

**12.35 Category: Plug In Hybrid Electric Vehicles (PHEV)**

**12.35.1 Scenario: Plug In Hybrid Electric Vehicle or Customer Receives and Responds to Utility Price Signals**

**Category Description**

Plug in electric vehicles will have a significant impact on the future electric system and challenge the utility and customer to manage vehicle connection and charging. As adoption rates of electric vehicles increase, the utility will have to handle the new load imposed on the electrical system. Scenarios will consider customer payment issues regarding mobility, load shifting vehicle charging and the use of electric vehicles as a distributed resource.

<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b>		
<p>In this scenario, the electric vehicle is able to receive and act on electricity pricing data sent from the utility. The use of pricing data for charging is primarily covered in another scenario. The pricing data can also be used in support of a distributed resource program where the customer allows the vehicle to provide power to the electric grid based on market conditions.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Improved system stability and availability</li> <li>• Pricing signals are accurate and trustworthy</li> <li>• Customer information is kept private</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Vehicle standards</li> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> </ul>



**12.36 Category: Distributed Resources**

**12.36.1 Scenario: Customer Provides Distributed Resource**

**Category Description**

Traditionally, distributed resources have served as a primary or emergency back-up energy source for customers that place a premium on reliability and power quality. Distributed resources include generation and storage devices that can provide power back to the electric power system. Societal, policy and technological changes are increasing the adoption rate of distributed resources and smart grid technologies can enhance the value of these systems.

**Scenario Description**

This scenario describes the process of connecting a distributed resource to the electric power system and the requirements of net metering.

<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b>	<b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer information is kept private</li> <li>• Net metering is accurate and timely</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Safety</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

**12.37 Category: Distributed Resources**

**12.37.1 Scenario: Utility Controls Customer’s Distributed Resource**

**Category Description**

Traditionally, distributed resources have served as a primary or emergency back-up energy source for customers that place a premium on reliability and power quality. Distributed resources include generation and storage devices that can provide power back to the electric power system. Societal, policy and technological changes are increasing the adoption rate of distributed resources and smart grid technologies can enhance the value of these systems.

<b><u>Scenario Description</u></b>		
<p>Distributed generation and storage can be used as a demand response resource where the utility can request or control devices to provide energy back to the electrical system. Customers enroll in utility programs that allow their distributed resource to be used for load support or to assist in maintaining power quality. The utility programs can be based on direct control signals or pricing information.</p>		
<b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b>	<b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Enables active participation by consumers</li> <li>• Accommodates all generation and storage options</li> <li>• Enables new products, services and markets</li> <li>• Provides power quality for the digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operate efficiently</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Commands are trustworthy and accurate</li> <li>• Customer’s information is kept private</li> <li>• DR messages are received timely</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Safety</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

**12.38 Category: Transmission Operations**

**12.38.1 Scenario: Real-time Normal Transmission Operations Using EMS Applications and SCADA Data**

**Category Description**

Transmission operations involve monitoring and controlling the transmission system using the SCADA system to monitor and control equipment in transmission substations. The Energy Management System (EMS) assesses the state of the transmission system using applications typically based on transmission power flow models. The SCADA/EMS is located in the utility’s control center, while the key equipment is located in the transmission substations. Protective relaying equipment monitors the health of the transmission system and takes corrective action within a few milliseconds, such as tripping circuit breakers, if power system anomalies are detected.

**Scenario Description**

Transmission normal real-time operations involve monitoring and controlling the transmission system using the SCADA and Energy Management System. The types of information exchanged include:

- Monitored equipment states (open/close), alarms (overheat, overload, battery level, capacity), and measurements (current, voltage, frequency, energy)
- Operator command and control actions, such as supervisory control of switching operations, setup/options of EMS functions, and preparation for storm conditions
- Closed-loop actions, such as protective relaying tripping circuit breakers upon power system anomalies
- Automation system controls voltage, var and power flow based on algorithms, real-time data, and network linked capacitive and reactive components

	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is vital to the safety and reliability of the transmission system</li> <li>• Availability is critical to protective relaying (e.g. &lt; 4 ms) and operator commands (e.g. one second)</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> <li>•</li> </ul>

**12.39 Category: Transmission Operations**

**12.39.1 Scenario: EMS Network Analysis Based on Transmission Power Flow Models**

**Category Description**

Transmission operations involve monitoring and controlling the transmission system using the SCADA system to monitor and control equipment in transmission substations. The Energy Management System (EMS) assesses the state of the transmission system using applications typically based on transmission power flow models. The SCADA/EMS is located in the utility’s control center, while the key equipment is located in the transmission substations. Protective relaying equipment monitors the health of the transmission system and takes corrective action within a few milliseconds, such as tripping circuit breakers, if power system anomalies are detected.

**Scenario Description**

Energy Management Systems (EMS) assesses the state of the transmission power system using the transmission power system analysis models and the SCADA data from the transmission substations.

- EMS performs model update, state estimation, bus load forecast
- EMS performs contingency analysis, recommends preventive and corrective actions
- EMS performs optimal power flow analysis, recommends optimization actions
- EMS or planners perform stability study of network
- Exchange power system model information with RTOs/ISOs and/or other utilities

	<b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is vital to the reliability of the transmission system</li> <li>• Availability is critical to react to contingency situations via operator commands (e.g. one second)</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cyber Security</li> </ul>

**12.40 Category: Transmission Operations**

**12.40.1 Scenario: Real-Time Emergency Transmission Operations**

**Category Description**

Transmission operations involve monitoring and controlling the transmission system using the SCADA system to monitor and control equipment in transmission substations. The Energy Management System (EMS) assesses the state of the transmission system using applications typically based on transmission power flow models. The SCADA/EMS is located in the utility's control center, while the key equipment is located in the transmission substations. Protective relaying equipment monitors the health of the transmission system and takes corrective action within a few milliseconds, such as tripping circuit breakers, if power system anomalies are detected.

**Scenario Description**

During emergencies, the power system takes some automated actions and the operators can also take actions:

- Power System Protection: Emergency operations handles under-frequency load/generation shedding, under-voltage load shedding, LTC control/blocking, shunt control, series compensation control, system separation detection, and wide area real time instability recovery
- Operators manage emergency alarms
- SCADA system responds to emergencies by running key applications such as disturbance monitoring analysis (including fault location), dynamic limit calculations for transformers and breakers based on real time data from equipment monitors, and pre-arming of fast acting emergency automation
- SCADA/EMS generates signals for emergency support by distribution utilities (according to the T&D contracts):
- Operators performs system restorations based on system restoration plans prepared (authorized) by operation management

<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is vital to the safety and reliability of the transmission system</li> <li>• Availability is critical to protective relaying (e.g. &lt; 4 ms) and operator commands (e.g. one second)</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer safety</li> <li>• Customer device standards</li> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> <li>•</li> </ul>
<p><b>12.41 Category: Transmission Operations</b></p>		
<p><b>12.41.1 Scenario: Wide Area Synchro-Phasor System</b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>Transmission operations involve monitoring and controlling the transmission system using the SCADA system to monitor and control equipment in transmission substations. The Energy Management System (EMS) assesses the state of the transmission system using applications typically based on transmission power flow models. The SCADA/EMS is located in the utility’s control center, while the key equipment is located in the transmission substations. Protective relaying equipment monitors the health of the transmission system and takes corrective action within a few milliseconds, such as tripping circuit breakers, if power system anomalies are detected.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>The Wide Area Synchro-Phasor system provides synchronized and time-tagged voltage and current phasor measurements to any protection, control, or monitoring function that requires measurements taken from several locations, whose phase angles are measured against a common, system wide reference. Present day implementation of many protection, control, or monitoring functions are hobbled by not having access to the phase angles between local and remote measurements. With system wide phase angle information, they can be improved and extended. The essential concept behind this system is the system wide synchronization of measurement sampling clocks to a common time reference.</p>		

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is vital to the safety and reliability of the transmission system</li> <li>• Availability is critical to protective relaying (e.g. &lt; 4 ms) and operator commands (e.g. one second)</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cyber Security</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>
<p><b>12.42 Category: RTO/ISO Operations</b></p>		
<p><b>12.42.1 Scenario: RTO/ISO Management of Central and DER Generators and Storage</b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>RTOs and ISOs manage the scheduling and dispatch of central and distributed generation and storage. These functions include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Real time scheduling with the RTO/ISO (for non-market generation/storage)</li> <li>• Real time commitment to RTO/ISO</li> <li>• Real time dispatching by RTO/ISO for energy and ancillary services</li> <li>• Real time plant operations in response to RTO/ISO dispatch commands</li> <li>• Real time contingency and emergency operations</li> <li>• Black Start (system restoration after blackout)</li> <li>• Emissions monitoring and control</li> </ul>		



<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p>	<p><b><u>Cyber Security Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances</li> <li>•</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Integrity is vital to the safety and reliability of the transmission system</li> <li>• Availability is critical to operator commands (e.g. one second)</li> <li>• Confidentiality is not important</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cyber Security</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

**12.43 Category: Asset Management**

**12.43.1 Scenario: Utility gathers circuit and/or transformer load profiles**

**Category Description**

At a high level Asset Management seeks a balance between asset performance, cost and risk to achieve the utilities business objectives. A wide range of conventional functions, models, applications, devices, methodologies and tools may be deployed to effectively plan, select, track, utilize, control, monitor, maintain and protect utility assets.

For our purposes we will establish the scope for the Asset Management category to be the use of specific applications and devices by utility staff such as condition monitoring equipment, protection equipment, event recorders, computer-based maintenance management systems (CMMS), display applications, ratings databases, analysis applications and data marts (historians).

**Scenario Description**

Load profile data is important for the utility planning staff and is also used by the asset management team that is monitoring the utilization of the assets and by the SCADA/EMS and system operations team. This scenario involves the use of field devices that measure loading, the communications network that delivers the data, the historian database and the load profile application and display capability that is either separate or an integrated part of the SCADA/EMS.

Load profile data may also be used by automatic switching applications that use load data to ensure new system configurations do not cause overloads.

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operating efficiency</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances in a self-correcting manner</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data is accurate (integrity)</li> <li>• Data is provided timely</li> <li>• Customer data is kept private</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Cyber Security</li> </ul>
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**12.44 Category: Asset Management**

**12.44.1 Scenario: Utility makes decisions on asset replacement based on a range of inputs including comprehensive off line and on line condition data and analysis applications**

**Category Description**

At a high level Asset Management seeks a balance between asset performance, cost and risk to achieve the utilities business objectives. A wide range of conventional functions, models, applications, devices, methodologies and tools may be deployed to effectively plan, select, track, utilize, control, monitor, maintain and protect utility assets.

For our purposes we will establish the scope for the Asset Management category to be the use of specific applications and devices by utility staff such as condition monitoring equipment, protection equipment, event recorders, computer-based maintenance management systems (CMMS), display applications, ratings databases, analysis applications and data marts (historians).

**Scenario Description**

When decisions on asset replacement become necessary the system operator, asset management, apparatus engineering and maintenance engineering staff work closely together with the objective of maximizing the life and utilization of the asset while avoiding an unplanned outage and damage to the equipment.

This scenario involves the use of on-line condition monitoring devices for the range of assets monitored, off line test results, mobile work force technologies, the communications equipment used to collect the on-line data, data marts (historian databases) to store and trend data as well as condition analysis applications, CMMS applications, display applications and SCADA/EMS.

	<b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b>	<b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b>
<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operating efficiency</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Data provided is accurate and trustworthy</li> <li>• Data is provided timely</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cyber Security</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Anticipates and responds to system disturbances in a self-correcting manner</li> </ul>		
<p><b>12.45 Category: Asset Management</b></p>		
<p><b>12.45.1 Scenario: Utility performs localized load reduction to relieve circuit and/or transformer overloads</b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>At a high level Asset Management seeks a balance between asset performance, cost and risk to achieve the utilities business objectives. A wide range of conventional functions, models, applications, devices, methodologies and tools may be deployed to effectively plan, select, track, utilize, control, monitor, maintain and protect utility assets.</p> <p>For our purposes we will establish the scope for the Asset Management category to be the use of specific applications and devices by utility staff such as condition monitoring equipment, protection equipment, event recorders, computer-based maintenance management systems (CMMS), display applications, ratings databases, analysis applications and data marts (historians).</p> <p>Advanced functions that are associated with Asset Management include dynamic rating and end of life estimation.</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>Transmission capacity can become constrained due to a number of system level scenarios and result in an overload situation on lines and substation equipment. Circuit and/or transformer overloads at the distribution level can occur when higher than anticipated customer loads are placed on a circuit or when operator or automatic switching actions are implemented to change the network configuration.</p> <p>Traditional load reduction systems are used to address generation shortfalls and other system wide issues. Localized load reduction can be a key tool enabling the operator to temporarily curtail the load in a specific area to reduce the impact on specific equipment. This scenario describes the integrated use of the AMI system, the demand response system, other load reduction systems and the SCADA/EMS to achieve this goal.</p>		

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operating efficiency</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances in a self-correcting manner</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Load reduction messages are accurate and trustworthy</li> <li>• Customer’s information is kept private</li> <li>• DR messages are received and processed timely</li> </ul>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Demand response acceptance by customers</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> <li>• Retail Electric Supplier access</li> <li>• Customer data access</li> </ul>
<p><b>12.46 Category: Asset Management</b></p>		
<p><b>12.46.1 Scenario: Utility system operator determines level of severity for an impending asset failure and takes corrective action</b></p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Category Description</u></b></p> <p>At a high level Asset Management seeks a balance between asset performance, cost and risk to achieve the utilities business objectives. A wide range of conventional functions, models, applications, devices, methodologies and tools may be deployed to effectively plan, select, track, utilize, control, monitor, maintain and protect utility assets.</p> <p>For our purposes we will establish the scope for the Asset Management category to be the use of specific applications and devices by utility staff such as condition monitoring equipment, protection equipment, event recorders, computer-based maintenance management systems (CMMS), display applications, ratings databases, analysis applications and data marts (historians).</p>		
<p style="text-align: center;"><b><u>Scenario Description</u></b></p> <p>When pending asset failure can be anticipated the system operator, asset management, apparatus engineering and maintenance engineering staff work closely together with the objective of avoiding an unplanned outage while avoiding further damage to the equipment.</p> <p>This scenario involves the use of on-line condition monitoring devices for the range of assets monitored, off line test results, mobile work force technologies, the communications equipment used to collect the on-line data, data marts (historian databases) to store and trend data as well as condition analysis applications, CMMS applications, display applications and SCADA/EMS.</p>		

<p><b><u>Smart Grid Characteristics</u></b></p>	<p><b><u>Objectives/Requirements</u></b></p>	<p><b><u>Potential Stakeholder Issues</u></b></p>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Provides power quality for the range of needs in a digital economy</li> <li>• Optimizes asset utilization and operating efficiency</li> <li>• Anticipates and responds to system disturbances in a self-correcting manner</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Asset information provided is accurate and trustworthy</li> <li>• Asset information is provided timely</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cyber Security</li> <li>• Customer data privacy and security</li> </ul>

## 13 Appendix E: Vulnerability Classes

### 13.1 Introduction

This document is in draft format. For the purpose of this document, a **Vulnerability Class** is a category of weakness which could adversely impact the operation of the electric grid. A **vulnerability** is the thing which can be leveraged to cause disruption or have otherwise undo influence over the Smart Grid. Actual attacks and impacts will be noted in addition documentation still being produced.

### 13.2 Vulnerability Classes

#### 13.2.1 People, Policy, and Procedure

- People
  - Insufficient trained personnel
  - Insufficient identity validation / background checks
- Policy
  - Inadequate security policy <sup>([11] Section 3-3)</sup>
  - Inadequate security training and awareness program <sup>([11] Section 3-3)</sup>
  - Inadequate privacy policy
  - Inadequate periodic security audits <sup>([11] Section 3-3)</sup>
  - Inadequate security oversight by management
  - Unnecessary system access
  - Inadequate continuity of operations or disaster recovery plan <sup>([11] Section 3-3)</sup>
  - Inadequate documentation of installed assets <sup>([11] Section 3-5)</sup>
  - Inadequate review and/or retention of logs <sup>([11] Section 3-6)</sup>
  - Inadequate change and configuration management policy
- Procedure
  - Inadequate risk assessment process
  - Inadequate risk management process
  - Inadequate incident response process
  - Inadequate identity protection; data privacy
  - Inadequate monitoring of security-related events



- Inadequate patch management process

### 13.2.2 Platform

- Platform Configuration Vulnerabilities
  - Inadequate security architecture and design <sup>([11] Section 3-3)</sup>
  - Installed security capabilities not enabled by default <sup>([11] Section 3-6)</sup>
  - Absent or deficient equipment implementation guidelines <sup>([11] Section 3-3)</sup>
  - Lack of prompt security patches from software vendors <sup>([11] Section 3-4)</sup>
  - Default configurations are used <sup>([11] Section 3-4)</sup>
  - Unneeded services running <sup>([11] Section 3-6)</sup>
- Platform Hardware Vulnerabilities
  - Inadequate monitoring and alerting
  - Physical Environmental Conditions
  - Inadequate testing of security changes <sup>([11] Section 3-5)</sup>
  - Inadequate physical protection for critical systems <sup>([11] Section 3-5)</sup>
  - Inadequate Physical Access Control <sup>([11] Section 3-5)</sup>
  - Inadequate Network/Logical Access Control <sup>([11] Section 3-5)</sup>
  - Lack of backup power <sup>([11] Section 3-5)</sup>
  - Loss of environmental control <sup>([11] Section 3-5)</sup>
  - Single point of failure for critical components <sup>([11] Section 3-5)</sup>
- Platform Software/Firmware Vulnerabilities
  - API Abuse<sup>[12]</sup>
  - Authentication Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
  - Authorization Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
  - Code Permission Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
  - Availability Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
  - Code Permission Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
  - Code Quality Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
  - Concurrency Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>

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- Configuration Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Cryptographic Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Encoding Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Environmental Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Error Handling Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- General Logic Error Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Input Validation Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Logging and Auditing Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Password Management Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Path Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Range and Type Error Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Sensitive Data Protection Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Session Management Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Synchronization and Timing Vulnerability<sup>[12]</sup>
- Unsafe Mobile Code<sup>[12]</sup>
- Use of Dangerous API<sup>[12]</sup>
- Unauthorized firmware modification<sup>[12]</sup>
- Insufficient firmware validation<sup>[12]</sup>
- Denial of Service<sup>[12]</sup>
- Remote access vulnerabilities<sup>[12]</sup>
- Buffer overflow<sup>[[11] Section 3-6]</sup>
- Mishandling of undefined, poorly defined, or “illegal” conditions<sup>[[11] Section 3-6]</sup>
- Use of insecure industry-wide protocols<sup>[[11] Section 3-6]</sup>
- Use of clear text<sup>[[11] Section 3-6]</sup>
- Inadequate malware protection<sup>[[11] Section 3-7]</sup>

### 13.2.3 Network

- Network Configuration Vulnerabilities
  - Inadequate network security architecture<sup>[[11] Section 3-8]</sup>

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- Poorly configured security equipment <sup>([11] Section 3-8)</sup>
- Inappropriate Lifespan for Authentication Credentials/Keys <sup>([11] Section 3-8)</sup>
- Inadequate access controls applied <sup>([11] Section 3-8)</sup>
- Network Hardware Vulnerabilities
  - Inadequate physical protection of network equipment <sup>([11] Section 3-9)</sup>
  - Unsecured physical ports <sup>([11] Section 3-9)</sup>
  - Loss of environmental control <sup>([11] Section 3-9)</sup>
  - Non-critical personnel have access to equipment and network connections <sup>([11] Section 3-9)</sup>
  - Lack of redundancy for critical networks <sup>([11] Section 3-9)</sup>
- Network Perimeter Vulnerabilities
  - Firewalls nonexistent or improperly configured <sup>([11] Section 3-10)</sup>
  - Control networks used for non-control traffic <sup>([11] Section 3-10)</sup>
  - Control network services not within the control network <sup>([11] Section 3-10)</sup>
- Network Monitoring and Logging Vulnerabilities
  - Inadequate firewall and router logs <sup>([11] Section 3-11)</sup>
  - No security monitoring on the network <sup>([11] Section 3-11)</sup>
- Communication Vulnerabilities
  - Critical monitoring and control paths are not identified <sup>([11] Section 3-12)</sup>
  - Standard, well-documented communication protocols are used in plain text <sup>([11] Section 3-12)</sup>
  - Authentication of users, data or devices is substandard or nonexistent <sup>([11] Section 3-12)</sup>
  - Lack of integrity checking for communications <sup>([11] Section 3-12)</sup>
  - (attack, not vulnerability) Insecure key storage
  - (attack, not vulnerability) Insecure key exchange
  - (attack, not vulnerability) Denial of Service conditions
- Wireless Connection Vulnerabilities
  - Inadequate authentication between clients and access points <sup>([11] Section 3-13)</sup>

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- Inadequate data protection between clients and access points <sup>([11] Section 3-13)</sup>

### 14 Appendix F: Crosswalk of Cyber Security Standards

DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
2.1.1	Security Policies and Procedures	62351-1 (1.2)	5.7.1	4.3.2.6	CIP 003 (R1,R1.1,R1.3, R5, R5.3) CIP 005 (R5, R5.1)	4.2	AC-1	FBS-21
2.2.1	Management Policies and Procedures	62351-1 (5.4,5.7)	5.7.1, 5.7.2	4.3.4.4	CIP 003 (R1, R2, R3, R4,R5, R6) CIP 004 (R1)	ES-3	PM-1	FBS-22 AOR-106
2.2.2	Management Accountability		5.7.2	4.3.2.6	CIP 003 (R1, R2, R3, R4,R5,R6) CIP 004 (R1)	4.2.1	PM-1	FBS-23 AOR-107 AAY-9
2.2.3	Baseline Practices		5.7.2, 5.5.3.1	A.3.2.5.4.1				FBS-24 AOR-108

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
								AAY-10 AAY-19
2.2.4	Coordination of Threat Mitigation			A.3.2.3.4.2	CIP 008 (R1.3)			FBS-25 AOR-109
2.2.5	Security Policies for Third Parties			A.3.3.3.2	CIP 003 (R6) CIP 004 (R2.1, R3.3, R4.1) CIP 007 (R1)	6.1.3		FBS-26 AOR-110
2.2.6	Termination of Third Party Access			A.3.3.5.4.1	CIP 004 (R4.1)			FBS-27 AOR-111
2.3.1	Personnel Security Policies and Procedures			4.3.3.2	CIP 003 (R1) CIP 004 (R3)	6.2.1	PS-1	AOR-37 AOR-45 AAY-14
2.3.2	Position			4.3.3.2.3	CIP 004 (R3.1)		PS-2	AOR-38

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
	Categorization							AOR-46
2.3.3	Personnel Screening			A.3.3.2.2	CIP 004 (R3)	6.2.1	PS-3	AOR-39 AOR-47
2.3.4	Personnel Termination			A.3.3.5.3	CIP 004 (R4.2) CIP 007 (R5.2.3)		PS-4	AOR-40 AOR-48
2.3.5	Personnel Transfer			4.3.3.2.2	CIP 004 (R4.1, R4.2) CIP 007 (R5.2.3)		PS-5	AOR-41 AOR-49 AAC-12
2.3.6	Access Agreements			A.3.3.2.2			PS-6	AOR-42 AOR-50
2.3.7	Third Party Security Agreements			A.3.2.3.4.2	CIP 007 (R4.1)		PS-7	AOR-43 AOR-51

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<b>DHS Catalog of Control System Security</b>	<b>DHS Catalog of Control System Security</b>	<b>IEC 62351</b>	<b>ANSI/ISA 99-1</b>	<b>ANSI/ISA 99-2</b>	<b>NERC CIPs (1-9)</b>	<b>NIST SP 800-82</b>	<b>NIST SP 800-53</b>	<b>AM System Security V1.01</b>
2.3.8	Personnel Accountability	62351-1 (5.4)		A.3.2.3			PS-8	AOR-44 AOR-52 AAY-15
2.3.9	Personnel Roles	-		4.3.2.6	CIP 004 (R3.1)			AOR-53
2.4.1	Physical and Environmental Security Policies and Procedures	62351-1 (5.4)		4.3.2.1	CIP 003 (R1, R1.1, R1.3, R5.3) CIP 006 (R1)	6.2.2	PE-1	AOR-12 AOR-54 AAY-16
2.4.2	Physical Access Authorizations			4.3.3.6.1	CIP 004 (R4.1)		PE-2	FAZ-5 AOR-13 AOR-55
2.4.3	Physical Access Control			A.3.3.3.3.1	CIP 006 (R2, R3)	6.2.2	PE-3	FAZ-6 FAZ-7 FAZ-8



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								AOR-14 AOR-15 AOR-56
2.4.4	Monitoring Physical Access	62351-1 (5.7)		A.3.3.3.3.1	CIP 006 (R4)	6.2.2	PE-6	AOR-57
2.4.5	Visitor Control				CIP 006 (R1.4)		PE-7	AOR-18 AOR-58
2.4.6	Visitor Records				CIP 006 (R5)		PE-8	AOR-19 AOR-59
2.4.7	Physical Access Log Retention				CIP 006 (R5)		PE-8	AOR-60
2.4.8	Emergency Shutoff					6.2.2	PE-10	AOR-61
2.4.9	Emergency Power			A.3.2.5.4.1			PE-11	AOR-22

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								AOR-62
2.4.10	Emergency Lighting			A.3.2.5.4.1			PE-12	AOR-23 AOR-63
2.4.11	Fire Protection			A.3.3.3.2			PE-13	FAS-5 FAS-6 AOR-24 AOR-64
2.4.12	Temperature and Humidity Controls			A.3.3.3.2			PE-14	AOR-25 AOR-65
2.4.13	Water Damage Protection			A.3.3.3.2			PE-15	AOR-26 AOR-66
2.4.14	Delivery and Removal			A.4.2.2			PE-16	AOR-27

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								AOR-67
2.4.15	Alternate Work Site					6.2.2.1	PE-17	AOR-28 AOR-68
2.4.16	Portable Media				CIP 003 (R6)			AOR-69
2.4.17	Personnel and Asset Tracking			A.3.3.3.2				AOR-70
2.4.18	Location of Control System Assets			4.3.3.3.4	CIP 002 (R2,R3)		PE-18	AOR-21 AOR-29 AOR-71
2.4.19	Information Leakage						PE-19	AOR-30 AOR-72
2.4.20	Power Equipment and Power Cabling		3.2.27			6.2.2.3	PE-9	AOR-20 AOR-73

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2.4.21	Physical Device Access Control		5.5.5, 5.2.1				PE-3	AOR-74
2.5.1	System and Services Acquisition Policy and Procedures				CIP 003 (R1, R1.1, R1.3)		SA-1	ADR-7 ADR-18 AAY-12
2.5.2	Allocation of Resources						SA-2	ADR-8 ADR-19
2.5.3	Life-Cycle Support						SA-3	ADR-9 ADR-20
2.5.4	Acquisitions						SA-4	ADR-10 ADR-21

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2.5.5	Control System Documentation						SA-5	ADR-11 ADR-22
2.5.6	Software License Usage Restrictions						SA-6	ADR-12 ADR-23
2.5.7	User-installed Software						SA-7	ADR-13 ADR-24
2.5.8	Security Engineering Principals	62351-1 (5.7)					SA-8	ADR-14 ADR-25
2.5.9	Outsourced Control System Services						PS-7	ADR-15 ADR-26
2.5.10	Vendor Configuration Management						SA-4	ADR-16 ADR-27

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
								ADR-52
2.5.11	Vendor Security Testing						SA-11	ADR-17 ADR-28
2.5.12	Vendor Life-cycle Practices							ADR-29
2.6.1	Configuration Management Policy and Procedures		5.6	A.3.2.2.3.1 A.3.2.6.2	CIP 003 (R6, R1.3)		CM-1	ADR-30 AAY-13
2.6.2	Baseline Configuration				CIP 007 (R9)		CM-2	ADR-31
2.6.3	Configuration Change Control		6.5.3.6	4.3.4.3	CIP 005 (R5.2) CIP 007 (R3, R9)		CM-3	ADR-32
2.6.4	Monitoring Configuration			4.3.4.3.3	CIP 007 (R1)		CM-4	FIN-18

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	Changes							ADR-33
2.6.5	Access Restrictions for Configuration Change			A.3.4.3.6	CIP 005 (R2, R2.1, R2.2, R2.4)		CM-5	ADR-34
2.6.6	Configuration Settings				CIP 005 (R2.2)		CM-6	ADR-35
2.6.7	Configuration for Least Functionality				CIP 05 (R2.2, R5) CIP 007 (R2)		CM-7	ADR-36
2.6.8	Configuration Assets				CIP 002 (R3, R4)		CM-8	ADR-37
2.6.9	Addition, Removal, and Disposition of Equipment			4.3.3.3.9	CIP 003 (R6) CIP 006 (R1.7)		MP-6	ADR-38

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2.6.10	Factory Default Authentication Management			4.3.3.5.7				ADR-39
2.7.1	Strategic Planning Policy and Procedures			4.3.2.3	CIP 003 (R1, R1.1, R1.3)		PL-1	AOR-31 AOR-75 AAY-8 AAY-17
2.7.2	Control System Security Plan	62351-1 (5.7)		A.3.2.3.4.1	CIP 003 (R3, R3.1, R3.2)	6.1.2	PL-2	AOR-32 AOR-76 AAY-18
2.7.3	Interruption Identification and Classification			4.3.4.5			RA-3	FIN-9 FAS-4 AOR-77



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2.7.4	Roles and Responsibilities			4.3.4.5.4	CIP 008 (R.12)		IR-1	AOR-78
2.7.5	Planning Process Training		5.6	A.3.2.4.1	CIP 004 (R1,R2)		AT-3	AOR-79
2.7.6	Testing			4.3.4.5.11	CIP 008 (R1.6)		CA-2	AOR-80
2.7.7	Investigate and Analyze	62351-1 (5.5)		A.4.3.3	CIP 008 (R1.1) CIP 009 (R3)			FBS-28 AOR-81
2.7.8	Corrective Action	-		4.4.3.4	CIP 009 (R3)		CP-4	FIN-4 AOR-82
2.7.9	Risk Mitigation	62351-1 (5.7)		4.4.3.4	CIP 002 (R1.1)		PL-2	AOR-83
2.7.10	System Security Plan Update	62351-1 (5.7)		4.3.2.6.7			PL-2	AOR-84

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2.7.11	Rules of Behavior			4.3.3.7.1			PL-4	AOR-34 AOR-85
2.7.12	Security-Related Activity Planning	62351-1 (5.5)			CIP 007 (R1.1)		PL-6	AOR-36 AOR-86
2.8.1	System and Communication Protection Policy and Procedures			A.3.2.1	CIP 003 (R1, R1.1, R1.3) CIP 005 (R2, R5)		SC-1	FRS-1 AAY-11
2.8.2	Management Port Partitioning						SC-3	FRS-2
2.8.3	Security Function Isolation						SC-7	FAZ-1 FRS-3 ADR-51 AAC-6 AAC-7

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2.8.4	Information Remnants						SC-4	FCP-1 FCP-11 FRS-4
2.8.5	Denial-of-Service Protection	62351-1 (5.6.2,5.8)		A.2.3.3.3			SC-5	FAV-7 FRS-5
2.8.6	Resource Priority			4.2.3.6			SC-6	FAV-5 FAV-6 FAV-8 FRS-6
2.8.7	Boundary Protection			4.3.3.4.2	CIP 005 (R1, R1.2, R1.3, R1.4, R1.6, R2, R5, R5.1)		SC-7	FBS-15 FBS-16 FBS-17 FBS-18

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								FBS-19 FBS-20 FRS-7
2.8.8	Communication Integrity						SC-8	FIN-37 FIN-41
2.8.9	Communication Confidentially			A.3.3.6.1			SC-9	FBS-18
2.8.10	Trusted Path						SC-11	FIN-26 FRS-10
2.8.11	Cryptographic Key Establishment and Management						SC-12	FRS-11 FTS-2
2.8.12	Use of Validated Cryptography						SC-13	FAS-2 FCS-6

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								FRS-12
2.8.13	Collaborative Computing						SC-15	FRS-13
2.8.14	Transmission of Security Parameters						SC-16	FIN-38 FRS-14
2.8.15	Public Key Infrastructure Certificates						SC-17	FRS-15 FTS-1
2.8.16	Mobile Code						SC-18	FRS-16 ADR-50
2.8.17	Voice-over-Internet Protocol						SC-19	FRS-17
2.8.18	System Connections			A.3.3.3.3.1	CIP 005 (R2, R5, R5.1)		CA-3	FRS-18 AOR-112

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2.8.19	Security Roles			4.3.3.7.3	CIP 003 (R5.2) CIP 004 (R2.2)		SA-9	FID-2
2.8.20	Message Authenticity	62351-1 (6.8.1)	5.10.2.3				SC-8	FNR-9 FRS-19
2.8.21	Architecture and Provisioning for Name/Address Resolution Service						SC-22	FIN-40 FRS-21
2.8.22	Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Authoritative Source)						SC-20	FIN-39 FRS-22
2.8.23	Secure Name/Address Resolution Service (Recursive or Caching Resolver)						SC-21	FRS-23

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2.9.1	Information and Document Management Policy and Procedures			4.3.4.4	CIP 002 (R1.1, D1.2)			AHR-18
2.9.2	Information and Document Retention			4.3.4.4.1	CIP 002 (R1.1, D1.2) CIP 006 (R7)			AHR-19
2.9.3	Information Handling			4.3.4.4.4	CIP 002 (R1.1)		MP-1	AHR-20
2.9.4	Information Classification			4.3.4.4.2	CIP 003 (R4,R4.1,R4.2)		RA-2	AHR-21
2.9.5	Information Exchange			4.3.4.4.2				AHR-22
2.9.6	Information and Document Classification			4.3.4.4.3	CIP 003 (R4,R4.1,R4.2)			AHR-23

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2.9.7	Information and Document Retrieval			4.3.4.4.5				AHR-24
2.9.8	Information and Document Destruction			4.3.4.4.4				AHR-25
2.9.9	Information and Document Management Review			4.3.4.4.7				AHR-26
2.9.10	Automated Marking						AC-15	FIN-42 AHR-27
2.9.11	Automated labeling						AC-16	FID-8 AHR-28
2.10.1	System Maintenance Policy and			4.3.4.3	CIP 003 (R1, R1.1, R1.3)		MA-1	ADR-1 ADR-40



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	Procedures				CIP 006 (R6)			
2.10.2	Legacy System Upgrades			4.3.4.3.4	CIP 007 (R1)			ADR-41
2.10.3	System Monitoring and Evaluation	62351-1 (5.2)	5.6	4.3.4.3.6			CA-2	FIN-18
2.10.4	Backup and Recovery		5.7.4	4.3.4.3.9			CP-6	ADR-43
2.10.5	Unplanned System Maintenance			A.3.4.3.8	CIP 007 (R1.1)		PL-6	ADR-44
2.10.6	Periodic System Maintenance			A.3.4.3.1			MA-2	ADR-2 ADR-45
2.10.7	Maintenance Tools						MA-3	FIN-31 ADR-3 ADR-46

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2.10.8	Maintenance Personnel						MA-5	FAZ-4 ADR-5 ADR-47
2.10.9	Remote Maintenance	62351-1 (6.9.1)	4.4, 5.5.4.1, 5.5.5				MA-4	FCP-15 ADR-4 ADR-48
2.10.10	Timely Maintenance						MA-6	ADR-6 ADR-49
2.11.1	Security Awareness Training Policy and Procedures			A.3.2.4.1	CIP 004 (R1, R2)		AT-1	AOR-1 AOR-87
2.11.2	Security Awareness			A.3.2.4.2	CIP 003 (R1.2)		AT-2	AOR-2 AOR-88

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2.11.3	Security Training			A.3.2.4.2	CIP 004 (R1, R2, R2.1, R2.2)		AT-3	AOR-3 AOR-89
2.11.4	Security Training Records			A.3.2.4.3.2	CIP 004 (R2.3)		AT-4	AOR-90
2.11.5	Contact with Security Groups and Associations						AT-5	AOR-5 AOR-91
2.11.6	Security Responsibility Training	62351-1 (5.7)		A.3.2.4.3.2				AOR-92
2.12.1	Incident Response Policy and Procedures			A.3.4.5.1	CIP 003 (R1) CIP 008 (R1, R1.2, R1.4, R1.5)	6.1.1	IR-1	AHR-1 AHR-11 AHR-29
2.12.2	Continuity of Operations Plan			A.3.2.5	CIP 003 (R1.3)		CP-1	FCP-12

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					CIP 009 (R1)			FIN-43 AHR-30
2.12.3	Continuity of Operations Roles and Responsibilities			A.3.2.5.4.1	CIP 009 (R1.1, R1.2)	6.2.3	CP-2	AHR-2 AHR-31
2.12.4	Incident Response Training			A.3.4.5.5.2	CIP 008 (R1.6)		IR-2	AHR-3 AHR-12 AHR-32
2.12.5	Continuity of Operations Plan Testing			A.3.4.5.5.1	CIP 009 (R2) CIP 008 (R1.6)	6.2.3 6.2.3.2	CP-4, IR-3	AHR-4 AHR-13 AHR-33
2.12.6	Continuity of Operations Plan Update			A.3.4.5.2	CIP 009 (R3)		CP-5	AHR-5 AHR-34

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2.12.7	Incident Handling			4.3.3.3.8 A.4.2.2	CIP 008 (R1.1)		IR-4	FIN-5 FAC-1 FAC-2 FAS-7 FAS-8 AOR-17 AHR-14 AHR-35
2.12.8	Incident Monitoring				CIP 007 (R6, R6.2)		IR-5	AHR-15 AHR-36
2.12.9	Incident Reporting			4.3.4.5.5	CIP 008 (R1.3)		IR-6	FAS-3 AHR-16 AHR-37
2.12.10	Incident Response				CIP 008 (R1, R1.2)		IR-7	AHR-17

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	Assistance							AHR-38
2.12.11	Incident Response Investigation and Analysis			A.3.4.5.5.2	CIP 008 (R1) CIP 006 (R4)		PE-6	AHR-39
2.12.12	Corrective Action			A.3.4.5.5.2.j	CIP 009 (R2,R3)		CP-4	FIN-6 AHR-40
2.12.13	Alternative Storage Sites			A.3.2.5.4.2. b			CP-6	AHR-6 AHR-41
2.12.14	Alternate Command/Control Methods			A.3.3.4.3	CIP 009 (R2)		CP-4	AHR-7 AHR-42
2.12.15	Alternate Control Center			A.3.3.4.3			CP-6,7	AHR-8 AHR-43
2.12.16	Control System Backup			4.3.4.3.9	CIP 009 (R4, R5)	6.2.3	CP-9	AHR-9

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
								AHR-44
2.12.17	Control System Recovery and Reconstitution			4.3.2.5	CIP 009 (R4)	6.2.3.2	CP-10	FCP-12 FIN-1 FIN-12 FIN-14 FAV-1 FAV-9 AHR-10 AHR-45
2.12.18	Fail-Safe Response					5.10		FIN-1 FIN-11 FIN-12 AHR-46

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<b>DHS Catalog of Control System Security</b>	<b>DHS Catalog of Control System Security</b>	<b>IEC 62351</b>	<b>ANSI/ISA 99-1</b>	<b>ANSI/ISA 99-2</b>	<b>NERC CIPs (1-9)</b>	<b>NIST SP 800-82</b>	<b>NIST SP 800-53</b>	<b>AM System Security V1.01</b>
2.13.1	Media Protection and Procedures				CIP 003 (R1, R1.1, R1.3) CIP 007 (R7)	3.3.2	MP-1	AOR-6 AOR-93
2.13.2	Media Access					3.3.2	MP-2	FCP-15 AOR-7 AOR-94
2.13.3	Media Classification					6.2.1 6.2.2	AC-16	AOR-8 AOR-95
2.13.4	Media Labeling						MP-3	AOR-8 AOR-96
2.13.5	Media Storage						MP-4	AOR-9 AOR-97
2.13.6	Media Transport						MP-5	AOR-10



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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
								AOR-98
2.13.7	Media Sanitization and Storage				CIP 007 (R7.1, R7.2, R7.3)	6.2.7	MP-6	AOR-11 AOR-99
2.14.1	System and Information Integrity Policy and Procedures	62351-1 (5.4)			CIP 003 (R1, R1.1, R1.3)		SI-1	FIN-29
2.14.2	Flaw Remediation				CIP 007 (R3.2)		SI-2	FIN-30
2.14.3	Malicious Code Protection				CIP 007 (R4, R4.2)	3.3.2, 6.2, 6.2.6, 6.2.6.1	CP-2, MA-3, MA-4, RA-5, SA-7, SC-7	FIN-5 FIN-31 FAS-4
2.14.4	System Monitoring Tools and Techniques				CIP 007 (R4.1, R6)		SI-4	FCP-13 FIN-5 FIN-7

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<b>DHS Catalog of Control System Security</b>	<b>DHS Catalog of Control System Security</b>	<b>IEC 62351</b>	<b>ANSI/ISA 99-1</b>	<b>ANSI/ISA 99-2</b>	<b>NERC CIPs (1-9)</b>	<b>NIST SP 800-82</b>	<b>NIST SP 800-53</b>	<b>AM System Security V1.01</b>
								FIN-8 FIN-9 FIN-25
2.14.5	Security Alerts and Advisories						SI-5	
2.14.6	Security Functionality Verification						SI-6	FIN-3 FIN-20 FIN-21 FIN-22 FIN-24 FIN-32 FNS-3

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
2.14.7	Software and Information Integrity						SI-7	FIN-2 FIN-5 FIN-33 FIN-43 FAS-1 FNS-1
2.14.8	Spam Protection				CIP 007 (R4)	3.2, 6.2.6	SI-8	
2.14.9	Information Input						SI-9	FIN-26 FIN-34 FRS-24

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
2.14.10	Information Input Accuracy, Completeness, Validity and Authenticity						SI-10	FIN-17 FIN-27 FIN-35 FRS-25 FRS-26 FRS-33
2.14.11	Error Handling						SI-11	FCP-14
2.14.12	Information Output and Retention						SI-12	FIN-28 FIN-36
2.15.1	Access Control Policies and Procedures	62351-1 (6.2)		4.3.3.3.1	CIP 003 (R1, R1.1, R1.3, R5, R5.3) CIP 005 (R2.1,R5,R5.1)	3.2.2	AC-1	AOR-117 AAC-1 AAC-8

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
2.15.2	Identification and Authentication Procedures and Policy			4.3.3.5.1	CIP 003 (R1, R1.1, R1.3) CIP 007 (R5)		IA-1	AOR-116
2.15.3	Account Management	62351-1 (6.2)		4.3.3.5	CIP 003 (R5.1, R5.2) CIP 004 (R4, R4.1) CIP 005 (R2.5, R5, R5.1) CIP 007 (R5.2)		AC-2	FAT-27 FRS-37 AOR-118 AAY-1 AAY-2
2.15.4	Identifier Management			4.3.3.5.4	CIP 005 (R5,R5.1)		IA-4	FCP-1 FID-6
2.15.5	Authenticator Management			4.3.3.6.3	CIP 007 (R5.2.1, R5.3)		IA-5	FCP-1 FCP-2 FCP-3 FCP-4

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
								FCP-13 FCP-15 FAT-55
2.15.6	Supervision and Review			A.3.3.5.4.1	CIP 007 (R5.1.2)		PE-2	AAC-2 AAC-9 AAC-13
2.15.7	Access Enforcement	62351-1 (6.7.1)		A.3.3.5.3			AC-3	FIN-34 FAV-3 FID-4 FAZ-3 FID-7 FAT-27 FAT-28

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
								FAT-29 FAT-30 FAT-31 FAT-32 FAZ-11 FRS-24 FRS-25 FRS-27 FRS-28 AAC-3 AAC-4 AAC-10 AAC-11
2.15.8	Separation of Duties			A.3.3.5.3			AC-5	FAT-36 FAZ-2

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
2.15.9	Least Privilege			A.3.3.4.1	CIP-007 (R5.1)		AC-6	FAT-37 FAZ-10
2.15.10	User Identification and Authentication			4.3.3.6.2			AC-2	FID-1 FID-5 FAT-4 FAT-26 FAT-42
2.15.11	Permitted Actions without Identification and Authentication						AC-14	
2.15.12	Device Authentication and Identification	62351-1 (6.3)		A.3.3.6.3.1			IA-3,	FAT-2
2.15.13	Authenticator Feedback						IA-6	FCP-15



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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
2.15.14	Cryptographic Module Authentication						IA-7	FAT-3 FCS-6
2.15.15	Information Flow Enforcement						AC-4	FCP-16 FAT-5 FAT-27 FAZ-3 FRS-27
2.15.16	Passwords			A.3.3.6.3.1, A.3.3.6.2	CIP 007 (R5.3)		--	FIN-16 FAT-55
2.15.17	System Use Notification				CIP-005 (R2.6, R5, R5.1)		AC-8	FAC-32 FBS-10 FNS-5 AOR-113

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
2.15.18	Concurrent Session Control						AC-10	FAZ-14 FBS-2 FBS-4
2.15.19	Previous Logon Notification						AC-9	FAC-31 FBS-11 FBS-12 FNS-4
2.15.20	Unsuccessful Logon Notification			A.3.3.6.2			AC-7	FAT-57 FAZ-12 AAY-4
2.15.21	Session Lock						AC-11	FAT-1 FAT-46 FAT-56

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
								FAZ-12 FBS-5 FBS-7
2.15.22	Remote Session Termination						Withdrawn	FAZ-13 FBS-5 FBS-8 FRS-44
2.15.23	Remote Access Policy and Procedures			4.3.3.6.5	CIP 005 (R1.1, R2.3, R2.4, R2.5, R5, R5.1)		AC-17	FBS-1 AOR-114
2.15.24	Remote Access	62351-1 (6.9.1)		4.3.3.6.4	CIP 005 (R1.1, R2.3, R2.4, R2.5, R5, R5.1)		AC-17	FAT-12
2.15.25	Access Control for Portable and Mobile Devices			A.3.3.6.2	CIP 005 (R2.4, R5, R5.1)	6.2.2.2	AC-19	FAT-21

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
2.15.26	Wireless Access Restrictions	62351-1 (5.6.1)			CIP 005 (R2.4, R5)	6.3.2.5	AC-18	FAT-21
2.15.27	Personally Owned Information						AC-20	AOR-115
2.15.28	External Access Protections				CIP 005 (R2.4, R2.5, R5, R5.1)		IA-2	FCP-11
2.15.29	Use of External Information Control Systems			A.3.2.3.4.1. d A.3.3.4.2			SC-7	FIN-3 FAZ-1
2.16.1	Audit and Accountability Process and Procedures			A.3.4.2.5.3	CIP 003 (R1,RR.1, R1.3) CIP 005 (R3, R5) CIP 007 (R5,	4.2 6.3.3	AU-1	AOR-119 AAY-5 AAY-6

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
					R5.2.3)			
2.16.2	Auditable Events	62351-1 (4.3)			CIP 005 (R3.1, R5, R5.1) CIP 007 (R5.1.2, R5.2.3, R6.1, R6.3)	6.3.3	AU-2	FAC-2 FAC-3 AAY-7
2.16.3	Content of Audit Records	62351-1 (4.3)			CIP 007 (R5.1.2, R5.2.3)	6.3.3	AU-3	FNR-2 FAC-7 FAC-8 FAC-9
2.16.4	Audit Storage						AU-4	FAC-6 FAC-25 FAC-27
2.16.5	Response to Audit Processing					6.3.3	AU-5	FAC-26

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
	Failures							FAC-28
2.16.6	Audit Monitoring, Process, and Reporting	62351-1 (4.3)			CIP 005 (R3.2, R5, R5.1) CIP 007 (R6.2, R6.5)	6.3.3	AU-6	FAC-10 FAC-11 FAC-12 FAC-13 FAC-14 FAC-15 FAC-16 FAC-17 FAC-18 FAC-19 AOR-120
2.16.7	Audit Reduction and Report Generation					6.3.3	AU-7, AU-12	FAC-20 FAC-21

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
								FAC-22 FAC-29
2.16.8	Time Stamps					6.3.3	AU-8	FAC-30
2.16.9	Protection of Audit Information					6.3.3	AU-9	FAC-4 FAC-5 FAC-24
2.16.10	Audit Record Retention				CIP 005 (R5.3) CIP 007 (R5.1.2, R6.4) CIP 008 (R.2)	6.3.3	AU-11	AHR-47
2.16.11	Conduct and Frequency of Audits			A.4.2.4.1b		6.3.1	AU-1	AOR-121
2.16.12	Auditor Qualification			4.4.2.6		4.2.6	CA-2	AOR-122

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
2.16.13	Audit Tools			A.2.3.3.6.3			AU-7	AOR-123
2.16.14	Security Policy Compliance				CIP 003 (R1, R1.1, R1.3)		CA-1	FNS-2 FNS-3 AOR-124
2.17.1	Monitoring and Reviewing Control System Security management Policy and Procedures			A.4.3.3	CIP 005 (R4, R5) CIP 006 (R6) CIP 007 (R1, R8)		CA-2	AOR-100
2.17.2	Continuous Improvement		5.6	A.4.3.6.2.n	CIP 007 (R1)	6.1.2	CA-2-2	AOR-101
2.17.3	Monitoring of Security Policy			4.4.3.6, 4.4.3.8	CIP 003 (R1.3, R6)		CM-1	AOR-102
2.17.4	Best Practices			4.4.3.6			SI-5	AOR-103



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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
2.17.5	Security Accreditation				CIP 003 (R2.3, R4.3)		CA-6	FAZ-9 AOR-104
2.17.6	Security Certification						CA-4	AOR-33 AOR-105
2.18.1	Risk Assessment Policy and Procedures	62351-1 (5.2.1)	5.5.3	4.3.4.2	CIP 002 (R1, R1.1) CIP 003 (R1) CIP 005 (R4, R5)	6.1.1	RA-1	
2.18.2	Risk Management Plan	62351-1 (5.2.1)		4.2.3.8, A.2.3.3.1, A.2.3.3.5.2	CIP 003 (R4, R4.1, R4.2)		RA-2	
2.18.3	Certification, Accreditation, and Security Assessment Policies and			A.3.4.2.5.3	CIP 005 (R4, R5) CIP 006 (R6) CIP 007 (R1, R8)		CA-1	

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	Procedures							
2.18.4	Security Assessments	62351-1 (5.7)		A.3.4.2.5.3	CIP 005 (R4, R5) CIP 006 (R6) CIP 007 (R1, R8)		CA-2	
2.18.5	Control System Connections				CIP 005 (R2,R5,R5.1)		CA-3	FAZ-1
2.18.6	Plan of Action and Milestones			A.4.3.6.2	CIP 003 (R4.3) CIP 005 R4.5, R5) CIP 007 (R8.4)		CA-5	
2.18.7	Continuous Monitoring	62351-1 (5.7)		A.4.2.1			CA-7	
2.18.8	Security Categorization			4.3.3.	CIP 003 (R4, R4.1, R4.2)		RA-2	

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DHS Catalog of Control System Security	DHS Catalog of Control System Security	IEC 62351	ANSI/ISA 99-1	ANSI/ISA 99-2	NERC CIPs (1-9)	NIST SP 800-82	NIST SP 800-53	AM System Security V1.01
					CIP 005 (R4.1, R4.2)			
2.18.9	Risk Assessment	62351-1 (5.2.1, 5.5)	5.5.3	4.2.3.8	CIP 002 (R1.2) CIP 005 (R4.1, R5, R5.1)		RA-3	
2.18.10	Risk Assessment Update	62351-1 (5.5)		4.2.3.10			RA-4	
2.18.11	Vulnerability Assessment and Awareness			4.2.3.12	CIP 005 (R4.2, R4.3, R4.4, R5, R5.1) CIP 007 (R3.1, R8)		RA-5	ADR-42
2.18.12	Identify, Classify, Analyze, and Prioritize Potential Security Risks			4.2.3.7 4.2.3.8				