**NAESB Accreditation Requirements for Authorized Certification Authorities**

1. INTRODUCTION
	1. About this Document

This document provides technical and management details which a Certificate Authority is required to meet in order to be accredited as an Authorized Certification Authority by NAESB. An Authorized Certification Authority is expected to illustrate compliance with this Accreditation Specification within a Certification Practice Statement. The following requirements are intended to apply to NAESB WEQ Business Practice Standards that employ PKI technology.

* 1. Definitions
		1. Authorized Certification Authority: Shall have the same meaning as defined in Business Practice Standard WEQ-000-2.
		2. Certificate Authority: The Certificate Authority manages the Certificate life cycle, which includes generation and issuance, distribution, renewal and reissuance, and revocation of Certificates.
		3. Registration Authority (RA): Shall have the same meaning as defined in Business Practice Standard WEQ-000-2.Local Registration Authority (LRA): A delegation of the RA function by the Certificate Authority to external registration authorities that may or may not be part of the same legal entity as the Certificate Authority. For example, A customer of a Certificate Authority may arrange with that Certificate Authority to perform the RA function itself or use its agent.
		4. RA Operations/Functions: The identification and authentication of Subscribers
		5. Certificate Authority Operations/Functions: The management of the Certificate life cycle, which includes generation and issuance, distribution, renewal and reissuance, and revocation of Certificates
		6. Critical Certificate Authority Operations/Functions: The management of the Certificate life cycle, which includes generation and issuance, distribution, renewal and reissuance, and revocation of the Certificate Authority’s root and subordinate private keys.
	2. Certificate Usage
		1. Appropriate Certificate Uses

A Certificate can be used for protecting information of varying sensitivity. As such, an Authorized Certification Authority should have the ability to provide Certificates at a number of assurance levels. The assurance level determines the Authorized Certification Authority’s overall confidence in the end entity’s identity. An Authorized Certification Authority will be responsible for providing at least one of the following assurance levels:

| **Assurance Level** | **Description**  |
| --- | --- |
| Rudimentary | This level provides the lowest degree of assurance concerning the identity of the end entity. One of the primary functions of this level is to provide data integrity to the information being signed. This level is relevant to environments in which the risk of malicious activity is considered to be low.  |
| Basic | This level provides a basic level of assurance relevant to environments where there are risks and consequences of data compromise, but they are not considered to be of major significance. This may include access to private information where the likelihood of malicious access is not high.  |
| Medium | This level is relevant to environments where risks and consequences of data compromise are moderate. This may include transactions having substantial monetary value or risk of fraud, or involving access to private information where the likelihood of malicious access is substantial.  |
| High | This level is reserved for those environments where the threats to data are high, or the consequences of the failure of security services are high. This may include very high value transactions or high levels of fraud risk. |

* 1. Requirements Administration

The NAESB Business Practice Standard WEQ-012 call for these Authorized Certification Authorities to meet certain minimum criteria and that the Certificates issued to participants meet a certain minimum criteria in order to ensure that the participant’s identity is tied to the Certificate and has been verified by the Certificate Authority. The Issuing Certification Authority must meet the provisions in the NAESB Business Practice Standard WEQ-012 in order for the Certificate to be considered compliant with NAESB Business Practice Standards.

* + 1. Organization Administering the Document

NAESB is responsible for the creation, modification, and all other aspects of Authorized Certification Authority accreditation requirements.

* + 1. Contacting NAESB

Questions regarding this Accreditation Specification may be directed to the NAESB office.

* + 1. Authorized Certification Authority Candidate Accreditation Procedures

. The Authorized Certification Authority should follow the Board Certification Committee Authorized Certificate Authority Process.

1. IDENTIFICATION & AUTHENTICATION
	1. Naming
		1. Types of Names

The Authorized Certification Authority shall only generate and sign Certificates that contain a non-null subject Distinguished Name (DN). This applies to all assurance levels. The table below summarizes the naming requirements that apply to each level of assurance.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Assurance Level** | **Naming Requirements** |
| Rudimentary | Non-Null Subject Name, or Null Subject Name if Subject Alternative Name is populated and marked critical |
| Basic | Non-Null Subject Name, and optional Subject Alternative Name if marked non-critical |
| Medium | Non-Null Subject Name, and optional Subject Alternative Name if marked non-critical |
| High | Non-Null Subject Name, and optional Subject Alternative Name if marked non-critical |

* + 1. Need for Names to be Meaningful

Names used in the Certificates issued by the Authorized Certification Authority must identify the person or object to which they are assigned. When DNs are used, the common name must respect name space uniqueness requirements and must not be misleading.

* + 1. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers

The Authorized Certification Authority shall not issue anonymous Certificates. Pseudonymous Certificates may be issued by the Authorized Certification Authority; however,Certificate Authority Certificates should not contain anonymous or pseudonymous identities.

* + 1. Uniqueness of Names

The Authorized Certification Authority is responsible for ensuring name uniqueness in Certificates issued by the Authorized Certification Authority. Name uniqueness is not violated when multiple Certificates are issued to the same entity as long as each subject string is unique.

* 1. Initial Identity Validation
		1. Authenticity of Organization Identity

Requests for Subscriber Certificates in the name of an affiliated organization shall include the organization name, address, and documentation of the existence of the organization.

The Authorized Certification Authority or RA shall verify the information, in addition to the authenticity of the requesting representative and the representative’s authorization to act in the name of the organization.

* + 1. Authentication of Subscribers

An Authorized Certification Authority may elect to perform RA Operations/Functions in-house or choose to delegate some, or all, RA Operations/Functions to other parties that are separate legal entities from the Authorized Certification Authority. In both cases the party or parties performing RA Operations/Functions are subject to the obligations for identity proofing, auditing, logging, protection of Subscriber information, record retention and other aspects germane to the RA function contained in this Accreditation Specification . All RA infrastructure and operations performing RA Operations/Functions shall be held to this requirement as incumbent upon theCertificate Authority when performing in-house RA Operations/Functions. The Authorized Certification Authority and/or delegated entity are responsible for ensuring that all parties performing RA Operations/Functions understand and agree to conform to this Accreditation Specification.

For Subscribers, the Authorized Certification Authority, and/or associated RAs shall ensure that the applicant’s identity information is verified in accordance with the process established by the applicable CP and Certification Practice Statement. Process information shall depend upon the Certificate level of assurance and shall be addressed in these requirements. The documentation and authentication requirements shall vary depending upon the level of assurance.

The authentication requirements to be used are defined by NIST SP800-63 version 1.0.2 section *7.2.1 Registration of Identity Proofing Requirements*[[1]](#footnote-1) using the following mappings:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **NIST Assurance Level** | **NAESB Assurance Level** |
| Level 1 | Rudimentary |
| Level 2 | Basic |
| Level 3 | Medium |
| Level 4 | High |

* 1. Identification and Authentication for Reissuance Requests
		1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Reissuance

Subscribers of Authorized Certification Authorities shall identify themselves for the purpose of reissuing as required in the table below.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Assurance Level** | **Identity Requirements** |
| Rudimentary | Identity may be established through use of current signature key.  |
| Basic | Identity may be established through use of current signature key, except that identity shall be reestablished through initial registration process at least once every five years from the time of initial registration.  |
| Medium | Identity may be established through use of current signature key, except that identity shall be established through initial registration process at least once every three years from the time of initial registration.  |
| High | Identity may be established through use of current signature key, except that identity shall be established through initial registration process at least annually.  |

* + 1. Identification and Authentication for Reissuance after Revocation

After a Certificate has been revoked, the Subscriber is required to go through the initial registration process described elsewhere in this document to obtain a new Certificate.

2.3.3 Re-verification and Revalidation of Identity When Certificate Information Changes

If at any point any subject name information embodied in a Certificate issued by aCertificate Authority is changed in any way, the identity proofing procedures outlined in this requirement must be re-performed and a Certificate issued with the validated information.

1. CERTIFICATE LIFECYCLE
	1. Issuance

The Authorized Certification Authority will verify the RA digital signature of the Certificate signing request prior to issuance.Certificate Authority Certificates created by the Authorized Certification Authority shall be checked to ensure that all fields and extensions are properly populated.

* 1. Certificate Acceptance

Submission of a public key for signing by the Authorized Certification Authority explicitly indicates acceptance of the Subscriber agreement.

* 1. Key Pair and Certificate Usage
		1. Certificate Usage

Restrictions in the intended scope of usage for a private key are specified through Certificate extensions, including the key usage and extended key usage extensions, in the associated Certificate.

* + 1. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage

Authorized Certification Authority-issued Certificates specify restrictions on use through critical Certificate extensions, including the basic constraints and key usage extensions. The Authorized Certification Authority issues Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) specifying the current status of all unexpired Authorized Certification Authority Certificates.

* 1. Authorized Certification Authority & Subscriber Certificate Rekey

Certificate rekey consists of issuing a new Certificate with a new validity period and serial number while retaining all other information in the original Certificate including the public key. Rekeying of Certificates is considered an insecure practice and increases the size of CRLs and thus is not allowed under this Accreditation Specification. After Certificate renewal, the old Certificate may or may not be revoked, but must not be further re-keyed, renewed, or modified.

* + 1. Circumstance of Certificate Renewal

A Certificate may be renewed if the public key has not reached the end of its validity period, the associated private key has not been compromised, and the Subscriber name and attributes are unchanged. In addition, the validity period of the Certificate must meet the requirements specified elsewhere in this document.

* + 1. Processing Certificate Renewal Requests

The Authorized Certification Authority may process Certificate renewal requests only if the chain of trust has not been compromised. Renewals may be performed if the Subscriber Certificate has been lost, but the associated private and public key pair has not been compromised.

* 1. Authorized Certification Authority Certificate Renewal and Reissuance

Renewing an Authorized Certification Authority Certificate consists of creating new Certificates with a different public and private key pair and serial number while retaining the remaining contents of the old Certificate that describe the subject. The new Certificate may be assigned a different validity period, key identifiers, CRL distribution point, and/or be signed with a different key. The renewal of a Certificate does not require a change to the Subject Name and does not violate the requirement for name uniqueness. Reissuing is exactly the same as renewing a Certificate with the exception that the validity period end date remains the same as the old Certificate which is being issued.

* + 1. Circumstances of an Authorized Certification Authority Certificate Renewal

An Authorized Certification Authority Certificate must be renewed before the validity period of the Certificates it signs is shortened (i.e. a child Certificate validity period cannot extend beyond the validity period of the parent signing Certificate) and the Subject Name and other attributes should be unchanged. In addition, the validity period of the Certificate must meet the requirements specified elsewhere in this document. Authorized Certification Authority Certificates should not be reissued as multiple Authorized Certification Authority Certificates with the same end validity date are confusing to both users and applications (i.e. browsers).

3.5.2. Processing Authorized Certification Authority Certificate Renewal Requests

An Authorized Certification Authority shall notify the NAESB office a minimum of 30 days in advance of a planned Authorized Certification Authority Certificate renewal, or as soon as practical in the event of an incident that forces an Authorized Certification Authority Certificate renewal.

3.6. Subscriber Certificate Renewal & Reissuance

Renewing a Subscriber Certificate consists of creating new Certificate with a different public and private key pair and serial number while retaining the remaining contents of the old Certificate that describe the Subscriber. The new Certificate may be assigned a different validity period, key identifiers, CRL distribution points, and/or be signed with a different key. The renewal of a Certificate shall not allow achange to the Subject Name and does not violate the requirement for name uniqueness. Reissuing is exactly the same as renewing a Certificate with the exception that the validity period end date remains the same as the old Certificate which is being reissued.

3.6.1. Processing Subscriber Certificate Renewal & Reissuance Report

Subscribers shall identify themselves for the purpose of renewal or reissuance of their Certificate as required in Section 2.3.1. After Certificate renewal or reissuance, the old Certificate may or may not be revoked, but must not be further used for renewals or reissuance.

3.7. Certificate Revocation & Suspension

Revocation requests must be authenticated. Requests to revoke a Certificate may be authenticated using that Certificate's associated private key, regardless of whether or not the private key has been compromised. For High, Medium, and Basic Assurance Levels, all Authorized Certification Authoritys shall publish CRLs.

3.7.1. Circumstances for Revocation

For the Authorized Certification Authority, a Certificate shall be revoked when the binding between the subject and the subject’s public key defined within a Certificate is no longer considered valid. There are three circumstances under which Certificates issued by the Authorized Certification Authority will be revoked:

* The first circumstance is when NAESB recommends that an Authorized Certification Authority-issued Certificate be revoked.
* The second circumstance is when the Authorized Certification Authority reasonably suspects, is notified, or becomes aware that the private key of a Certificate has been compromised.
* The third circumstance is when the Authorized Certification Authority becomes aware of an emergency which, if the Certificate is not revoked, may have material commercial impact to parties operating in accordance with this Accreditation Specification.

Authorized Certification Authorities that implement Certificate revocation shall, at a minimum, revoke Certificates for the reason of key compromise upon receipt of an authenticated request from a party authorized by the Authorized Certification Authority, with a Certificate equal to or greater than the assurance level of the Certificate being revoked, or the Authorized Certification Authority itself.

For Certificates that express an organizational affiliation, Authorized Certification Authorities shall require that the organization must inform the Authorized Certification Authority of any changes in the Subscriber affiliation. If the affiliated organization no longer authorizes the affiliation of a Subscriber, the Authorized Certification Authority shall revoke any Certificates issued to that Subscriber containing the organizational affiliation. If an organization terminates its relationship with a subordinate Authorized Certification Authority such that it no longer provides affiliation information, the subordinate Authorized Certification Authority shall revoke all Certificates affiliated with that organization.

Whenever any of the above circumstances occur, the associated Certificate shall be revoked and placed on the CRL. Revoked Certificates shall be included on all new publications of the Certificate status information until the Certificates expire.

3.7.2. Procedure for Revocation Request

Authorized Certification Authorities shall revoke Certificates upon receipt of a secured and authenticated request from a verified, appropriate entity or when there is sufficient evidence of compromise or loss of the Subscriber’s corresponding private key. A request to revoke a Certificate shall identify the Certificate to be revoked, explain the reason for revocation and include credentials of the party deemed as the appropriate party to submit revocation requests for the Organization identified in the digital Certificate being revoked.

3.7.3. Revocation Request Grace Period

The revocation request grace period is the time available to the Subscriber within which the Subscriber must make a revocation request after reasons for revocation have been identified.

In the case of key compromise, an Authorized Certification Authority should communicate to Subscribers within 1 hour of becoming aware of a confirmed key compromise. An Authorized Certification Authority should direct Authorized Certification Authority Subscribers to request revocation after becoming aware of a suspected key compromise.

3.7.4. Time Within Which Authorized Certification Authority Must Process Revocation Request

The Authorized Certification Authority shall revoke Subscriber Certificates as quickly as is practical upon receipt of a verified, proper revocation request.

3.7.5. CRL Issuance Frequency

For an Authorized Certification Authority, the interval between CRLs shall not exceed 24 hours when there are no revocations during the interval. The following table specifies the maximum interval for CRL issuance when no revocation has occurred:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Assurance Level** | **Maximum Interval for CRL Issuance** |
| Rudimentary | No stipulation |
| Basic | 24 hours |
| Medium | 24 hours |
| High | 1. 24 hours
 |

3.7.6. Maximum Latency of CRLs

CRLs shall be published within 4 hours of generation. Each CRL shall be published no later than the time specified in the next Update field of the previously issued CRL for the same scope.

3.7.7. Online Revocation/Status Checking Availability

If on-line revocation/status checking is supported by an Authorized Certification Authority, the latency of Certificate status information distributed on-line by Authorized Certification Authorities or their delegated status responders must meet or exceed the requirements for CRL issuance stated in 3.7.5.

3.7.8. Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise

For Authorized Certification Authorities, when aCertificate Authority Certificate is revoked or Subscriber Certificate is revoked because of compromise, or suspected compromise, of a private key, a CRL must be issued as specified below:

| **Assurance Level** | **Maximum Latency for Emergency CRL Issuance** |
| --- | --- |
| Rudimentary | No stipulation |
| Basic | 24 hours after notification |
| Medium | 18 hours after notification |
| High | 6 hours after notification |

3.8. Key Escrow and Recovery

3.8.1. Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices

The Authorized Certification Authority shall not escrow private keys on behalf of Subscribers or any other entity outside of the Authorized Certification Authority. An Authorized Certification Authority may offer secure backup facilities for key storage to Subscribers.

1. FACILITY MANAGEMENT AND OPERATIONS CONTROLS
	1. Physical Controls

All equipment at the cryptographic hardware security module level and any equipment and software associated or interfaced to the Certificate Authority functions shall be protected from unauthorized access at all times. All physical control requirements specified in sections 4.1.1 through section 4.1.7 apply to the Authorized Certification Authority and any remote device used to administer or perform Critical Certificate Authority Operations/Functions except where specifically noted.

* + 1. Site Location and Construction

The location and construction of the facility housing the Authorized Certification Authority equipment, including sites housing any remote device used to administer or perform Critical Certificate Authority Operations/Functions shall meet the criteria established by section 3.4 Physical and Environmental Security of the Trust Service Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities Version 2.0 or the latest effective version established by the AICPA/CICA.

* + 1. Physical Access forCertificate Authority Equipment

Authorized Certification Authority equipment, to include any remote device used to administer or perform Certificate Authority Operations/Functions, shall always be protected from unauthorized access. The security mechanisms shall be commensurate with the level of threat in the equipment environment. If the Authorized Certification Authority intends to issue Certificates at all levels of assurance, it shall be operated and controlled on the presumption that it will be issuing at least one High Assurance Level Certificate.

Physical access controls for equipment shall meet the criteria established by section 4.7Certificate Authority Cryptographic Hardware Life Cycle Management of the Trust Service Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities Version 2.0 or the latest effective version established by the AICPA/CICA

In addition to those requirements, the following requirements shall apply to Authorized Certification Authorities that issue Medium or High Assurance Level Certificates:

* Ensure manual or electronic monitoring for unauthorized intrusion at all times
* Ensure an access log is maintained and inspected periodically
* Require two person physical access control to both the cryptographic module and computer systems
* Removable cryptographic modules, activation information used to access or enable cryptographic modules, and other Authorized Certification Authority equipment used in Critical Certificate Authority Operations/Functions shall be placed in secure containers when not in use. Activation data shall either be memorized or recorded and stored in a manner commensurate with the security afforded the cryptographic module, and shall not be stored with the cryptographic module or removable hardware associated with any remote device used to administer or perform Critical Certificate Authority Operations/Functions.

A security check of the facility housing the Authorized Certification Authority equipment or remote devices used to administer theCertificate Authorities (operating at the Basic Assurance Level or higher) shall occur if the facility is to be left unattended. At a minimum, the check shall verify the following:

* The equipment is in a state appropriate to the current mode of operation (e.g., that cryptographic modules are in place when “open”, and secured when “closed”; and for the Authorized Certification Authority, that all equipment other than the repository is shut down);
* Any security containers are properly secured;
* Physical security systems (e.g., door locks, vent covers) are functioning properly; and
* The area is secured against unauthorized access.

A person or group of persons shall be made explicitly responsible for making such checks. When a group of persons is responsible, a log identifying the person performing a check at each instance shall be maintained. If the facility is not continuously attended, the last person to depart shall initial a sign-out sheet that indicates the date and time, and asserts that all necessary physical protection mechanisms are in place and activated.

* + 1. Power and Air Cooling

The Authorized Certification Authority (operating at the Basic Assurance Level or higher) shall have backup capability sufficient to automatically lock out input, finish any pending actions, and record the state of the equipment before lack of power or air conditioning causes a shutdown. In addition, the Authorized Certification Authority directories (containing Authorized Certification Authority issued Certificates and CRLs) shall be provided with uninterrupted power sufficient for a minimum of six hours operation in the absence of commercial power.

* + 1. Water Exposures

CA equipment shall be installed such that it is not in danger of exposure to water (e.g., on tables or elevated floors).

Water exposure from fire prevention and protection measures (e.g. sprinkler systems) are excluded from this requirement.

* + 1. Media Storage

Authorized Certification Authority media shall be stored so as to protect it from accidental damage (water, fire, electromagnetic). Sensitive Authorized Certification Authority media shall be stored so as to protect it from unauthorized physical access.

* + 1. Waste Disposal

Sensitive media and documentation that are no longer needed for operations shall be destroyed in a secure manner. For example, sensitive paper documentation shall be shredded, burned, or otherwise rendered unrecoverable.

* + 1. Off-Site Backup

For the Authorized Certification Authority operating at the Basic Assurance Level or higher, full system backups sufficient to recover from system failure shall be made on a periodic schedule. Backups are to be performed and stored off-site not less than once per week. At least one full backup copy shall be stored at an off-site location separate from the Authorized Certification Authority equipment. Only the latest full backup need be retained. The backup shall be stored at a site with physical and procedural controls commensurate to that of the operational Authorized Certification Authority.

* 1. Procedural Controls

Unless stated otherwise, the requirements in this section apply equally to the Authorized Certification Authority or delegated entities as applicable

* + 1. Trusted Roles

A trusted role is one whose incumbent performs functions that can introduce security problems if not carried out properly, whether accidentally or maliciously. The people selected to fill these roles must be extraordinarily responsible or the integrity of theCertificate Authority is weakened. The functions performed in these roles form the basis of trust for all uses of the Authorized Certification Authority. Two approaches are taken to increase the likelihood that these roles can be successfully carried out. The first ensures that the person filling the role is trustworthy and properly trained. The second distributes the functions amongst more than one person, so that any malicious activity would require collusion.

The requirements of this policy are defined in terms of four roles:

1. Administrator
	1. Authorized to install, configure, and maintain theCertificate Authority
	2. Establish and maintain user accounts
	3. Configure profiles and audit parameters
	4. Management ofCertificate Authority private key life cycle
2. Registration Administrator
	1. Authorized to request or approve Certificates or Certificate revocations
	2. Verify the identity of Subscribers and accuracy of information included in Certificates
	3. Maintains records and other documentation acquired during identity proofing/validation of Subscribers
3. Auditor
	1. Authorized to maintain audit logs
	2. Perform or oversee internal compliance audits to ensure that the Authorized Certification Authority is operating in accordance with its Certification Practice Statement
4. Operator
	1. Authorized to perform system backup and recovery
	2. Other routine operation ofCertificate Authority equipment

Some roles may be combined. The roles required for each level of assurance are identified in Section 4.2.4.

* + 1. Number of Persons Required per Task

Only one person is required per task forCertificate Authorities operating at the Rudimentary Assurance Level. Two or more persons are required forCertificate Authorities operating at the Basic, Medium, or High Assurance Levels for the following tasks:

* Certificate Authority key generation;
* Certificate Authority signing key activation;
* Certificate Authority private key backup.

Where multiparty control is required as stated above, at least one of the participants shall be an Administrator. All participants must serve in a trusted role as defined in Section 4.2.1. Multiparty control shall not be achieved using personnel that serve in the Auditor trusted role.

Physical access to theCertificate Authorities does not constitute a task as defined in this section. See Section 4.1.2 for Physical Access Requirements

* + 1. Identification and Authentication for Each Role

At all assurance levels other than Rudimentary, an individual shall identify and authenticate him/herself before being permitted to perform any actions set forth above for that role or identity.

* + 1. Separation of Roles

Role separation, when required as set forth below, may be enforced either by theCertificate Authority equipment, or procedurally, or by both means. Requirements for the separation of roles, and limitations on use of procedural mechanisms to implement role separation, are described below for each level of assurance:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Assurance Level** | **Role Separation Rules** |
| Rudimentary | No stipulation |
| Basic | Individual personnel shall be specifically designated to the four roles defined in Section 4.2.1 above. Individuals may assume more than one role; however, no one individual shall assume both the Registration Administrator and Administrator roles. This may be enforced procedurally. No individual shall be assigned more than one identity, except in cases where the Authorized Certification Authority issues a pseudonymous Certificate to internal users to protect the identities of those users. |
| Medium | Individual personnel shall be specifically designated to the four roles defined in Section 4.2.1 above. Individuals may only assume one of the Registration Administrator, Administrator, and Auditor roles, but any individual may assume the Operator role except an auditor. TheCertificate Authority software and hardware shall identify and authenticate its users and shall ensure that no user identity can assume both an Administrator and a Registration Administrator role, assume both the Administrator and Auditor roles, and assume both the Auditor and Registration Administrator roles. No individual shall have more than one identity, except in cases where the Authorized Certification Authority issues a pseudonymous Certificate to internal users to protect the identities of those users. |
| High | Individual personnel shall be specifically designated to the four roles defined in Section 4.2.1 above. Individuals may assume only one of the Registration Administrator, Administrator and Auditor roles. Individuals designated as Registration Administrator or Administrator may also assume the Operator role. An auditor may not assume any other role. TheCertificate Authority software and hardware shall identify and authenticate its users and shall enforce these roles. No individual shall have more than one identity, except in cases where the Authorized Certification Authority issues a pseudonymous Certificate to internal users to protect the identities of those users. |

* 1. Personnel Controls
		1. Background, Qualifications, and Experience Requirements

All persons filling trusted roles shall be selected on the basis of loyalty, trustworthiness, and integrity. For PKIs operated at Basic Assurance Level and above, each person filling a trusted role must satisfy at least one of the following:

* The person shall be a citizen of the United States; or
* The person shall be a citizen of the country where theCertificate Authority is located; or
* For PKIs operated on behalf of multinational governmental organizations, the person shall be a citizen of one of the member countries; or
* For PKIs located within the European Union, the person shall be a citizen of one of the member States of the European Union; or
* For RA personnel only, in addition to the above, the person may be a citizen of the country where the RA is located.

For PKIs operated at Rudimentary Assurance Level there is no citizenship requirement specified.

* + 1. Background Check Procedures

Authorized Certification Authority personnel shall, at a minimum, pass a background investigation covering the following areas:

* Employment;
* Education;
* Place of residence;
* Law Enforcement; and
* References.
	+ 1. Training Requirements

All personnel performing duties with respect to the operation of the Authorized Certification Authority shall receive comprehensive training in all operational duties they are expected to perform, including disaster recovery and business continuity procedures.

In addition, personnel performing duties with respect to the operation of the Authorized Certification Authority shall receive comprehensive training, or demonstrate competence, in the following areas:

* CA/RA security principles and mechanisms;
* All PKI software versions in use on theCertificate Authority system.

Documentation shall be maintained identifying all personnel who received training and the level of training completed. Where competence was demonstrated in lieu of training, supporting documentation shall be maintained.

* + 1. Retraining Frequency and Requirements

Individuals responsible for PKI roles shall be aware of changes in the Authorized Certification Authority operation. Any significant change to the operations shall have a training (awareness) plan, and the execution of such plan. Annual refresher training is required at minimum. Documentation shall be maintained identifying all personnel who received training and the level of training completed.

* + 1. Job Rotation Frequency and Sequence

For the Authorized Certification Authority, any job rotation frequency and sequencing procedures shall provide for continuity and integrity of the Authorized Certification Authority’s services.

* + 1. Independent Contractor Requirements

Contractor personnel employed to perform trusted roles shall meet the personnel requirements set forth in the Authorized Certification Authority’s CP and the Accreditation Specification as applicable.

* + 1. Documentation Supplied to Personnel

For the Authorized Certification Authority, documentation sufficient to define duties and procedures for each trusted role shall be provided to the personnel filling that role.

* 1. Audit Logging Procedures

Audit log files shall be generated for all events relating to the security of the Authorized Certification Authority. Where possible, the security audit logs shall be automatically collected. Where this is not possible, a logbook, paper form, or other physical mechanism shall be used. All security audit logs, both electronic and non-electronic, shall be retained and made available during compliance audits.

* + 1. Types of Events Recorded

A message from any source received by the Authorized Certification Authority requesting an action related to the operational state of theCertificate Authority is an auditable event. At a minimum, each audit record shall include the following (either recorded automatically or manually for each auditable event):

* The type of event,
* The date and time the event occurred,
* A success or failure indicator, where appropriate, and
* The identity of the entity and/or operator (of the Authorized Certification Authority) that caused the event.

Detailed audit requirements are listed in the table below according to the level of assurance.

All security auditing capabilities of the Authorized Certification Authority operating system andCertificate Authority applications required by this CP shall be enabled. As a result, most of the events identified in the table shall be automatically recorded. Where events cannot be automatically recorded, theCertificate Authority shall implement manual procedures to satisfy this requirement.

| **Auditable Event** | **Rudimentary** | **Basic** | **Medium** | **High** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Security Audit** |
| Any changes to the audit parameters, e.g., audit frequency, type of event audited |  | X | X | X |
| Any attempt to delete or modify the audit logs |  | X | X | X |
| Obtaining a third-party time-stamp |  | X | X | X |
| **Identification and Authentication** |
| Successful and unsuccessful attempts to assume a role |  | X | X | X |
| The value of maximum authentication attempts is changed |  | X | X | X |
| The number of unsuccessful authentication attempts exceeds the maximum authentication attempts during user login |  | X | X | X |
| An Administrator unlocks an account that has been locked as a result of unsuccessful authentication attempts |  | X | X | X |
| An Administrator changes the type of authenticator, e.g., from password to biometrics |  | X | X | X |
| **Local Data Entry** |
| All security-relevant data that is entered in the system |  | X | X | X |
| **Remote Data Entry** |
| All security-relevant messages that are received by the system |  | X | X | X |
| **Data Export and Output** |
| All successful and unsuccessful requests for confidential and security-relevant information |  | X | X | X |
| **Key Generation** |
| Whenever theCertificate Authority generates a key. (Not mandatory for single session or one-time use symmetric keys) | X | X | X | X |

| **Auditable Event** | **Rudimentary** | **Basic** | **Medium** | **High** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Private Key Load and Storage** |
| The loading of Component private keys | X | X | X | X |
| All access to Certificate subject private keys retained within theCertificate Authority for key recovery purposes | X | X | X | X |
| **Trusted Public Key Entry, Deletion, and Storage** |
| All changes to the trusted public keys, including additions and deletions | X | X | X | X |
| **Secret Key Storage** |
| The manual entry of secret keys used for authentication |  |  | X | X |
| **Private and Secret Key Export** |
| The export of private and secret keys (keys used for a single session or message are excluded) | X | X | X | X |
| **Certificate Registration** |
| All Certificate requests | X | X | X | X |
| **Certificate Revocation** |
| All Certificate revocation requests |  | X | X | X |
| **Certificate Status Change Approval** |
| The approval or rejection of a Certificate status change request |  | X | X | X |
| **Certificate Authority Configuration** |
| Any security-relevant changes to the configuration of theCertificate Authority |  | X | X | X |
| **Account Administration** |
| Roles and users are added or deleted | X | X | X | X |
| The access control privileges of a user account or a role are modified | X | X | X | X |
| **Certificate Profile Management** |
| All changes to the Certificate profile | X | X | X | X |
| **Revocation Profile Management** |
| All changes to the revocation profile |  | X | X | X |
| **Certificate Revocation List Profile Management** |
| All changes to the Certificate revocation list profile |  | X | X | X |
| **Miscellaneous** |
| Appointment of an individual to a Trusted Role | X | X | X | X |
| Designation of personnel for multiparty control |  |  | X | X |
| Installation of the operation system |  | X | X | X |
| Installation of theCertificate Authority |  | X | X | X |
| Installing hardware cryptographic modules |  |  | X | X |
| Removing hardware cryptographic modules |  |  | X | X |
| Destruction of cryptographic modules |  | X | X | X |
| System startup |  | X | X | X |
| Logon Attempts toCertificate Authority applications |  | X | X | X |
| Receipt of hardware/software |  |  | X | X |
| Attempts to set passwords |  | X | X | X |
| Attempts to modify passwords |  | X | X | X |
| Backing upCertificate Authority internal database |  | X | X | X |
| RestoringCertificate Authority internal database |  | X | X | X |

| **Auditable Event** | **Rudimentary** | **Basic** | **Medium** | **High** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **(Miscellaneous)** |
| File manipulation (e.g., creation, renaming, moving) |  |  | X | X |
| Posting of any material to a repository |  |  | X | X |
| Access toCertificate Authority internal database |  |  | X | X |
| All Certificate compromise notification requests |  | X | X | X |
| Loading tokens with Certificates |  |  | X | X |
| Shipment of Tokens |  |  | X | X |
| Zeroizing tokens |  |  | X | X |
| Re-key of theCertificate Authority | X | X | X | X |
| **Configuration Changes toCertificate Authority Involving:** |
| Hardware |  | X | X | X |
| Software |  | X | X | X |
| Operating System |  | X | X | X |
| Patches |  | X | X | X |
| Security Profiles |  |  | X | X |
| **Physical Access / Site Security** |
| Personnel access to room housingCertificate Authority |  |  | X | X |
| Access to theCertificate Authority server |  |  | X | X |
| Known/suspected violations of physical security |  | X | X | X |
| **Anomalies** |
| Software error conditions |  | X | X | X |
| Software check integrity failures |  | X | X | X |
| Receipt of improper messages |  |  | X | X |
| Misrouted messages |  |  | X | X |
| Network attacks (suspected or confirmed) |  | X | X | X |
| Equipment failure | X | X | X | X |
| Electrical power outage |  |  | X | X |
| Uninterruptible power supply failure |  |  | X | X |
| Obvious and significant network service or access failures |  |  | X | X |
| Violations of CP | X | X | X | X |
| Violations of Certification Practice Statement | X | X | X | X |
| Resetting operating system clock |  | X | X | X |

* + 1. Frequency of Processing Logs

Audit logs shall be reviewed in accordance to the table below. Such reviews involve verifying that the log has not been tampered with and then briefly inspecting all log entries with a more thorough investigation of any alerts or irregularities in the log. Examples of irregularities include discontinuities in the logs and loss of audit data. Actions taken as a result of these reviews shall be documented.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Assurance Level** | **Review Audit Log** |
| Rudimentary | Only required for cause. |
| Basic | Only required for cause. |
| Medium | At least once every two months.Statistically significant set of security audit data generated by Authorized Certification Authoritys since the last review shall be examined (where the confidence intervals for each category of security audit data are determined by the security ramifications of the category and the availability of tools to perform such a review), as well as a reasonable search for any evidence of malicious activity. |
| High | At least once per month.Statistically significant set of security audit data generated by Authorized Certification Authoritys since the last review shall be examined (where the confidence intervals for each category of security audit data are determined by the security ramifications of the category and the availability of tools to perform such a review), as well as a reasonable search for any evidence of malicious activity. |

* + 1. Retention Period for Audit Logs

For Medium and High Assurance Levels, audit logs shall be retained on-site until reviewed, as well as being retained in the manner described below. For Rudimentary and Basic Assurance Levels, audit logs shall be retained on-site for at least two months or until reviewed, as well as being retained in the manner described below. The individual who removes audit logs from the Authorized Certification Authority systems shall be an official different from the individuals who, in combination, command the Authorized Certification Authority signature key.

* + 1. Protection of Audit Logs

The Authorized Certification Authority system configurations and procedures must be implemented together to ensure that:

* Only personnel assigned to trusted roles have read access to the logs;
* Only authorized people may archive audit logs; and,
* Audit logs are not modified.

The entity performing audit log archive need not have modify access, but procedures must be implemented to protect archived data from destruction prior to the end of the audit log retention period (note that deletion requires modification access).

The off-site storage location for audit logs shall be a safe, secure location separate from the location where the data was generated.

* + 1. Audit Log Backup Procedures

Audit logs and audit summaries shall be backed up at least monthly. A copy of the audit log shall be sent off-site on a monthly basis.

* + 1. Audit Collection System

The audit log collection system may or may not be external to the Authorized Certification Authority systems. Automated audit processes shall be invoked at system (or application) startup, and cease only at system (or application) shutdown.

* + 1. Cyber Security Vulnerability Assessments

Authorized Certification Authority personnel shall routinely assess PKI systems for the presence of known vulnerabilities and have a process by which those vulnerabilities are remediated.

* + 1. Security Control Assessments

Authorized Certification Authority personnel shall routinely assess security control processes to identify process failures for non-conformance with thisrequirement. The Authorized Certification Authority shall have a process by which identified instances of non-conformance are remediated.

* + 1. Real Time Security Monitoring

Authorized Certification Authority personnel shall have a process by which real time security events are monitored and analyzed.

* + 1. Incident Investigation and Response

Authorized Certification Authority personnel shall have a process by which identified security incidents are investigated and identified breaches are remediated and reported to NAESB, their Subscribers, and the Energy Information Sharing and Analysis Center.

* 1. Records Archive

The Authorized Certification Authority archive records shall be sufficiently detailed as to verify that the Authorized Certification Authority was properly operated as well as verify the validity of any Certificate (including those revoked or expired) issued by the Authorized Certification Authority.

* + 1. Types of Events Archived

At a minimum, the following data shall be recorded for archive in accordance with each assurance level:

| **Data to be Archived** | **Rudimentary** | **Basic** | **Medium** | **High** |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Certificate Authority accreditation | X | X | X | X |
| CP | X | X | X | X |
| Certification Practice Statement | X | X | X | X |
| Contractual obligations | X | X | X | X |
| Other agreements concerning operations of theCertificate Authority | X | X | X | X |
| System and equipment configuration | X | X | X | X |
| Modifications and updates to system or configuration | X | X | X | X |
| Certificate requests | X | X | X | X |
| Revocation requests |  | X | X | X |
| Subscriber identity authentication data |  | X | X | X |
| Documentation of receipt and acceptance of Certificates |  | X | X | X |
| Subscriber agreements |  | X | X | X |
| Documentation of receipt of tokens (if applicable) |  | X | X | X |
| All Certificates issued or published | X | X | X | X |

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Data to be Archived** | **Rudimentary** | **Basic** | **Medium** | **High** |
| Record ofCertificate Authority Renewal and Reissuance | X | X | X | X |
| All CRLs issued and/or published |  | X | X | X |
| Other data or applications to verify archive contents |  | X | X | X |
| Compliance Auditor reports |  | X | X | X |
| Any changes to audit parameters, e.g., audit frequency, type of events audited |  | X | X | X |
| Any attempt to delete or modify the audit log |  | X | X | X |
| Whenever theCertificate Authority generates a key (not mandatory for single-session or one-time-use symmetric keys) | X | X | X | X |
| All access to the Certificate subject private keys retained within theCertificate Authority for key recovery purposes | X | X | X | X |
| All changes to the trusted public keys, including additions and deletions | X | X | X | X |
| The export of private and secret keys (keys used for a single session or message are excluded) | X | X | X | X |
| The approval or rejection of a Certificate status change request |  | X | X | X |
| Appointment of an individual to a trusted role | X | X | X | X |
| Destruction of cryptographic modules |  | X | X | X |
| All Certificate compromise notifications |  | X | X | X |
| Remedial action taken as a result of violations of physical security |  | X | X | X |
| Violations of CP | X | X | X | X |
| Violations of Certification Practice Statement | X | X | X | X |

* + 1. Retention Period for Archive

The minimum retention periods for archive data are identified below. All entities shall comply with their respective records retention policies in accordance with whatever laws apply to those entities. This minimum retention period for these records is intended only to facilitate the operation of the Authorized Certification Authority.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Assurance Level** | **Minimum Retention Period** |
| Rudimentary | 7 years  |
| Basic | 7 years  |
| Medium | 7 years  |
| High | 20 years  |

* + 1. Protection of Archive

No unauthorized user shall be permitted to write to or delete the archive. The contents of the archive shall not be released except as required by any statute, valid court order, or rules and regulations of any governmental authority having jurisdiction over the parties. Records of individual transactions may be released upon request of any Subscribers involved in the transaction or their legally recognized agents. Archive media shall be stored in a safe, secure storage facility separate from the Authorized Certification Authority itself.

If the original media cannot retain the data for the required period, a mechanism to periodically transfer the archived data to new media shall be defined by the archive site.

* + 1. Requirements for Time Stamping of Records

CA archive records shall be automatically time-stamped as they are created. The Certification Practice Statement shall describe how system clocks used for time-stamping are maintained in synchrony with an authoritative time requirement.

* + 1. Procedures to Obtain and Verify Archive Information

Procedures detailing how to create, verify, package, transmit, and store archive information shall be published in the applicable CP or Certification Practice Statement. The contents of the archive shall not be released except as required by law. Records of individual transactions may be released upon request of any Subscribers involved in the transaction or their legally recognized agents.

* 1. Key Changeover

To minimize risk from compromise of aCertificate Authority’s private signing key, that key may be changed often; from that time on, only the new key will be used for Certificate signing purposes. The older, but still valid, public key will be available to verify old signatures until all of the Certificates signed using the associated private key have also expired. If the old private key is used to sign CRLs that cover Certificates signed with that key, then the old key must be retained and protected.

* 1. Compromise and Disaster Recovery
		1. Incident and Compromise Handling Procedures

In addition to requirements of the NAESB board certification of Authorized Certification Authorities, Authorized Certification Authorities shall notify the Certificate Subscribers if any of the following cases occur:

* Reasonably suspected or detected compromise of the Authorized Certification Authority private keys
* Successful or sustained attempt at physical or electronic penetration of Authorized Certification Authority systems;
* Successful or sustained attempt at denial of service attacks on Authorized Certification Authority components;
* Any incident preventing the Authorized Certification Authority from issuing a CRL within 24 hours of the time specified in the next update field of its currently valid CRL.
	+ 1. Computing Resources, Software, and/or Data are Corrupted

When computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted, the Authorized Certification Authority shall respond as follows:

* Before returning to operation, ensure that the system’s integrity has been restored
* If theCertificate Authority signature keys are not destroyed,Certificate Authority operation shall be reestablished, giving priority to the ability to generate Certificate status information within the CRL issuance schedule
* If theCertificate Authority signature keys are destroyed,Certificate Authority operation shall be reestablished as quickly as possible, giving priority to the generation of a newCertificate Authority key pair.
	+ 1. Business Continuity Capabilities after a Disaster

The Authorized Certification Authority system shall be deployed so as to provide 24 hour, 365 day per year availability.

The Authorized Certification Authority shall operate a hot backup site, whose purpose is to ensure continuity of operations in the event of failure of the primary site. The Authorized Certification Authority operations shall be designed to restore full service within six (6) hours of primary system failure.

The Authorized Certification Authority shall at the earliest feasible time directly advise the Certificate Subscribers in the event of a disaster where the Authorized Certification Authority installation is physically damaged and all copies of the Authorized Certification Authority's signature keys are destroyed.

* 1. CA and RA Termination

In the event of termination of the Authorized Certification Authority operation, Certificates signed by the Authorized Certification Authority shall be revoked. Certificate Subscribers will be given as much advance notice as circumstances permit, and attempts to provide alternative sources of interoperation will be sought in the event the Authorized Certification Authority is terminated. An Authorized Certification Authority that voluntarily plans to withdraw from the NAESB certification program must provide Subscribers and parties performing RA Operations/Functions 90 days advance notice of such withdrawal. NAESB may terminate an Authorized Certification Authority at any time with 30 days’ notice.

1. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS
	1. Key Pair Generation and Installation
		1. Certificate Authority Key Pair Generation

For all levels of assurance above Rudimentary, cryptographic keying material used to sign Certificates, CRLs or status information by the Authorized Certification Authority must be:

* Generated in Federal Information Processing Standards 140-2 validated cryptographic modules that must meet or exceed Security Level 3.
* CA key pair generation must create a verifiable audit trail that the security requirements for procedures were followed.
* Multiparty control is required forCertificate Authority key pair generation.
* An independent third party shall validate the execution of the key generation procedures either by witnessing the key generation or by examining the signed and documented record of the key generation.

For all levels of assurance, the documentation of the procedure must be detailed enough to show that appropriate role separation was used.

* + 1. Subscriber Key Pair Generation

Subscriber key pair generation may be performed by the Subscriber,Certificate Authority, or RA. If theCertificate Authority or RA generates Subscriber key pairs, the requirements for key pair delivery specified in Section 5.1.3 must also be met.

For Certificates issued at the High Assurance Level, Subscriber key generation shall be performed using a Federal Information Processing Standards 140-2 Level 2 validated hardware cryptographic module.

For Basic and Medium Assurance Levels, either Federal Information Processing Standards 140-2 validated software or hardware cryptographic modules shall be used for key generation.

* + 1. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber

If Subscribers generate their own key pairs, then there is no need to deliver private keys, and this section does not apply.

WhenCertificate Authoritys or RAs generate keys on behalf of the Subscriber, then the private key must be delivered securely to the Subscriber. Private keys may be delivered electronically or may be delivered on a hardware cryptographic module. In all cases, the following requirements must be met:

* Only those parties explicitly authorized by the Subscriber may retain any copy of the private key after delivery to the Subscriber.
* The private key must be protected from activation, compromise, or modification during the delivery process.
* The Subscriber shall acknowledge receipt of the private key(s).
* Delivery shall be accomplished in a way that ensures that the correct tokens and activation data are provided to the correct Subscribers.
	+ For hardware modules, accountability for the location and state of the module must be maintained until the Subscriber accepts possession of it.
	+ For electronic delivery of private keys, the key material shall be encrypted using a cryptographic algorithm and key size at least as strong as the private key. Activation data shall be delivered using a separate secure channel.

The Authorized Certification Authority must maintain a record of the Subscriber acknowledgement of receipt of the token.

* + 1. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer

ForCertificate Authorities operating at the Basic, Medium, or High Assurance levels, the following requirements apply:

* Where key pairs are generated by the Subscriber or RA, the public key and the Subscriber’s identity must be delivered securely to theCertificate Authority for Certificate issuance.
* The delivery mechanism shall bind the Subscriber’s verified identity to the public key. If cryptography is used to achieve this binding, it must be at least as strong as theCertificate Authority keys used to sign the Certificate.

For Rudimentary Assurance Level, no stipulation is made.

* + 1. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties

When aCertificate Authority updates its signature key pair, theCertificate Authority shall distribute the new public key in a secure fashion. The new public key may be distributed in a self-signed Certificate, in a key rollover Certificate, or in a newCertificate Authority (e.g., cross-) Certificate obtained from the issuer(s) of the currentCertificate Authority Certificate(s).

Self-signed Certificates shall be conveyed to relying parties in a secure fashion to preclude substitution attacks.

Key rollover Certificates are signed with theCertificate Authority’s current private key, so secure distribution is not required.

CA Certificates are signed with the issuingCertificate Authority’s current private key, so secure distribution is not required.

* + 1. Key Sizes

All Federal Information Processing Standandards-approved signature algorithms shall be considered acceptable; additional restrictions on key sizes are detailed below.

* For allCertificate Authority Certificates the signature keys should be at least 2048 bits for RSA or DSA, and at least 160 bits for ECDSA.
* AllCertificate Authoritys Certificates should use SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, or SHA-512 hash algorithm when generating digital signatures. The signatures on all Certificates and CRLs that are issued after 12/31/2013 shall be generated using, at a minimum, SHA-256.
* AllCertificate Authority Certificates that expire after 12/31/2012, when they expire should be signed with keys of at least 4096 bits for RSA or DSA and at least 256 bits for ECDSA.
* Where implemented, Certificate Status Servers (CSS)es shall sign responses using the same signature algorithm, key size, and hash algorithm used by theCertificate Authority to sign CRLs.
* After December 31, 2013, all OCSP responders that generate signatures on OCSP responses shall use SHA-256.
* Subscriber Certificates issued after the effective date of these requirements, that include a keyUsage extension that asserts the nonRepudiation, keyEncipherment, dataEncipherment, or keyAgreement bit shall contain public keys that are at least 2048 bits for RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman, or 224 bits for elliptic curve algorithms.
* Subscriber Certificates issued after the effective date of these requirements, that do not include a keyUsage extension shall contain public keys that are at least 2048 bits for RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman, or 224 bits for elliptic curve algorithms.
* Subscriber Certificates issued after the effective date of these requirements shall contain public keys that are at least 1024 bit for RSA, DSA, or Diffie-Hellman, or 160 bits for elliptic curve algorithms.
* Subscriber Certificates that expire after December 31, 2030 shall contain public keys that are at least 3072 bits for RSA or DSA, or 256 bits for elliptic curve algorithms.
* Subscriber Certificates that include a keyUsage extension that only asserts the digitalSignature bit that expire after December 31, 2013 shall contain public keys that are at least 2048 bits for RSA or DSA, or 224 bits for elliptic curve algorithms.
	+ 1. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking

Public key parameters for signature algorithms defined in the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) shall be generated in accordance with Federal Information Processing Standards 140-2. Parameter quality checking (including primarily testing for prime numbers) shall be performed in accordance with Federal Information Processing Standards 140-2.

* + 1. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

The use of a specific key is determined by the key usage extension in the X.509 Certificate.

Subscriber Certificates shall assert key usages based on the intended application of the key pair. In particular, Certificates to be used for digital signatures (including authentication) shall set the digitalSignature and/or nonRepudiation bits. Certificates to be used for key or data encryption shall set the keyEncipherment and/or dataEncipherment bits. Certificates to be used for key agreement shall set the keyAgreement bit.

All Certificates may include a single key for use with encryption and signature in support of legacy applications. Such dual-use Certificates shall be generated and managed in accordance with their respective signature Certificate requirements.

* 1. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls
		1. Cryptographic Module Specifications and Controls

The relevant requirement for cryptographic modules is Federal Information Processing Standards PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules.

Cryptographic modules shall be validated to the Federal Information Processing Standards 140-2 level identified in this section. Additionally, the NAESB reserves the right to review technical documentation associated with any cryptographic modules under consideration for use by the Authorized Certification Authority.

The table below summarizes the minimum requirements for private key storage in cryptographic modules; As mentioned elsewhere if any Certificates are issued at a higher assurance level than allCertificate Authority operations must operate at the highest assurance level (i.e. If aCertificate Authority issues one high assurance Certificate than allCertificate Authority operations must operate at that assurance level).

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Assurance Level** | **Certificate Authority, CMS, & CSS** | **Subscriber** |
| Rudimentary | Level 1 (hardware or software) | N/A |
| Basic | Level 3 (hardware or software) | Level 1 |
| Medium | Level 3 (hardware) | Level 1 |
| High | Level 3 (hardware) | Level 2 (hardware) |

* + 1. Private Key Multi-Person Control

Use of the Authorized Certification Authority private signing key shall require action by multiple persons as set forth in Section 4.2.2 of this document.

* + 1. Private Key Escrow
			1. Escrow of Authorized Certification Authority Private Signature Keys

Under no circumstances shall an Authorized Certification Authority’s signature key used to sign Certificates or CRLs be escrowed.

* + - 1. Escrow of Subscriber Encryption Keys

Per section 3.8.1, the Authorized Certification Authority shall not escrow private keys on behalf of Subscribers or any other entity outside of the Authorized Certification Authority. An Authorized Certification Authority may offer secure backup facilities for key storage to Subscribers.

* + 1. Private Key Backup
			1. Backup of Authorized Certification Authority Private Signature Keys

Authorized Certification Authority private signature keys shall be backed up under multi-person control, as specified in Section 4.2.2.

At least one copy of the Authorized Certification Authority private signature key shall be stored off site. All copies of theCertificate Authority private signature key shall be accounted for and protected in the same manner as the original.

* + - 1. Backup of Subscriber Private Signature Keys

At the High Assurance Level, Subscriber private signature keys are stored in a hardware device as non-exportable and thus may not be backed up or copied.

At the Rudimentary, Basic, or Medium Assurance Levels, Subscriber private signature keys may be backed up or copied, but must be either held in the Subscriber’s control or generated and delivered in accordance to sections 5.1.2 and 5.1.3.

Backed up Subscriber private signature keys shall not be stored in plain text form outside the cryptographic module. Storage must ensure security controls consistent with the protection provided by the Subscriber’s cryptographic module listed in section 5.2.1.

* + 1. Private Key Archival

Private signature keys shall not be archived.

For private encryption keys (key management or key transport), no stipulation is made.

* + 1. Private Key Transfer into or from a Cryptographic Module

Authorized Certification Authority private keys may be exported from the cryptographic module only to performCertificate Authority key backup procedures as described in Section 5.2.4.1. At no time shall theCertificate Authority private key exist in plain text outside the cryptographic module.

All other keys shall be generated by and in a cryptographic module. In the event that a private key is to be transported from one cryptographic module to another, the private key must be encrypted during transport; private keys must never exist in plaintext from outside the cryptographic module boundary.

Private or symmetric keys used to encrypt other private keys for transport must be protected from disclosure.

* + 1. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module

No stipulation beyond that specified in Federal Information Processing Standards -140-2.

* + 1. Method of activating Private Keys

For the Authorized Certification Authorities that operate at the Medium or High Assurance Level,Certificate Authority signing key activation requires multiparty control as specified in Section 4.2.2.

The Subscriber, LRA, or assigned agent must be authenticated to the cryptographic module before the activation of any private key(s). Acceptable means of authentication include, but are not limited to, pass-phrases, PINs or biometrics. Entry of activation data shall be protected from disclosure (i.e., the data should not be displayed while it is entered).

* + 1. Methods of Deactivating Private Keys

Cryptographic modules that have been activated shall not be available to unauthorized access. After use, the cryptographic module shall be deactivated, e.g., via a manual logout procedure, or automatically after a period of inactivity as defined in the applicable Certification Practice Statement.Certificate Authority Hardware cryptographic modules shall be removed and stored in a secure container when not in use.

* + 1. Method of Destroying Private Keys

Individuals in trusted roles shall destroyCertificate Authority, RA and status server (e.g., OCSP server) private signature keys when they are no longer needed. Subscriber private signature keys shall be destroyed when they are no longer needed, or when the Certificates to which they correspond expire or are revoked. For software cryptographic modules, this can be overwriting the data. For hardware cryptographic modules, this will likely be executing a “zeroize” command. Physical destruction of hardware is not required.

* 1. Aspects of Key Management
		1. Public Key Archival

The public key is archived as part of the Certificate archival.

* + 1. Certificate Operational Periods/Key Usage Periods

The Authorized Certification Authority shall limit the use of its private keys to a maximum of three years for Certificate signing and six years for CRL signing. Authorized Certification Authoritys that distribute their self-signed Certificates for use as trust anchors shall limit the use of the associated private key to a maximum of 20 years, unless qualifying to be grandfathered in by adhering to all of the following conditions:

* must have a minimum of 10 years with no security breaches toCertificate Authority operations which resulted in compromise ofCertificate Authority keys,
* must have allCertificate Authority keys sizes in Certificate chain at least 2048.

The self-signed Certificates shall have a lifetime not to exceed 20 years. Code and content signers may use their private keys for three years; the lifetime of the associated public keys shall not exceed 2 years. Subscribers’ signature private keys and Certificates have a maximum lifetime of 2 years.

CAs must not issue Subscriber Certificates that extend beyond the expiration date of their own Certificates and public keys.

The validity period of the Subscriber Certificate must not exceed the routine re-key Identity Requirements as specified in section 2.3.1.

* 1. Activation Data
		1. Activation Data Generation and Installation

The activation data used to unlock Authorized Certification Authority or Subscriber private keys, in conjunction with any other access control, shall have an appropriate level of strength for the keys or data to be protected. If the activation data must be transmitted, it shall be via an appropriately protected channel, and distinct in time and place from the associated cryptographic module. Where the Authorized Certification Authority uses passwords as activation data for theCertificate Authority signing key, at a minimum the activation data shall be changed uponCertificate Authority renewal or reissuance.

* + 1. Activation Data Protection

Data used to unlock private keys shall be protected from disclosure by a combination of cryptographic and physical access control mechanisms. Activation data shall be:

* Memorized,
* Biometric in nature, or
* Recorded and secured at the level of assurance associated with the activation of the cryptographic module, and shall not be stored with the cryptographic module.

The protection mechanism shall include a facility to temporarily lock the account, or terminate the application, after a predetermined number of failed login attempts as set forth in the respective CP or Certification Practice Statement.

* 1. Computer Security Controls
		1. Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements

For the Authorized Certification Authority, the computer security functions listed below are required. These functions may be provided by the operating system, or through a combination of operating system, software, and physical safeguards. The Authorized Certification Authority and its ancillary parts shall include the following functionality:

* Require authenticated logins
* Provide Discretionary Access Control
* Provide a security audit capability
* Restrict access control to Authorized Certification Authority services and PKI roles
* Enforce separation of duties for PKI roles
* Require identification and authentication of PKI roles and associated identities Prohibit object re-use or require separation for Authorized Certification Authority random access memory
* Require use of cryptography for session communication and database security
* Archive Authorized Certification Authority history and audit data
* Require self-test security related Authorized Certification Authority services
* Require a trusted path for identification of PKI roles and associated identities
* Require a recovery mechanisms for keys and the Authorized Certification Authority system
* Enforce domain integrity boundaries for security critical processes

For Certificate Status Servers, the computer security functions listed below are required:

* Authenticate the identity of users before permitting access to the system or applications;
* Manage privileges of users to limit users to their assigned roles;
* Enforce domain integrity boundaries for security critical processes; and
* Support recovery from key or system failure.

For remote workstations used to administer theCertificate Authority’s, the computer security functions listed below are required:

* Authenticate the identity of users before permitting access to the system or applications;
* Manage privileges of users to limit users to their assigned roles;
* Generate and archive audit records for all transactions; (see section 4.4)
* Enforce domain integrity boundaries for security critical processes; and
* Support recovery from key or system failure.

All communications between any PKI trusted role and theCertificate Authority shall be authenticated and protected from modification.

* 1. Lifecycle Security Controls
		1. System Development Controls

The System Development Controls for Authorized Certification Authorities at the Basic Assurance Level and above are as follows:

* For commercial off-the-shelf software, the software shall be designed and developed under a formal, documented development methodology.
* For hardware and software developed specifically for a particularCertificate Authority, the applicant shall demonstrate that security requirements were achieved through a combination of software verification & validation, structured development approach, and controlled development environment.
* Where open source software has been utilized, the applicant shall demonstrate that security requirements were achieved through software verification & validation and structured development/life-cycle management.
* Hardware and software procured to operate theCertificate Authority shall be purchased and shipped in a fashion to reduce the likelihood that any particular component was tampered with (e.g., by ensuring the equipment was randomly selected at time of purchase).
* TheCertificate Authority hardware and software shall be dedicated to performing one task: theCertificate Authority. There shall be no other applications; hardware devices, network connections, or component software installed which are not part of theCertificate Authority operation.
* Proper care shall be taken to prevent malicious software from being loaded onto theCertificate Authority equipment. Hardware and software shall be scanned for malicious code on first use and periodically thereafter, but at a minimum every 12 months.
* Hardware and software updates shall be purchased or developed in the same manner as original equipment, and be installed by trusted and trained personnel in a defined manner.
	+ 1. Security Management Controls

The configuration of the Authorized Certification Authority system as well as any modifications and upgrades shall be documented and controlled. There shall be a mechanism for detecting unauthorized modification to the Authorized Certification Authority software or configuration. A formal configuration management methodology shall be used for installation and ongoing maintenance of the Authorized Certification Authority systems. The Authorized Certification Authority software, when first loaded, shall be verified as being that supplied from the vendor, with no modifications, and be the version intended for use.

* 1. Network Security Controls

Network security controls shall be employed to protect the Authorized Certification Authority. Networking equipment shall have all unused network ports and services turned off. Any network software installed on the Authorized Certification Authority equipment shall be necessary to the functioning of the Authorized Certification Authority. Any boundary control devices used to protect the Authorized Certification Authority local area network shall deny all but the necessary services to the PKI equipment even if those services are enabled for other devices on the network. Authorized Certification Authorities, RAs, CMSs, directories, remote workstations used to administer theCertificate Authorities, and Certificate status servers shall employ appropriate network security controls. Any network software present shall be necessary to the functioning of the equipment. TheCertificate Authority shall establish connection with a remote workstation used to administer theCertificate Authority only after successful authentication of the remote workstation at a level of assurance commensurate with that of theCertificate Authority.

* 1. Time Stamping

Asserted times shall be accurate to within three minutes. Electronic or manual procedures may be used to maintain system time. Clock adjustments are auditable events, see Section 4.4.1.

1. CERTIFICATE, CRL, and OCSP PROFILES FORMAT
	1. Certificate Profile
		1. Version Numbers

The Authorized Certification Authority shall issue X.509 v3 Certificates (populate version field with integer "3").

* + 1. Certificate Extensions

For allCertificate Authorities, use of standard Certificate extensions shall comply with [RFC 5280].

* + 1. Algorithm Object Identifiers

Certificates issued by the Authorized Certification Authority shall identify the signature algorithm using one of the following OIDs:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| id-dsa-with-sha1 | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 3 } |
| sha-1WithRSAEncryption | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 5 } |
| Sha256WithRSAEncryption | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 11 } |
| sha512WithRSAEncryption | {iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) sha512WithRSAEncryption(13)} |
| id-RSASSA-PSS | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 10 } |
| ecdsa-with-SHA1 | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) 1 } |
| ecdsa-with-SHA224 | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 1 } |
| ecdsa-with-SHA256 | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2 (3) 2 } |
| ecdsa-with-SHA384 | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 3 } |
| ecdsa-with-SHA512 | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) signatures(4) ecdsa-with-SHA2(3) 4 } |

Where Certificates are signed using RSA with PSS padding, the OID is independent of the hash algorithm; the hash algorithm is specified as a parameter. RSA signatures with PSS padding may be used with the hash algorithms and OIDs specified below:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| id-sha256 | { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 1 } |
| id-sha512 | { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840) organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistalgorithm(4) hashalgs(2) 3 } |

Certificates issued by the Authorized Certification Authority shall identify the cryptographic algorithm associated with the subject public key using one of the following OIDs:

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| id-dsa | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) x9-57(10040) x9cm(4) 1 } |
| RsaEncryption | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-1(1) 1 } |
| Dhpublicnumber | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-x942(10046) number-type(2) 1 } |
| id-ecPublicKey | { iso(1) member-body(2) us(840) ansi-X9-62(10045) id-publicKeyType(2) 1 } |

* + 1. Name Forms

Where required as set forth in Section 2.1.1, the subject and issuer fields of all Certificates shall be populated with an X.500 Distinguished Name. Distinguished names shall be composed of standard attribute types, such as those identified in [RFC5280].

* + 1. Certificate Policy Object Identifier

All end entity Certificates issued by the Authorized Certification Authority shall include a Certificate Policies extension containing Certificate Policy’s asserting the OID(s) appropriate to the level of assurance with which it was issued. This is in addition to any Certificate Policy identifiers internally used by the Authorized Certification Authority. The following table lists the Certificate attributes for valid assurance levels. Note that an OID for a higher level covers all lower level assurance levels. For example an end entity Certificate which contains the OID for High Assurance Level means only the Certificate Policy OID associated with High Assurance Level is required and not OID is needed for Rudimentary, Basic, or Medium Assurance Levels.

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Assurance Level** | **URI** | **Object Identifier** |
| Rudimentary | http://www.naesb.org/PKI/AssuranceLevel/Rudimentary | TBD |
| Basic | http://www.naesb.org/PKI/AssuranceLevel/Basic | TBD |
| Medium | http://www.naesb.org/PKI/AssuranceLevel/Medium | TBD |
| High | http://www.naesb.org/PKI/AssuranceLevel/High | TBD |

* + 1. Policy Qualifiers Syntax and Semantics

Certificates issued by the Authorized Certification Authority may contain policy qualifiers.

* 1. CRL Profile
		1. Version Numbers

The Authorized Certification Authority shall issue X.509 version two (2) CRLs.

* + 1. Algorithm Object Identifiers

The Authorized Certification Authority shall sign all CRL’s with an approved signature algorithm listed in section 6.1.3.

* 1. Authority Key Identifiers

To assist with digital signature validation and speed the processing of CRL’s, the Authorized Certification Authority shall include the Authority Key Identifier of theCertificate Authority Certificate used to sign the CRL.

If implemented, CSS shall sign responses with an approved signature algorithm listed in section 6.1.3.

1. OTHER BUSINESS and LEGAL MATTERS
	1. Financial Responsibility

These requirements contain no limits on the use of any Certificates issued by the Authorized Certification Authority. Rather, entities acting as Relying Parties shall determine what financial limits, if any, they wish to impose for Certificates used to complete a transaction.

* 1. Confidentiality of Business Information

Authorized Certification Authority information not requiring protection can be made publicly available.

* 1. Privacy of Personnel Information
		1. Privacy Plan

The Authorized Certification Authority should have a privacy plan to protect its personnel’s personally identifying information from unauthorized disclosure.

* + 1. Information Treated as Private

The Authorized Certification Authority shall protect a Subscriber’s personally identifying information from unauthorized disclosure.

* + 1. Information Not Deemed Private

Information included in Authorized Certification Authority and Subscriber public key Certificates are not subject to protections outlined in Section 7.3.2, provided however, that existing agreements between the Authorized Certification Authority and Subscribers may require public key Certificates to be treated as private under Section 7.3.2.

* + 1. Responsibility to Protect Private Information

Sensitive information must be stored securely by Authorized Certification Authority’s and may be released only in accordance with other stipulations in Sections 4.5.3 and 7.3.

* 1. Intellectual Property Rights

The Authorized Certification Authority will not knowingly violate intellectual property rights held by others.

* 1. Representations and Warranties
		1. Subscriber Representations and Warranties

For Medium and High Assurance Levels, the Authorized Certification Authority shall require Subscribers to acknowledge/accept the requirements the Subscriber shall meet respecting protection of the private key and use of the Certificate before being issued the Certificate. For Basic Assurance Level, the Authorized Certification Authority shall require Subscribers to acknowledge his or her obligations respecting protection of the private key and use of the Certificate before being issued the Certificate.

Authorized Certification Authority’s should require all Subscribers at Basic, Medium, and High Assurance Levels to agree to the following terms and conditions:

* Accurately represent themselves in all communications with the PKI authorities.
* Protect their private keys at all times, in accordance with this policy, as stipulated in their Certificate acceptance agreements and local procedures.
* Promptly notify the appropriateCertificate Authority upon suspicion of loss or compromise of their private keys. Such notification shall be made directly or indirectly through mechanisms consistent with theCertificate Authority’s Certification Practice Statement.
* Abide by all the terms, conditions, and restrictions levied on the use of their private keys and Certificates.
	+ 1. Representations and Warranties of Affiliated Organizations

The Authorized Certification Authority should inform Affiliated Organizations of their obligations to authorize the affiliation of Subscribers with the organization, and shall inform the Authorized Certification Authority of any severance of affiliation with any current Subscriber.

* 1. Compliance with Applicable Law

The Authorized Certification Authority is required to comply with applicable law.

1. <http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-63/SP800-63V1_0_2.pdf> [↑](#footnote-ref-1)