

# Policy 5 — Emergency Operations

Version 3

Replaced OSL  
with IRL

## Policy Subsections

- A. Coordination with Other Operating Authorities
- B. Insufficient Generating Capacity
- C. Transmission System Relief
- D. Separation from the Interconnection
- E. System Restoration
- F. Disturbance Reporting

Add req't for  
Operating  
Authority to  
have situational  
awareness.

## Introduction

The OPERATING AUTHORITY is responsible for operating its systems in a safe and reliable manner to ensure reliable service of its end-use customers.

From Appendix 9D

The integrity and reliability of the interconnected power system is of paramount importance, and shall take precedence above all other aspects including commercial operations.

OPERATING AUTHORITIES shall operate within proven secure power system parameters at all times. Should the OPERATING AUTHORITY enter an unknown operating state, it shall immediately restore operations to respect proven secure power system parameters.

Need reasonable  
implementation  
time.

OPERATING AUTHORITIES shall inform other potentially affected OPERATING AUTHORITIES and those throughout the interconnection of real time or anticipated emergency conditions to facilitate emergency assistance, and take actions to avoid where possible, or mitigate the emergency.

OPERATING AUTHORITIES shall immediately take appropriate action to relieve any abnormal real time conditions that jeopardize reliable interconnected power system operation. These actions may include firm load shedding. Neighboring OPERATING AUTHORITIES shall render all available emergency assistance requested, provided that the requesting OPERATING AUTHORITY has implemented its comparable emergency procedures.

If two Op  
Authorities do not  
agree, operate to  
the most  
conservative  
limits.

Each OPERATING AUTHORITY ~~and Region~~ shall establish a program of system operator controlled manual and automatic load shedding which is designed to arrest declining frequency, transmission interface overloads, or voltage decays that could result in an uncontrolled failure of components of the interconnected bulk electric system. The program shall be coordinated throughout each Interconnection to prevent unbalanced load shedding which may cause high transmission loading and extreme frequency and/or voltage deviations.

The Operating Authority is responsible for implementing the actions identified directed by the RELIABILITY COORDINATOR to protect the RELIABILITY COORDINATOR AREA. If the OPERATING AUTHORITY believes that a RELIABILITY COORDINATOR directive may harm the OPERATING AUTHORITY's equipment or creates a public safety hazard, the OPERATING AUTHORITY and RELIABILITY COORDINATOR will arrive at a mutually agreeable solution that will mitigate these concerns and result in the reliable operation of the RELIABILITY AREA.

From Appendix 9D.  
Added language to deal  
with disagreements.

## A. Coordination with Other Operating Authorities Operating Authority Responsibilities

[Appendix 7A – Instructions for Interregional Emergency Telephone Networks]

### Requirements

1. **Bulk Power System.** The Operating Authority shall not remove Bulk ~~power~~ Power system-System facilities from service if removing those facilities would burden neighboring Operating Authorities unless:

Need to compare with FERC Order 2003. Sec. 14

  - 1.1. ~~If bulk electric power facilities must be removed from service,~~ the Operating Authority ~~must~~ first notify ~~sy~~ the adjacent Operating Authorities and coordinates the impact resulting from the removal of the Bulk Power System facility. ~~{add words for coordination}~~ or,
  - 1.2. ~~When~~ time does not permit such notification and coordination, or when immediate action is required to prevent hazard to the public, sustained customer service interruption, or damage to facilities, the Operating Authority shall notify adjacent Operating Authorities at the earliest possible time to ensure Operating Authority coordination.
2. The Operating Authority shall comply with Control Performance Standards [see Policy 1A] during an emergency. The Operating Authority shall coordinate interchange schedule changes as needed to maintain reliability.
3. The Operating Authority shall observe normal facility ratings unless there is insufficient generating capacity to comply with Control Performance Standards, or insufficient reactive resources in the Operating Authority Area, in which case emergency transfer capabilities may be used prior to shedding firm load.
  - 3.1. The Operating Authority shall ensure that emergency transfer capabilities shall not be exceeded to the extent possible.
    - 3.1.1. In emergency transfer capabilities are exceeded, the Operating Authority shall take immediate corrective action, up to and including load shedding, to return flow below the emergency transfer capability.
  - 3.2. The Operating Authority shall operate within the System Operating Limits and Interconnection Reliability Limits
4. Each Control Area shall maintain automatic generation control equipment operational and in service. [See also Policy 1E, “Automatic Generation Control Standard”]
5. The Operating Authority shall immediately restore the real and reactive power balance by implementing such control actions as reconfigure the transmission, redispatch generation, voltage reduction, load transfers, between load and source. ~~{Need to rewrite this. What “balance?” Between “load and source?” Need to capture the concept of reactive reserves and capacity.}~~ If the Operating Authority remains unable to restore its real and reactive power balance it shall request emergency assistance from neighboring

and adjacent Operating Authorities. If emergency assistance is not adequate to mitigate the real and reactive power balance, than load shedding shall be implemented.

6. The Operating Authority shall immediately reduce the effects of power flows through other Operating Authority Areas if those flows have been identified as contributing to an operating emergency (e.g., resulting in SOL or IRL violations) in those other Operating Authority Areas. [See Policy 9, “Reliability Coordinator Procedures” for further information on using local or Interconnection-wide transmission loading relief procedures]

7. ~~When Operating Authority has taken all possible action (see list below and incorporate next paragraph in here) unable to [add language: cannot comply with Control Performance Standards or return its system to SOL or IRL] within its Operating Authority area, that Operating Authority shall request for assistance from neighboring Operating Authorities. Upon receiving a request for assistance from another Operating Authority to mitigate an emergency, the Operating Authority shall provide available assistance within the requested timeframe.~~

~~7.1. Assistance shall be requested only after comparable action(s) has been implemented by the requesting Operating Authority(s). Assistance may include, but is not limited to, and in no implied order of priority:~~

~~7.2. Redispatching generation (may be subject to agreements).=~~

~~7.3. Providing reactive support.~~

~~7.4. Curtailing non-firm energy transfers to non-affected Operating Authorities~~

~~7.5. Supplying capacity and energy to the Operating Authority experiencing the emergency~~

~~7.6. Redistribution or sharing of operating reserve.~~

~~7.7. Shedding interruptible load where permitted by a power system's internal policy.~~

~~7.8. Implementing voltage reduction.~~

~~7.9. Loading facilities to their emergency transfer capabilities provided that adverse weather conditions do not prevent such assistance.~~

~~7.10. Any other actions that would mitigate the operating emergency.~~

8. Upon receiving a request for assistance from another Operating Authority to mitigate an emergency, the Operating Authority shall provide available assistance within the requested timeframe. Assistance shall be requested only after comparable action(s) has been implemented by the requesting Operating Authority(s). Assistance may include, but is not limited to, and in no implied order of priority:

8.1. Redispatching generation (may be subject to agreements).

8.2. Providing reactive support.

8.3. Curtailing non-firm energy transfers to non-affected Operating Authorities

8.4. Supplying capacity and energy to the Operating Authority experiencing the emergency

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8.5. Redistribution or sharing of operating reserve.

8.6. Shedding interruptible load where permitted by a power system's internal policy.

8.7. Implementing voltage reduction.

8.8. Loading facilities to their emergency transfer capabilities provided that adverse weather conditions do not prevent such assistance.

8.9. Any other actions that would mitigate the operating emergency.

8.10. \_\_\_\_\_

9. \_\_\_\_\_

## B. Communications and Coordination

### Requirements

1. **Communication and Coordination.** Reliable inter-area and intra-area voice communications shall be available for the Operating Authorities, as appropriate to their accountabilities. Adequate communications (voice and data links) such as priority communication paths to appropriate entities which are staffed and available to act in addressing a real time emergency condition., with an availability at least equivalent to that provided by a dedicated and redundant circuit. Operating Authorities ~~Notifying~~ notifying other Operating authorities shall inform their Reliability Coordinator and -all other potentially affected operating authorities through predetermined communication paths.

**Procedures for the calls need to be developed to ensure that orderly calls are conducted. Primary moderator should have back-up moderators available. Use of Hotline needs further clarification. Hotline not used for local load shedding. Save it for Interconnection problem identification and usage.**

- 1.1. **Hotline use.** When a condition is identified that could threaten the reliability of the Interconnection or when firm load shedding is anticipated, the affected OPERATING AUTHORITY, via its RELIABILITY COORDINATOR, shall utilize the Interconnection-wide telecommunications network in accordance with Appendix 7A — Regional and Interregional Telecommunication, Subsection A, “NERC Hotline,” to convey the following at information to others in the Interconnection:—

1.2.1.1.1. **Insufficient resources.** The OPERATING AUTHORITY is unable to purchase capacity to meet its load and reserve requirements on a day-ahead and hour by hour basis.

1.3.1.1.2. **Lack of single contingency coverage. System Operating Limit or Interconnected Reliability Limit violation.** Line loadings and voltage/reactive levels are such that a single contingency could threaten the reliability of the Interconnection. (Once a single contingency occurs, the OPERATING AUTHORITY must prepare for next contingency)

1.4.1.1.3. **Emergency actions for inability to purchase capacity or energy.** A 3% or greater voltage reduction, public appeals for load curtailments, or firm load shedding is anticipated due to an inability to purchase emergency capacity/energy.

1.5.1.1.4. **Emergency actions for other reasons.** Implementation of 3% or greater voltage reduction, public appeals for load reduction, or firm load shedding for other than local problems.

1.6.1.1.5. **Sabotage incident.** The system suspects or has identified a multi-site sabotage occurrence, or single-site sabotage of a critical facility.

## C. Insufficient Generating Capacity

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### Introduction

During a system emergency, the Operating Authority must continue to comply with NERC Control Performance and Disturbance Control Standards as explained in Policy 1, “Generation Control and Performance,” regardless of costs. In other words, the Operating Authority may not rely on the frequency bias of the other CONTROL AREAS in the Interconnection to provide energy during the emergency because doing so reduces the Interconnection’s ability to recover its frequency following additional generator failures.

Rewrote Intro based on meeting discussion.

If the Operating Authority can not comply with the Control Performance and Disturbance Control standards, then it must immediately implement remedies to do so. These include, but are not limited to:

1. Requesting assistance from other Control Areas
2. Declaring an Energy Emergency through its Reliability Coordinator
3. Load reduction, such as public appeals, voltage reductions, curtailing interruptible loads and firm loads.

### Requirements

1. A CONTROL AREA anticipating an operating capacity emergency shall perform all actions necessary including bringing on all available generation, postponing equipment maintenance, scheduling interchange purchases in advance, and being prepared to reduce firm load.
2. **Returning ACE to Acceptable Levels.** In the event of a capacity deficiency, generation and transmission facilities shall be used to the fullest extent practicable to restore normal system frequency and voltage and return ACE to acceptable performance criteria as defined in Policy 1E. Using bias variables to “cover up” problems is prohibited.

Policy 1 should be revised to require operation within a tolerance of - 500 MW or 2 x L(10) for 30 minutes.

#### 2.1. Under Generation Condition.

2.1.2.1.1. Schedule assistance. The deficient ~~system~~ Operating Authority shall schedule all available assistance that is required with as much advance notice as possible.

2.2.2.1.2. Using Interconnection’s bias. The deficient ~~system~~ Operating Authority ~~shall~~ may ~~shall only~~ use the assistance provided by the Interconnection’s frequency bias ~~only~~ for the time needed to implement one or more of the following:

2.2.2.1.2.1. Operating reserve. Utilize its readily available operating reserve.

2.2.2.1.2.2. Available resources. Use all resources available to the deficient system. The deficient Operating Authority shall declare an Emergency Energy Alert in accordance with Appendix 5B.

B. Insufficient Generating Capacity

2.2.3.2.1.2.3. **Emergency Procedures.** Utilize emergency procedures including:

2.2.3.1.2.1.2.3.1. Internal emergency procedures ~~up to and including firm load shedding~~

2.2.3.2.1.2.3.2. Emergency assistance from ~~others~~ others

2.1.2.3.3. Firm load shedding

3. **Elevating Transmission Service Priority.** When a TRANSMISSION PROVIDER expects to elevate the transmission service priority of an INTERCHANGE TRANSACTION from Priority 6 (Network Integration Transmission Service from Non-designated Resources) to Priority 7 (Network Integration Transmission Service from designated Network Resources) as permitted in its transmission tariff [See **Appendix 9C1**, “**Transmission Loading Relief Procedure**” for explanation of Transmission Service Priorities]
  - 3.1. **Declaring Energy Emergency Alert.** The LOAD-SERVING ENTITY served by the CONTROL AREA or TRANSMISSION PROVIDER must request its RELIABILITY COORDINATOR to initiate an ENERGY EMERGENCY ALERT. [See **Appendix 9B5B**, “**Energy Emergency Alerts**”]
    - 3.1.1. **Posting EEA on Web.** This Alert must be posted on the NERC Web site, and include the expected total MW that may have its TRANSMISSION SERVICE priority **changed**.
    - 3.2. **Forecasting change in service priority.** EEA 1 will be used to *forecast* the change of the priority of TRANSMISSION SERVICE of an INTERCHANGE TRANSACTION on the system from Priority 6 to Priority 7.
    - 3.3. **Announcing change in service priority.** EEA 2 will be used to *announce* the change of the priority of TRANSMISSION SERVICE of an INTERCHANGE TRANSACTION on the system from Priority 6 to Priority 7.
4. **Emergency action.** If all other steps prove inadequate to relieve the capacity/energy emergency, the deficient control area shall take immediate action, which includes, but is not limited to, the following:
  - 4.1. Schedule all available emergency assistance from other Control Areas.
  - 4.2. Implement manual firm load shedding.
5. **Unilateral action.** The Control Area shall not unilaterally adjust generation in an attempt to return Interconnection frequency to normal beyond that supplied through frequency bias action and interchange schedule changes. Such unilateral adjustment may jeopardize overloaded transmission facilities.

## C. Transmission System Relief

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### **Introduction**

This policy:

1. Summarizes the authority, information and tools required by SYSTEM OPERATORS responsible for the reliability of the INTERCONNECTIONS.
2. Identifies the accountability for developing and implementing procedures to alleviate INTERCONNECTED RELIABILITY LIMIT violations.
3. Describes the requirement to develop procedures for the curtailment and restoration of transmission service.

### **Requirements**

1. **Relieving System Operating Limit violations.** Each CONTROL AREA experiencing or contributing to an INTERCONNECTED RELIABILITY LIMIT violation shall take immediate steps to relieve the condition which may include firm load shedding.
2. **Operator authority and responsibility.** SYSTEM OPERATORS having responsibility for the reliability of the transmission system within a CONTROL AREA, pool, etc. shall have and shall exercise specific authority to alleviate INTERCONNECTED RELIABILITY LIMIT violations. The authority shall enable the SYSTEM OPERATOR to take timely and appropriate actions including curtailing transmission service or energy schedules, operating equipment (e.g., generators, phase shifters, breakers), shedding firm load, etc.
3. **Action shall not reduce reliability.** Action to correct an SOL OR IRL violation shall not cause an SOL or IRL violation in neighboring and adjacent Operating Authority areas. ~~someplace else.~~ Furthermore, this action shall not damage interconnected generation or transmission equipment,
  - 3.1. **Disconnection of overloaded equipment.** [Put subject first “the OA” shall] The affected Operating Authority shall disconnect the affected facility ~~if the overload on a transmission facility or abnormal voltage/reactive condition persists and equipment is endangered, the affected Operating Authority may disconnect the affected facility.~~ Neighboring Operating Authorities and Reliability Coordinators impacted by the disconnection shall be notified prior to switching, if time permits, otherwise, immediately thereafter.
4. **System Operating Limit violation assessment.** The Control Area shall have sufficient information and analysis tools to determine the cause(s) of SYSTEM OPERATING LIMIT violations. This analyses shall be conducted in all operating timeframes. The system operator shall use the results of these analyses to immediately mitigate the SOL violation. [The Reliability Coordinator is responsible for assessing the system for IRL violations,]

This is necessary to protect equipment that could not be readily replaced, or would hinder system restoration if it were destroyed. However the Operating Authority must have an operating plan to ensure that taking the facility out of service does not cause an SOL or IRL violation elsewhere.

Comment: Coordinate this requirement with that imposed on the Reliability Coordinator in Policy 9 and Appendix 9D

## **D. Separation from the Interconnection (This guide is not needed.)**

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### **Introduction**

Because the facilities of each system may be vital to the secure operation of the INTERCONNECTION, systems and CONTROL AREAS shall make every effort to remain connected to the INTERCONNECTION. However, if a system or CONTROL AREA determines that it is endangered by remaining interconnected, it may take such action as it deems necessary to protect its system

If a portion of the interconnection becomes separated from the remainder of the INTERCONNECTION, abnormal frequency and voltage deviations may occur. To permit resynchronizing, relief measures shall be applied by those separated systems contributing to the frequency and voltage deviations.

The RCWG and ORS recommends deletion of this section of Policy 5 since it contains no requirements.

### **~~Guides (This guides seem to be addressing the promotion of keeping interconnected)~~**

~~**Load shedding to prevent separation.** The Operating Authority shall have an emergency load reduction plan for all identified IRLs. The plan shall include the details on how the Operating Authority will implement load reduction in sufficient amount and time to mitigate the IRL violation before system separation or collapse would occur. The load reduction plan must be capable of being implemented within 30 minutes.~~

~~**1. Generator shutdown.** If abnormal levels of frequency or voltage resulting from an area disturbance make it unsafe to operate the generators or their support equipment in parallel with the system, their separation or shutdown should be accomplished in a manner to minimize the time required to re-parallel and restore the system to normal.~~

~~**1.1. Separating generators with local load.** If feasible, generators should be separated with some local, isolated load still connected. Otherwise, generators should be separated carrying their own auxiliaries.~~

~~**2. AGC.** AGC should remain operative if practicable. (How is this going to help? Would want to be on frequency control, and not tie-line bias control.)~~

~~**3. Instructions for plant operators.** Plant operators should be supplied with instructions specifying the frequency and voltage below which it is undesirable to continue to operate generators connected to the system. (Something was developed for Y2K.)~~

~~**4. Generator protection at high and low frequency.** Protection systems should be considered for automatically separating the generators from the system at predetermined high and low frequencies.~~

## D. System Restoration

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[Policy 6D – Operations Planning–System Restoration]  
[System Restoration and Blackstart Procedures Reference Document]

### **Introduction**

After a system collapse, restoration shall begin when it can proceed in an orderly and secure manner. Systems and CONTROL AREAS shall coordinate their restoration actions. Restoration priority shall be given to the station supply of power plants and the transmission system. Even though the restoration is to be expeditious, system operators shall avoid premature action to prevent a re-collapse of the system.

Customer load shall be restored as generation and transmission equipment becomes available, recognizing that load and generation must remain in balance at normal frequency as the system is restored.

### **Requirements**

1. **Returning to normal operations.** Following a disturbance in which one or more system areas become isolated, steps shall begin immediately to return the system to normal:
  - 1.1. **Extent of isolated system.** The ~~system operator~~Operating Authority shall determine the extent and condition of the isolated area(s).
  - 1.2. **Frequency restoration.** The ~~system operator~~Operating Authority shall then take the necessary action to restore system frequency to normal, including adjusting generation, placing additional generators on line, or load shedding.
  - 1.3. **Interchange schedule review.** Interchange schedules between CONTROL AREAS or fragments of CONTROL AREAS within the separated area shall be immediately reviewed and appropriate adjustments made in order to gain maximum assistance in restoration. Attempts shall be made to maintain the adjusted schedules whether generation control is manual or automatic.
  - 1.4. **Resynchronizing.** When voltage, frequency and phase angle permit, the ~~system operator~~Operating Authority may resynchronize the isolated area(s) with the surrounding area(s), properly notifying adjacent systems, and considering the size of the area being reconnected and the capacity of the transmission lines effecting the reconnection. (Restoration plan should consider the number of synchronizing points across the system.) (Covered in policy 6)
  - 1.5. **Off-site supply for nuclear plants.** Restoration of off-site power to nuclear stations shall be given high priority.
  - 1.6. **Load Restoration.** Synchronizing one Control Area to another, may need to shed load during the re-synchronizing process in order to prevent burdening the other system.

[Review Policy 9 \(coordination with RC\) and the System Restoration document \(Role of RC in restoration\).](#)

## **Guides**

1. **Isolating loads to help restoration.** In order to systematically restore, loads without overloading the remaining system, opening circuit breakers should be considered to isolate loads in blacked-out areas.
2. **Restoration.** Load shed during a disturbance should be restored utilizing approved Restoration Procedures that will maintain the integrity of the control area and Interconnection.
  - 2.1. **Manual restoration.** Load may be restored manually or by supervisory control only by direct action or order of the ~~system operator~~ Operating Authority as generating and transmission capacity become available.
  - 2.2. **Automatic restoration.** Automatic load restoration may be used where feasible to minimize restoration time.
    - 2.2.1. **Coordination.** Load restoration should be coordinated with neighboring systems, coordinated areas, and Regions.
    - 2.2.2. **Must not burden others.** Load restoration should not aggravate system frequency excursions, overload tie lines, or burden any system in the Interconnection.
3. **Oil-filled cables.** Reenergizing oil-filled pipe-type cables should be given special consideration, especially if loss of oil pumps could cause gas pockets to form in pipes or potheads.
4. **Maintaining transmission voltage.** The following should be considered when trying to maintain normal transmission voltage during restoration:
  - 4.1. **Preventing excessive voltage.** Removal of shunt capacitors or addition of reactors or addition of small blocks of isolated load to prevent excessive voltage when energizing long transmission lines.
  - 4.2. **Energizing cables.** Effects of energizing high-voltage cables at the end of a long, lightly loaded system.
  - 4.3. **Reactive considerations.** The capability of the generators to provide or absorb reactive power flows.

## F. Disturbance Reporting

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### [Appendix 5F – Reporting Requirements for Major Electric System Emergencies]

#### **Introduction**

Disturbances or unusual occurrences that jeopardize the operation of the interconnected systems, and result, or could result, in system equipment damage, or customer interruptions, must be studied in sufficient depth to increase industry knowledge of electrical interconnection mechanics to minimize the likelihood of similar events in the future. It is important that the facts surrounding a disturbance shall be made available to RELIABILITY COORDINATORS, system and CONTROL AREA operators, system managers, Regional Councils, NERC, and regulatory agencies entitled to the information.

#### **Requirements**

1. **Regional Council Reporting Procedures.** Each Regional Council shall establish and maintain a Regional reporting procedure to facilitate preparation of preliminary and final disturbance reports.
2. **Analyzing disturbances.** Bulk system disturbances shall be promptly analyzed by the affected systems.
3. **Disturbance reports.** Based on the NERC and DOE disturbance reporting requirements, those systems responsible for investigating the incident shall provide a preliminary written report to their Regional Council and NERC.
  - 3.1. **Preliminary written reports.** Either a copy of the report submitted to DOE, or, if no DOE report is required, a copy of the NERC Interconnected Reliability Limit and Preliminary Disturbance Report form shall be submitted by the affected system(s) within 24 hours of the disturbance or unusual occurrence. Certain events (e.g. near misses) may not be identified until some time after they occur. Events such as these should be reported within 24 hours of being recognized.
  - 3.2. **Preliminary reporting during adverse conditions.** Under certain adverse conditions, e.g. severe weather, it may not be possible to assess the damage caused by a disturbance and issue a written Interconnected Reliability Limit and Preliminary Disturbance Report within 24 hours. In such cases, the affected entity(ies) shall notify its Regional Council(s) and NERC promptly and verbally provide as much information as is available at that time. The affected utility(ies) shall then provide timely, periodic verbal updates until adequate information is available to issue a written Preliminary Disturbance Report.
  - 3.3. **Final written reports.** If in the judgment of the Regional Council, after consultation with the electric system(s) in which a disturbance occurred, a final report is required, the affected electric system(s) shall prepare this report within 60 days. As a minimum, the final report shall have a discussion of the events and its cause, the conclusions reached, and recommendations to prevent recurrence of this type of event. The report shall be subject to Regional Council approval.
4. **Notifying NERC.** The NERC Disturbance Reporting Requirements, shown in **Appendix 5F, Sections A and B**, are the minimum requirements for reporting disturbances, unusual occurrences, and voltage excursions to NERC.
5. **Notifying DOE.** The U.S. Department of Energy's most recent Emergency Incident and Disturbance Reporting Requirements, outlined in **Appendix 5F, Section C**, are the minimum

requirements for U.S. utilities and other entities subject to Section 13(b) of the Federal Energy Administration Act of 1974. Copies of these reports shall be submitted to NERC at the same time they are submitted to DOE.

6. **Assistance from NERC Operating Committee (OC) and the Disturbance Analysis Working Group (DAWG).** When a bulk system disturbance occurs, the Regional Council's OC and DAWG representatives shall make themselves available to the system or systems immediately affected to provide any needed assistance in the investigation and to assist in the preparation of a final report.
7. **Final report recommendations.** The Regional Council shall track and review the status of all final report recommendations at least twice each year to ensure they are being acted upon in a timely manner. If any recommendation has not been acted on within two years, or if Regional Council tracking and review indicates at any time that any recommendation is not being acted on with sufficient diligence, the Regional Council shall notify the NERC Planning Committee and Operating Committee of the status of the recommendation(s) and the steps the Regional Council has taken to accelerate implementation.